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The Perception of Emotional Coldness in Andrei Turgenev’s Diaries
Andrei Zorin
In this article, Andrei Zorin discusses the generational shift in the tech-
niques of self-analysis that occurred in Russia at the turn from the eigh-
teenth to the nineteenth centuries as revealed in the diaries of Andrei 
Turgenev, a document that has attracted the attention of many scholars 
but still remains largely unpublished. Young Turgenev was inﬂ uenced 
both by his upbringing in the circles of Moscow Freemasons and by the lit-
erature of German Sturm und Drang and especially by the early tragedies 
by Friedrich Schiller. In his self-reﬂ ections, his dramatic love story, and 
his attempts to translate Alexander Pope’s Eloisa to Abelard into Russian, 
Turgenev demonstrated his quest to resemble his favorite literary char-
acters and the despair caused by his failure to meet these self-imposed 
standards. Both his quest and his personality as revealed in the diaries can 
serve as a symbol of the new emotional culture that emerged in Russia and 
became prevalent there throughout the Romantic age.
Fear: Soldiers and Emotion in Early Twentieth-Century Russian 
Military Psychology
Jan Plamper
This article provides an analysis of the locus of fear in military psychol-
ogy in late imperial Russia. After the Russo-Japanese War and the 1905 
Revolution, the debate coalesced around two poles: “realists” (such as 
the military psychiatrist Grigorii Shumkov) argued that fear was natural, 
while “romantics” upheld the image of constitutionally fearless soldiers. 
Jan Plamper begins by identifying the advent of modern warfare (fore-
shadowed by the Crimean War) and its engendering of more and different 
fears as a key cause for a dramatic increase in fear-talk among Russia’s sol-
diers. He links these fears to literature, which offered—most prominently 
in Lev Tolstoi’s Sevastopol Sketches (1855)—some of the vocabulary soldiers 
could use to express their fears. Mikhail Dragomirov’s fear-centered mili-
tary theory during the Great Reforms was the next milestone. Plamper 
closes by sketching the history of fear after World War I, from Iosif Stalin’s 
penal battalions to the rehabilitation of military psychology under Nikita 
Khrushchev and beyond.
Poetics of Disgust: To Eat and Die in Andrei Belyi’s Petersburg
Olga Matich
The article examines the aversive emotion of disgust and its deployment 
in the visual arts and in the premier Russian modernist novel, Andrei 
Belyi’s Petersburg, which has not been considered in regard to its affective 
poetics before. Based on recent studies of the emotions in cultural history 
and theory, it explores the philosophical, psychological, and aesthetic 





aspects of disgust as a response to something viscerally and/or morally 
repugnant. The emotion, induced by the experience seen or imagined 
close up, provokes the observer’s recoil as deﬁ ned by cultural norms. As 
such, disgust is performative in spatial terms. Olga Matich argues that 
movement away from the loathsome image or idea affords the possibil-
ity of making the experience cognitively readable or legible, that disgust 
creates a space in which the individual negotiates her emotional as well as 
moral response. Yet she claims that aesthetically—and in certain instances 
ethically—disgust, which is always about the boundaries of the permis-
sible, is also liberating: it offers society, its artists, and their consumers 
the opportunity to transgress established norms. Through extensive close 
readings of Petersburg, Matich shows that Belyi’s experimental novel does 
precisely that, challenging the reader not to avert her readerly gaze from 
that which is unsettling and to appreciate, even to delight in, his shocking 
metamorphic image-making. She calls Petersburg a modernist exemplar of 
baroque aesthetics, characterized by excessive affect and grotesque rep-
resentation, especially of the corpse, invoking the transience of life and 
dissolution of form.
“With a Shade of Disgust”: Affective Politics of Sexuality and Class 
in Memoirs of the Stalinist Gulag
Adi Kuntsman
This article addresses a topic seldom discussed in gulag studies: same-sex 
relations in the camps. In particular, it deals with affective politics of sexu-
ality and class in gulag memoirs and the role of disgust in the formation 
of sexual and class boundaries. It approaches disgust as existing between 
the individual and the social, the subjective and the historical, the internal 
and the external, and traces the ways the gulag memoirs constitute the 
disgusting, the disgusted, and the boundary between them. At the center 
of the article are descriptions of same-sex relations in the Kolyma camps 
of the 1930s–1950s by Evgenia Ginzburg and Varlam Shalamov. Based 
on a critical reading of these and other memoirs, Adi Kuntsman reveals 
how same-sex relations among the common criminals are constructed by 
the memoirists as disgusting because they go against gender norms and 
against class perceptions of sexual morality. Kuntsman shows how these 
perceptions of the appropriate, embedded within the habitus of the intel-
ligentsia, are transformed in the memoirs into the universal category of 
humanness, locating the common criminals, and, by association, anyone 
who engages in same-sex relations, beyond the bounds of humanity.
Between Ideology and Desire: Rhetoric of the Self in the Works 
of Nikolai Chernyshevskii and Nikolai Dobroliubov
Konstantine Klioutchkine
Departing from the familiar scholarly focus on the ideological content 
of works by intelligentsia forerunners, this article examines the record of 
everyday life in their private and public writing. Konstantine Klioutch-





kine argues that their obsessive focus on ordinary experience indicated 
that articulating mundane desires was as important to the two writers as 
expressing progressive views. As professional journalists, Nikolai Cher-
nyshevskii and Nikolai Dobroliubov organized their experience primarily 
by way of writing. Accordingly, the article explores rhetorical procedures 
accommodating both ideology and desire in their inﬂ uential account of 
themselves as prototypical new men.
The Covert Design of The Brothers Karamazov: Alesha’s Pathology 
and Dialectic
James L. Rice
A future revolutionary, Alesha Karamazov is, at nineteen, an inexperi-
enced boy who lives in a monastery and who has been considered strange 
since birth. Fedor Dostoevskii endows him with hysteria—then a serious 
psychopathology with convulsions that were clinically seen as analogous 
to epilepsy, the morbus sacer from which Dostoevskii himself suffered. Rec-
ognized as an epidemic problem, hysteria in this novel is elaborately de-
ployed as a symbol of Russia’s social ills and the underlying cause of far-
reaching personality changes in Alesha (for better or worse), preparing 
him for a heroic destiny. Although hysteria was soon altered and later 
eliminated as a clinical syndrome, James L. Rice enables us to read the 
novel for the ﬁ rst time in the light of documented medical history.
Pollution and Puriﬁ cation in the Moscow Human Rights Networks of the 
1960s and 1970s
Barbara Walker
In this article Barbara Walker examines the theme of (samo)zhertvovanie in 
the Moscow human rights movement of the 1960s and 1970s. Some par-
ticipants in that movement have expressed emotional satisfaction in the 
belief that they were motivated by the desire for self-giving; but that belief 
has sometimes been received with doubt. Walker uncovers the social phe-
nomenon of a charity movement for the beneﬁ t of political prisoners that, 
she argues, lies near the social and emotional heart of the human rights 
movement. An important theme of the charity movement, whether real 
or constructed, is emotional puriﬁ cation of a sense of personal and social 
contamination stemming from participation in what some experienced as 
corruption in Soviet state and society. This article draws on ideas of spir-
itual atonement and salvation through altruism as explanatory cultural 
factors in this phenomenon.
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______________________________________ LETTER FROM THE EDITOR
The Slavic Review Web site advises authors that “Slavic Review is a peer-
reviewed journal featuring new scholarship, in any discipline, concern-
ing eastern and east central Europe, Russia, the Caucasus, and Central 
Asia, past and present. We seek original and signiﬁ cant new research that 
also explores conceptual and analytical themes with potential resonance 
across ﬁ elds and disciplines.” This terse second sentence implies a body 
of purposes, values, and experiences that shape this journal’s personal-
ity. We receive, of course, a great many more manuscripts than we can 
ultimately accept for publication. As editor, I must make difﬁ cult choices, 
with the help of external peer reviewers and the editorial board, even 
among publishable articles. To put in a few words the complex mix of con-
siderations that shape decisions, we seek research that makes an original 
and important contribution to scholarly interpretation with ﬁ elds, try to 
ensure fair balance across disciplines and geographic regions, and, prefer 
studies that explore signiﬁ cant concepts, categories, and theories and that 
can speak to scholars in different ﬁ elds and disciplines. When these have 
the promise of interesting scholars outside the Russian and east European 
ﬁ eld, all the better.
Although every article is expected to do this work well on its own, or-
ganized clusters of articles around speciﬁ c topics and themes, sometimes 
accompanied by invited commentary (including by scholars outside Slavic 
studies), have particular potential to realize this desired intellectual syn-
ergy and reach. The cluster on emotions featured in this issue, joined by 
individual articles that also engage questions of emotion and self, demon-
strate this, I hope. Although these articles all concern Russia (to be sure, 
from the end of the eighteenth century to the late twentieth century and 
from the perspectives of three disciplines), at stake are conceptual and 
analytical issues at the heart of a great deal of humanistic and social sci-
ence research, including how the study of emotions illuminates questions 
of class, gender, sexuality, power, morality, science, literature, religion, 
and ideology—social and cultural structures and practices that are both 
powerfully normative and continually contested and transgressed. Though 
prisms of sensibility, feeling, passions, and emotions and discourses about 
these, the articles in this issue also explore such large (and elusive) ter-
rains as the self, the spaces of public and private, notions of thought and 
perception, the body, death, and modernity. Not least, by focusing on 
emotion, these articles ponder a methodological challenge facing most of 
us: how to “read” texts and language for “meaning” and to understand the 
interplay of cultural signiﬁ cations with society, politics, and history.
As always, I welcome comments and suggestions on the work of the 
journal.
M.D.S.
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 EMOTIONAL TURN? FEELINGS 
_______________________ IN RUSSIAN HISTORY AND CULTURE
Introduction
Jan Plamper
Recent scholarship in the humanities and social sciences is awash with 
emotions. Affective social science, the cognitive poetics of emotion, the 
philosophy of emotions, the history of emotions, and the outer markers of 
institutionalization and professionalization—conferences, research clus-
ters, dissertations, publications—together create a solid impression: this 
is a “turn,” if there ever was one.1
It appears that this turn has reached Slavic studies.2 That it has taken 
so long may seem surprising. After all, in the western European imagina-
tion, “the east,” and Russia as a part thereof, has long been linked with 
emotion—so unmediated and untrammeled that an indication of quan-
tity sufﬁ ced as a description: too much emotion, extreme emotion, rather 
Thanks to Michael David-Fox, Catriona Kelly, Barbara Rosenwein, Mark D. Steinberg, and 
Ilya Vinkovetsky for very helpful comments.
1. On emotions and the social sciences, see Patricia Ticineto Clough with Jean Halley, 
The Affective Turn: Theorizing the Social (Durham, 2007); on cognitive poetics and emotions, 
see Keith Oatley, Best Laid Schemes: The Psychology of Emotions (Cambridge, Eng., 1992) or 
Reuven Tsur, Toward a Theory of Cognitive Poetics, 2d ed. (1992; Brighton, 2008); on the 
philosophy of emotions, see Martha C. Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of 
Emotions (Cambridge, Eng., 2001). For signs of the professionalization of one ﬁ eld, the 
history of emotions, consider in the United States, the Institute for the Study of Emotion 
at Florida State University (with William Reddy, Peter Stearns, and others as inaugural 
lecturers in 2002) and a monograph series (“The History of Emotions Series” at New York 
University Press edited by Peter Stearns and Jan Lewis); in Germany, an Excellence Cluster 
on “Languages of Emotion” at the Free University (Berlin), directed by Winfried Men-
ninghaus, as well as a Center for the History of Emotions at the Max Planck Institute for 
Human Development (Berlin), headed by Ute Frevert; and, in Switzerland at Collegium 
Helveticum (Zurich), a section on “Die Rolle der Emotion: Ihr Anteil bei menschlichem 
Handeln und bei der Setzung sozialer Normen.” A milestone in the professionalization of 
the history of emotions was a 1998 conference “The Historicity of Emotions,” which grew 
out of a half-year seminar at the Institute for Advanced Studies at Hebrew University, Je-
rusalem. The conference was convened by Michael Heyd and Yosef Kaplan and attended 
by such historians as Natalie Zemon Davis and Anthony Grafton (e-mail communication 
from Michal Altbauer-Rudnik, 10 June 2007).
2. Take only conferences, such as Sheila Fitzpatrick’s workshop “History of Emotions 
in Russia” at the University of Chicago (2003); a roundtable “Thinking about Feelings: 
Emotions in Russian/Soviet History and Culture” at the annual meeting of the American 
Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies (2004); the conference “Emotsii v russ-
koi istorii i kulture” organized by Marc Elie, Schamma Schahadat, and myself in Moscow 
(2008); the conference “Interpreting Emotion in Eastern Europe, Russia, and Eurasia” 
convened by Mark D. Steinberg and Valeria Sobol at the University of Illinois, Urbana-
Champaign (2008).






than a different kind of emotion. Whence the current emotional turn? 
Let me brieﬂ y map some of the roads that led to it.
If there is a single overarching distinction that has structured all 
humanities and social science emotions research, it would have to be a 
variant of the nature versus nurture binary, namely universalism versus 
social constructionism.3 Historical writings on emotions can certainly be 
grouped around these two poles. Medievalist Johan Huizinga in 1919, 
ﬁ rst-generation Annaliste Lucien Febvre in 1941, third-generation An-
naliste Jean Delumeau in 1978, and psychohistorians (Peter Gay, Lloyd 
deMause, Peter Loewenberg) during the 1970s all operated with histori-
cally invariable emotions concepts, either in a straightforward anachro-
nistic (past emotions are the same as in my own time and culture) or in a 
psychoanalytical-anachronistic key (culturally speciﬁ c Freudian concepts 
work everywhere and always).4 Emotions, according to the universalists, 
deserved a place in history, but they did not have a history; they moved 
through time and space more or less unchanged. By contrast, historical 
sociologist Norbert Elias in 1939, historian of France Theodore Zeldin 
in 1973, social historian Peter Stearns in 1985, and medievalist Barbara 
Rosenwein in the late 1990s and early 2000s imagined emotions in a more 
relativist way as being culturally variable, while allowing room for some 
universal aspects.5 William M. Reddy’s trail-blazing The Navigation of Feel-
3. Among those who have noted—and bemoaned—the dominance of this binary 
is Alexander Laban Hinton: “Unfortunately, debates over the emotions frequently lapse 
into nature/nurture dichotomies.” Alexander Laban Hinton, “Introduction: Developing 
a Biocultural Approach to the Emotions,” in Alexander Laban Hinton, ed., Biocultural Ap-
proaches to the Emotions (Cambridge, Eng., 1999), 1.
4. See Johan Huizinga, The Waning of the Middle Ages: A Study of the Forms of Life, 
Thought, and Art in France and the Netherlands in the Dawn of the Renaissance, trans. Fritz Hop-
man (Haarlem, 1919; London, 1924); Lucien Febvre, “La sensibilité et l’histoire: Com-
ment reconstituer la vie affective d’autrefois?” Annales d’histoire sociale 3 ( January–June 
1941): 5–20 (for an English version, see Febvre, “Sensibility and History: How to Recon-
stitute the Emotional Life of the Past,” in Peter Burke, ed., A New Kind of History: From the 
Writings of Febvre [New York, 1973], 12–26; on the context from which Febvre’s article 
arose, see John Corrigan, ed., Religion and Emotion: Approaches and Interpretations [Oxford, 
2004], 28–29n20); Jean Delumeau, La Peur en Occident (XIVe–XVIIIe siècles): Une cité as-
siégée (Paris, 1978); Lloyd deMause, ed., The History of Childhood (New York, 1974); Peter 
Gay, The Bourgeois Experience: Victoria to Freud, 5 vols. (New York, 1984 –1998); and Peter 
Loewenberg, “Emotion und Subjektivität: Desiderata der gegenwärtigen Geschichtswis-
senschaft aus psychoanalytischer Perspektive,” in Paul Nolte, Manfred Hettling, Frank-
Michael Kuhlemann, and Hans-Walter Schmuhl, eds., Perspektiven der Gesellschaftsgeschichte 
(Munich, 2000), 58–78. For overview articles in English, see Adela Pinch, “Emotion and 
History: A Review Article,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 37, no. 1 ( January 
1995): 100–109; Barbara H. Rosenwein, “Worrying about Emotions in History,” American 
Historical Review 107, no. 3 ( June 2002): 821– 45; Joanna Bourke, “Fear and Anxiety: Writ-
ing about Emotion in Modern History,” History Workshop Journal 55, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 
111–33; Peter N. Stearns, “History of Emotions: Issues of Change and Impact,” in Michael 
Lewis, Jeannette M. Haviland-Jones, and Lisa Feldman Barrett, eds., Handbook of Emotions, 
3d ed. (New York, 2008), 17–31. No one to my knowledge has systematically scoured pre-
twentieth-century historiography for writings on emotions.
5. See Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process, trans. Edmund Jephcott (Basel, 1939; New 
York, 1978); Theodore Zeldin, France, 1848–1945 (Oxford, 1973 –1977), Zeldin, “Personal 
History and the History of Emotions,” Journal of Social History 15, no. 3 (Spring 1982): 
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ing can be seen as a new synthesis of the social constructionism associated 
with cultural anthropology, which since the 1970s has been uncovering an 
ever greater variety of emotion expression, and the universalism of cog-
nitive psychology, which is experiment-based, works with living subjects, 
and operates with such natural science veriﬁ cation procedures as Karl 
Popper’s principle of falsiﬁ ability.6
Among Soviet historians and western Russianists it took longer for 
social constructionist positions to gain ground. In the Methodology Sec-
tor at the Institute for General History (Academy of Sciences) in Nikita 
Khrushchev’s time, Mikhail Gefter, Boris Porshnev, and others pioneered 
the Soviet study of the (social) psychology of individuals and groups in 
history. Gefter and his colleagues took the lead from the prerevolutionary 
St. Petersburg school of philologically oriented history, from Soviet psy-
chologists like Aleksandr Luriia and Lev Vygotskii, from Mikhail Bakhtin, 
from the mentalités concept of the French Annales school (mediated 
through Polish Annalistes like Bronisław Geremek), and from the Moscow-
Tartu school of semiotics.7 These were fragile ﬁ rst steps and historians 
labored hard to package their research in ideologically compatible lan-
guage, pointing to the centrality of the category of emotion in Vasilii Kli-
uchevskii and especially Vladimir Lenin.8 The sector was closed down in 
1969 and Porshnev died in 1972, but historians like Aron Gurevich and 
Iurii Bessmertnyi continued the tradition, ﬁ rst underground and later, 
since perestroika, openly, resulting in such publications as the volume 
Chelovek v mire chuvstv (Man in the world of feelings).9 Also during per-
339– 47, and Zeldin, An Intimate History of Humanity (New York, 1994) (I am grateful to Ste-
phen Kotkin for ﬁ rst alerting me to Zeldin’s work); Peter N. Stearns with Carol Z. Stearns, 
“Emotionology: Clarifying the History of Emotions and Emotional Standards,” American 
Historical Review 90, no. 4 (October 1985): 813 –36, as well as Carol Zisowitz Stearns and 
Peter N. Stearns, Anger: The Struggle for Emotional Control in America’s History (Chicago, 
1986), Peter N. Stearns, American Cool: Constructing a Twentieth-Century Emotional Style (New 
York, 1994), and Peter N. Stearns and Jan Lewis, eds., An Emotional History of the United 
States (New York, 1998); Barbara H. Rosenwein, ed., Anger’s Past: The Social Uses of an Emo-
tion in the Middle Ages (Ithaca, 1998); and Rosenwein, Emotional Communities in the Early 
Middle Ages (Ithaca, 2006).
6. Consider the arrangement of Reddy’s chapters: ﬁ rst there is the universalist the-
sis (Chapter 1, “Answers from Cognitive Psychology”), then the constructionist antithesis 
(Chapter 2, “Answers from Anthropology”), which is then aufgehoben in a synthesis, the 
history of emotions (Chapters 3 – 4, “Emotional Expression as a Type of Speech Act” and 
“Emotional Liberty”). See William H. Reddy, The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the 
History of Emotions (Cambridge, Eng., 2001). In the late 1990s Reddy was one of the ﬁ rst hu-
manities scholars to launch a life science–inspired attack against social constructionism. 
See William M. Reddy, “Against Constructionism: The Historical Ethnography of Emo-
tions,” Current Anthropology 38, no. 3 ( June 1997): 327–51.
7. See Roger D. Markwick, “Cultural History under Khrushchev and Brezhnev: From 
Social Psychology to Mentalités,” Russian Review 65, no. 2 (April 2006): 283 –301.
8. In their emphasis on the prevalence of emotion talk in Vladimir Lenin they 
foreshadowed Anna Krylova, “Beyond the Spontaneity-Consciousness Paradigm: ‘Class 
Instinct’ as a Promising Category of Historical Analysis,” Slavic Review 62, no. 1 (Spring 
2003): 1–23.
9. Western social history of private life, including the family and sexuality, left a strong 
mark on this volume. See, e.g., Natalia Pushkareva, “Mir chuvstv russkoi dvorianki kontsa 






estroika, ethnographically informed historiography became immensely 
popular. Lev Gumilev and his “passionarity” (passionarnost) and “passion-
ate peoples” (passionarnye narody) belong in this rubric. Emotion here is 
eminently cultural, in fact so much so that the cultural gets ethnicized 
and biologized.10
It was only when a handful of western (cultural) historians of Russia 
began to absorb the ﬁ ndings of Stearns, Rosenwein, and especially Reddy, 
that emotion as a socially constructed concept entered Russian history. 
Mark D. Steinberg was one of the ﬁ rst, as he excavated an emotionally 
charged “vocabulary of spiritual afﬂ iction” in early twentieth-century 
worker poetry and stated “the still obvious fact that human experience 
and action are composed of emotions as well as rational perception, of 
moral sensibilities as well as ethical conviction.” 11 Catriona Kelly, in her 
studies on advice literature, problematized—for Russia—Elias’s linear 
process of increasing emotional control.12 Sheila Fitzpatrick traced some 
of the speciﬁ cally Stalinist notions of happiness (schaste) and yearning 
sadness (toska).13 Árpád von Klimó and Malte Rolf found that Nazi ecstasy 
(Rausch) differs from Stalinist enthusiasm (entuziazm) in its objectlessness: 
Rausch aims at transgressing all boundaries while entuziazm is always ori-
ented toward some goal deemed worthwhile.14 Ronald Grigor Suny ex-
plored the emotional coloring of Soviet and post-Soviet ethnic politics.15 
XVIII–nachala XIV veka: Seksualnaia sfera,” in Iu. L. Bessmertnyi, ed., Chelovek v mire 
chuvstv: Ocherki po istorii chastnoi zhizni v Evrope i nekotorykh stranakh Azii do nachala novogo 
vremeni (Moscow, 2000), 85–119. On the family history roots of 1980s emotions history 
more generally, see Stearns, “History of Emotions: Issues of Change and Impact,” 17–31. 
For works on Muscovite and eighteenth-century honor inspired by western medieval and 
early modern European studies, see Nancy Shields Kollmann, By Honor Bound: State and 
Society in Early Modern Russia (Ithaca, 1999), and Angela Rustemeyer, Dissens und Ehre: 
Majestätsverbrechen in Russland (1600 –1800) (Wiesbaden, 2006).
10. See L. N. Gumilev, Etnogenez i biosfera zemli (Leningrad, 1989). This—and the 
larger tradition of Russian/Soviet anthropology of emotions—is something Catriona Kelly 
thankfully alerted me to. Consider most recently A. K. Baiburin, “Toska i strakh v kontekste 
pokhoronnoi obriadnosti (k ritualno-mifologicheskomu podtekstu odnogo siuzheta),” in 
A. K. Baiburin, ed., Trudy fakulteta etnologii Evropeiskogo universiteta v Sankt-Peterburge, no. 1 
(St. Petersburg, 2001): 96 –115.
11. Mark D. Steinberg, Proletarian Imagination: Self, Modernity, and the Sacred in Russia, 
1910 –1925 (Ithaca, 2002), 232, 15.
12. Catriona Kelly, Reﬁ ning Russia: Advice Literature, Polite Culture, and Gender from 
Catherine to Yeltsin (Oxford, 2001); Kelly, “Regulating Emotion: Gender and Sensibility in 
Russian Conduct Literature, 1760–1820” (unpublished typescript, Workshop “History of 
Emotions in Russia,” University of Chicago, 24 November 2003).
13. Sheila Fitzpatrick, “Happiness and Toska: An Essay in the History of Emotions in 
Pre-War Soviet Russia,” Australian Journal of Politics and History 50, no. 3 (September 2004): 
357–71.
14. Árpád von Klimó and Malte Rolf, “Rausch und Diktatur,” Zeitschrift für Geschichts-
wissenschaft, no. 10 (2003): 877–95. Also see Árpád von Klimó and Malte Rolf, “Rausch 
und Diktatur: Emotionen, Erfahrungen und Inszenierungen totalitärer Herrschaft,” in 
Árpád von Klimó and Malte Rolf, eds., Rausch und Diktatur: Inszenierung, Mobilisierung und 
Kontrolle in totalitären Systemen (Frankfurt am Main, 2006), 11– 43.
15. Ronald Grigor Suny, “Why We Hate You: The Passions of National Identity and 
Ethnic Violence” (paper delivered at Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies, 
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Glennys Young gave the 1962 Novocherkassk riots an emotions-centered 
reading that joins political science literature on “contentious politics” with 
the history of emotions.16 And Alexander Martin, following Alain Corbin’s 
lead, hinted at the emotional dimensions of the olfactory experience of 
Moscow in the late eighteenth to late nineteenth centuries.17
More obviously than in the case of history, feelings have long been 
a staple of scholarship on Russian culture.18 For more than a century, 
literary scholars and others have been reconstructing the rich heritage 
of emotion talk in Russian poetry, prose, theater, cinema—from Nikolai 
Karamzin’s Poor Lisa to Lidiia Ginzburg’s On Psychological Prose, from the 
novels of psychological realism to the Stanislavsky method, from symbolist 
love to Sergei Eizenshtein’s ﬁ lms.19 Or they have been exploring emotion’s 
active suppression and absence—from ideinost in nineteenth-century 
literary criticism to socialist realism, from the suspicion of emotions in 
modernism (Russian and general) to formalist cricitism (Boris Eikhen-
baum on Mikhail Lermontov).20 However, emotion as an analytical—
and variable—unit has only recently come into play. Emotion was, as 
it were, hidden in plain view. In the new emotion research on Russian 
culture, the binary of universalism versus social constructionism has also 
held. Cultural studies and students of rhetoric have tended toward more 
social constructionist positions.21 Psychoanalytically inspired scholarship 
1 February 2004), at http://repositories.cdlib.org/iseees/bps/2004_01-sunyr (last ac-
cessed 26 February 2009).
16. Glennys Young, “Emotions, Contentious Politics, and Empire: Some Thoughts 
about the Soviet Case,” Ab Imperio, no. 2 (2007): 113 –50.
17. Alexander M. Martin, “Sewage and the City: Filth, Smell, and Representations of 
Urban Life in Moscow, 1770–1880,” Russian Review 67, no. 2 (April 2008): 243 –74; Alain 
Corbin, The Foul and the Fragrant: Odor and the French Social Imagination (Cambridge, Mass., 
1986). Also see Vladimir V. Lapin, Peterburg: Zapakhi i zvuki (St. Petersburg, 2007). More 
generally, see the thematic issue on the history of the senses, Journal of Social History 40, 
no. 4 (Summer 2007).
18. For the following survey I am much indebted to Schamma Schahadat, “Psikholo-
gizm, liubov, otvrashchenie, razum: Emotsii s tochki zreniia literaturovedeniia i ﬁ losoﬁ i,” 
in Jan Plamper, Marc Elie, and Schamma Schahadat, eds., Rossiiskaia imperiia chuvstv: Pod-
khody k kulturnoi istorii emotsii (Moscow, 2009).
19. See Olga Matich, “The Symbolist Meaning of Love: Theory and Practice,” in Irina 
Paperno and Joan Delaney Grossman, eds., Creating Life: The Aesthetic Utopia of Russian 
Modernism (Stanford, 1994), 24 –50. For a juxtaposition of Russian sentimentalist khandra 
with Czech veselost, see Gudrun Langer, “Russkaja Chandra-C˘eská veselost: Melancholie 
und nationale Identitätsmuster in der russischen und tschechischen Literatur der ersten 
Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts,” Germanoslavica 7 (2000): 147–75, 237– 49. On Stanislavsky 
and emotions, see Peta Tait, Performing Emotions: Gender, Bodies, Spaces, in Chekhov’s Drama 
and Stanislavski’s Theatre (Burlington, Vt., 2002).
20. Boris Mikhailovich Eikhenbaum, Lermontov: Opyt istoriko-literaturnoi otsenki (Len-
ingrad, 1924). Also see Eikhenbaum, “Razmyshleniia ob iskusstve. 1. Iskusstvo i emotsiia,” 
Zhizn iskusstva, no. 11 (11 March 1924): 8–9. This is a point I owe to Catriona Kelly.
21. On emotions and gender, see Barbara Heldt, Terrible Perfection: Women and Russian 
Literature (Bloomington, 1987); Svetlana Boym, “Loving in Bad Taste: Eroticism and Liter-
ary Excess in Marina Tsvetaeva’s ‘The Tale of Sonechka,’ ” in Jane T. Costlow, Stephanie 
Sandler, Judith Vowles, eds., Sexuality and the Body in Russian Culture (Stanford, 1993), 
156 –76. I owe these references to Catriona Kelly as well.






has operated with more universalist concepts. The impact of universalist 
life science has so far been marginal in the Russian literary ﬁ eld; while 
many of their colleagues in English departments are “going neuro” and 
studying brain scans of readers, Russianists have generally been more hes-
itant. Perhaps the Bazarovs and Rakhmetovs, the nihilists and materialists, 
Ludwig Büchner’s Kraft und Stoff during Fedor Dostoevskii’s time, and the 
Soviet scientiﬁ c experiments of the 1920s have resulted in a greater skep-
ticism about “bio-revolutions.”
Historically informed skepticism toward the life sciences is something 
Russianists could contribute to the wider ﬁ eld of humanities emotions 
research. Yet there are more general grounds for such skepticism.22 First, 
humanities scholars rarely access the primary life science research on 
emotions, and if they do, they are hardly in a position to judge its quality. 
For the most part they rely on such life science popularizers as Antonio 
Damasio and Joseph LeDoux as “translators,” yet all of these translators 
are players in the life science ﬁ eld with distinct interests and idiosyncra-
sies.23 Second, on many questions life science research is just getting off 
the ground; it would be fatal to step— once again, after eugenics and 
Aleksei Zamkov’s rejuvenation experiments in the Stalinist elite—into this 
pseudoscience trap.24 Third, even if certain universal life science ﬁ ndings 
on emotions do hold, they are, as Daniel Gross has written, only “trivially 
true,” for the gist of humanities research is variation across culture and 
time.25 The historian of fear, for instance, is not so much interested in the 
universally true brain chemical reaction to a source of threat but rather in 
the fact that fear of being buried alive was rampant among Britons in the 
late nineteenth century, as evidenced in the engineering of cofﬁ ns with 
breathing tubes and bells and wills that stipulated the cutting of throats 
after death, and that this fear object vanished around 1914.26
Just as the overarching binary of universalism versus social construc-
tionism is only one possible way to group what has been done so far, so the 
list of roads leading up to the emotional turn is far from exhaustive. One 
could also have retraced the impact of Pavlovian psychology (and that 
of Vygotskii and Luriia) on the development of western neuroscience;27 
22. For a critique of an attempt to validate Norbert Elias’s civilizing process with a 
peculiar brand of evolutionary psychology, see Barbara H. Rosenwein, “The Uses of Biol-
ogy: A Response to J. Carter Wood’s ‘The Limits of Culture?’ ” Cultural and Social History 4, 
no. 4 (December 2007): 553 –58.
23. See, e.g., Antonio R. Damasio, Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human 
Brain (New York, 1994); Joseph E. LeDoux, The Emotional Brain: The Mysterious Underpin-
nings of Emotional Life (New York, 1998).
24. On Zamkov, see Eric Naiman, “On Soviet Subjects and the Scholars Who Make 
Them,” Russian Review 60, no. 3 ( July 2001): 308–9.
25. Daniel M. Gross, The Secret History of Emotion: From Aristotle’s Rhetoric to Modern 
Brain Science (Chicago, 2006), 34.
26. Joanna Bourke, Fear: A Cultural History (London, 2005), 34 – 43.
27. For Ivan Pavlov’s impact, see, for example, Eric R. Kandel, “From Metapsychology 
to Molecular Biology: Explorations into the Nature of Anxiety,”American Journal of Psychia-
try 140, no. 10 (October 1983): 1278–79; LeDoux, The Emotional Brain, 142– 48 (Pavlov), 
356 (Luriia).
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early (and late) twentieth-century Russian Freudianism;28 the eastern Eu-
ropean ﬁ eld;29 the cultural anthropology of postsocialist everyday life in 
the eastern bloc writ large;30 the comparative linguistics of emotion in 
which the Slavicist Anna Wierzbicka has been leading;31 the nonverbal 
semiotics of the Moscow school of applied linguistics;32 the political sci-
ence and nationality studies on emotional-ethnic conﬂ ict;33 musicology;34 
dance studies;35 and many more.
Or one could have pointed to some of the perspectives of future emo-
tions studies. A sustained analysis of emotions in history and culture of-
ten resembles, not venturing into a new world, but rather putting a new 
lens on the objective through which one views one’s own world. Once the 
new lens is on, one asks incredulously: How is it we have no study of the 
emotional impact of the psychological realist novel on the reader? How 
could we study the Russian gentry without an eye for its notion of disgust 
toward others (persons, things, times)? Where are the comparative his-
tories of national emotions stereotypes, such as Russian khandra or toska 
(and Portuguese saudade, German Angst or Weltschmerz, the British “stiff 
upper lip”)? How could the history of the Russian revolutionary move-
ment have been written without some idea of its constructs of hatred and 
anger? And how could a history of the Great Terror of 1937–38 have been 
written without attention to fear?
The articles in this forum try to give an inkling of the range of vistas 
that open up when the emotions lens is put on. Chronologically, they 
range from the late eighteenth century when Andrei Turgenev started 
keeping the diary Andrei Zorin writes about to the Stalin era Adi Kunts-
man’s gulag memoirists chronicle. As for disciplinary background, Zo-
rin and Olga Matich are literary scholars with a keen eye for the literary 
strategies of emotion talk—the tricks writers use to represent and evoke 
28. See Aleksandr Etkind, Eros nevozmozhnogo: Istoriia psikhoanaliza v Rossii (St. Peters-
burg, 1993); Martin A. Miller, Freud and the Bolsheviks: Psychoanalysis in Imperial Russia and 
the Soviet Union (New Haven, 1998).
29. See Maruška Svašek, ed., Postsocialism: Politics and Emotions in Central and Eastern 
Europe (New York, 2006); Noah W. Sobe, “Slavic Emotion and Vernacular Cosmopolitan-
ism: Yugoslav Travels to Czechoslovakia in the 1920s and 1930s,” in Anne E. Gorsuch and 
Diane P. Koenker, eds., Turizm: The Russian and East European Tourist under Capitalism and 
Socialism (Ithaca, 2006), 82–96.
30. On post-Soviet Omsk, see Dale Pesman, Russia and Soul: An Exploration (Ithaca, 
2000).
31. Anna Wierzbicka, Emotions across Languages and Cultures: Diversity and Universals 
(Cambridge, Eng., 1999); Jean Harkins and Anna Wierzbicka, eds., Emotions in Crossling-
uistic Perspective (Berlin, 2001).
32. See, e.g., I. A. Sharonov, ed., Emotsii v iazyke i rechi: Sbornik nauchnykh statei (Mos-
cow, 2005); Grigorii Eﬁ movich Kreidlin, Neverbalnaia semiotika (Moscow, 2002). Also see 
V. M. Kruglov, Imena chuvstv v russkom iazyke XVIII veka (St. Petersburg, 1998).
33. See Roger D. Petersen, Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred, and Resentment 
in Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe (Cambridge, Eng., 2002).
34. David MacFayden, Songs for Fat People: Affect, Emotion and Celebrity in the Soviet Popu-
lar Song, 1900 to 1955 (Montreal, 2002).
35. See Irina Sirotkina, “Pliaska i ekstaz v Rossii ot Serebrianogo veka do kontsa 
1920kh gg.,” in Plamper, Elie, and Schahadat, eds., Rossiiskaia imperiia chuvstv: Podkhody k 
kulturnoi istorii emotsii.






feelings. Kuntsman, a social anthropologist by training, draws on cultural 
theory, queer theory, and literary scholarship to alert us to the linkages 
between disgust, metonymy, and same-sex sexuality in gulag memoirs. I 
am a historian and my article constitutes an attempt at analysis of a scien-
tiﬁ c discourse that revolved around emotion.
Let us take a closer look at the articles and the numerous connections 
between them. More generally, all conﬁ rm both the clichéd but funda-
mentally true dominance of literature in Russia and the well-known “life 
imitates art imitates life . . . ” pattern.36 Early nineteenth-century noble-
men learn to feel with German, French, and British writers (Zorin); the 
key text of disgust à la russe is Russia’s most celebrated modernist novel 
(Matich); highly literary memoirs reached a status of objective (and ethi-
cally impeccable) historical documentation of the gulag and abused this 
status to slip in and buttress a brand of heteronormativity that sits un-
comfortably with the tradition of human rights these memoirs are seen to 
belong to (Kuntsman); and soldiers learn to express their fear after, and 
with, Lev Tolstoi (Plamper).
I want to close with a few words on ﬁ gurative speech and how meta-
phors are employed to evoke emotions. Zorin, whose larger project is to 
put sentiment back into sentimentalism, presents a proliferation of ther-
mic metaphors when his young diarist turns to the emotion of love: “cold,” 
“hot,” “burning,” “ﬂ ame.” 37 These metaphors are marked by their binary 
nature. The metaphors in Andrei Belyi’s Petersburg, as detailed by Matich, 
and in prominent gulag memoirs, as described by Kuntsman, are of a dif-
ferent order: they are metonymies and rest on relations of contiguity. It is 
precisely the proximity of an abominable object and the sign that draws 
the reader close and creates a reaction of disgust, of away-movement, of 
ot-vrashchenie. Humans are brought into close, too close, contact with the 
not-quite-human—animals like pigs in Belyi’s novel, blatari and kobly in the 
gulag memoirs. Same-sex sexuality is represented as disgusting, and this 
representation is intended to evoke disgust in readers. Dudkin and Lip-
panchenko in Petersburg are brought into homosexual closeness, and so 
are criminal camp inmates and homosexuals. In their transgressiveness 
and contiguity, the metaphors of disgust are in fact meant to reinforce the 
binaries of life and death, human and nonhuman, heterosexual and ho-
mosexual, valorizing the ﬁ rst item and thus being ultimately conservative, 
in the sense of conserving hierarchy and difference. In the end, then, they 
are not that different from Andrei Turgenev’s thermic binary metaphors 
outlined by Zorin.
One way out might lie in the very act of analysis that these articles 
perform. While Matich demonstrates how Belyi mobilizes disgust’s trans-
gressive potential and by means of a baroque poetics of disgusting excess 
breaks through the cyclical temporal concept of the high classicist city-
36. On this pattern, see Irina Paperno, Chernyshevsky and the Age of Realism: A Study in 
the Semiotics of Behavior (Stanford, 1988).
37. For another study in this vein see I. Iu. Vinitskii, Utekhi melankholii (Moscow, 
1997).
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text that is St. Petersburg, Kuntsman lays bare the perﬁ dious imbrication 
of underclass criminality with homosexuality via metonymies of disgust. 
Kuntsman’s work of making this transparent suggests how we, the unas-
suming readers of Ginzburg’s morally righteous, heroic memoir, might 
resist being glued to this imbrication by means of sticky metaphors, how 
we might break out of the dissident icon Ginzburg’s cycle of homophobia-
as-disgust we are otherwise prone to repeat. Ad nauseam.
Figurative speech, poetics, and scientiﬁ c discourse—these foci are the 
stuff of literary scholarship and cultural history. They also mark a cer-
tain distance from neurobiology, brain science, evolutionary biology, and 
other life sciences that currently dominate many public and academic de-
bates traditionally in the domain of the humanities (free will, intentional-
ity, selfhood, love). While it remains to be seen whether future humanities 
emotions research with a Russian focus keeps this distance, it seems fair 
to predict that there will be such research—beyond the four articles to 
which we now turn.
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The Perception of Emotional Coldness 
in Andrei Turgenev’s Diaries
Andrei Zorin
Russian Schillerian
The diaries of Andrei Turgenev, an aspiring writer, a leader of a small 
circle of young Moscow intellectuals and one of the forerunners of Rus-
sian Sturm und Drang, have attracted scholarly attention ever since they 
were discovered about a hundred years ago.1 Since then, many scholars 
have quoted different parts of Turgenev’s diaries, usually in articles deal-
ing with the history of Druzheskoe literaturnoe obshchestvo, the literary 
group that Turgenev formed together with his brother Aleksandr, Vasilii 
Zhukovskii, Aleksei Merzliakov, Andrei Kaisarov, Aleksandr Voeikov, and 
several other young Moscow authors, and with the Russian reception of 
western, especially German, writers.2 The document itself, however, apart 
from one extract, remains unpublished.3 This text reﬂ ects a major gen-
erational shift in the value systems of the educated Russian public at the 
1. Vasilii Istrin presented extensive quotes from the diaries in his article on Turgenev’s 
younger brother Aleksandr. See Vasilii Istrin, “Mladshii turgenevskii kruzhok i Alexander 
Ivanovich Turgenev,” in Arkhiv bratev Turgenevykh (St. Petersburg, 1911), 2:15–111. Evge-
nii Tarasov started preparing Andrei Turgenev’s diaries for publication as a special volume 
in the Arkhiv bratev Turgenevykh series, but the edition never appeared because of the 
revolution and civil war in Russia.
2. See Vladimir I. Rezanov, Iz razyskanii o sochineniiakh Zhukovskogo, vol. 2 (St. Peters-
burg, 1916); Iurii Lotman, Andrei Sergeevich Kaisarov i literaturno-obshchestvennaia borba ego 
vremeni (Tartu, 1958), 15–76; Victor M. Zhirmunskii, Gete v russkoi literature (Leningrad, 
1981), C. 60– 64; Jurii Lotman, “Neue Materialen über die Anfange der Beschäftigung 
mit Schiller in der russischen Literatur,” Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Ernst Moritz Arndt-
Universität Greifswald. Gesellschafts- und sprachwissenschaftliche Reihe 8, nos. 5– 6 (1958/59): 
424 –26; Hans Bernd Harder, Schiller in Russland: Materialien zu einer Wirkungsgeschichte 
(1789–1814) (Bad Homburg, 1969), 45–74; Rostislav Danilevskii, “Schiller i stanovle-
nie russkogo romantizma,” in M. P. Alekseev, Rannie Romanticheskie veianiia (Leningrad, 
1972), 41– 43; Andrei Zorin, “U istokov russkogo germanophilstva,” in S. I. Panov, ed., 
Novye bezdelki (Moscow, 1995–1996), 8–35; Gerhard Giesemann, Kotzebue in Russland: 
Materialen zu einer Wirkungsgeschichte (Frankfurt am Main, 1971), 128– 42; Rostislav Da-
nilevskii, “Viland v russkoi literature,” in M. P. Alekseev, ed., Ot klassitsizma k romantizmu 
(Leningrad, 1970), 350–51. On Andrei Turgenev in English, see Marc Raeff, “Russian 
Youth on the Eve of Romanticism: Andrei I. Turgenev and His Circle,” in Alexander 
and Janet Rabinowitch, eds., with Ladis K. D. Kristof, Revolution and Politics in Russia: Es-
says in Memory of B. I. Nikolaevsky (Bloomington, 1972), 39–54. The expanded version 
of this article was also published in French: “La jeunesse russe à l’aube du 19e siècle: 
André Turgenev et ses amis,” Politique et culture en Russie, 18e–20e siècles (Paris, 1996), 
61– 87.
3. See Mariia Virolainen, ed., “Iz dnevnika Andreia Ivanovicha Turgeneva,” in 
E. M. Diakonova, ed., Vostok—Zapad: Literaturnye vzaimosviazi v zarubezhnykh issledovaniiakh 
(Moscow, 1989), 100–139. See also Vadim Vatsuro and Mariia Virolainen, eds., “Pisma An-
dreia Turgeneva k Zhukovskomu,” in D. S. Likhachev, R. V. Iezuitova, and F. Z. Kanunova, 
eds., Zhukovskii i russkaia kultura (Moscow, 1987). A full scholarly edition of Turgenev’s 
diaries is currently under preparation by myself, M. Virolainen, and A. Koiten. I am grate-
ful to my co-authors for permission to draw on the results of our work
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turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and provides us with a 
glimpse at the emergence of early Romantic sensibility in Russia.
A son of Ivan Turgenev, one of the leading members of the circle of 
Moscow Freemasons, Andrei Turgenev was brought up in a Masonic en-
vironment. Diary writing was not only encouraged but directly prescribed 
by the traditional Freemasonic upbringing. The diarist was supposed to 
“examine every evening the preceding day” in order to “keep watch con-
stantly over all the impulses of our mind and heart, to scrutinize their every 
disposition and every action.” 4 Ivan Turgenev translated the most popular 
manual of this sort: Self-Knowledge by John Mason. The third edition of this 
book appeared in Moscow in 1800 with a special “Epistle to my children” 
attached to the treatise by the translator. Here Turgenev urged his sons 
to follow the instructions given in the book and “to acquire means to pass 
through difﬁ cult and unpleasant ways leading to self-knowledge.” 5
Masonic diaries were often read during the meetings of the lodges, 
becoming in that way a sort of a joint enterprise, a collective exercise in 
self-disciplining, self-fashioning, and moral improvement. In one of the 
personal confessions drafted for the lodge meeting, Ivan Turgenev ac-
cused himself of “gluttony,” “debauchery,” and “pride.” 6
Andrei Ivanovich, who started his diary in November 1799, followed 
the patterns set by the Freemasons in trying to use the diary as a means 
of self-scrutiny and of measuring his moral qualities, abilities, and perfor-
mance against the given standard. It seems unlikely that his father would 
have approved of this text, however. First of all, Andrei’s diary was a mani-
festly personal venture: in his ﬁ rst entry, he wrote,
Здесь буду я вписывать все свои мысли, чувства, радостные и 
неприятные, буду рассуждать об интересных для меня предметах, не 
боясь ничьей критики.”
Here I’ll write all my thoughts, feelings joyful and unpleasant, shall de-
liberate upon the subjects interesting to me without being afraid of any-
one’s censure.” 7
He deliberately “privatized” his inner life, deciding to focus only on the 
subjects interesting to himself and to shun any outside interference.
On 30 May 1803, forty days before his untimely death, in one of his 
last diary entries (in his forty remaining days he managed to write only six 
more), Turgenev once again returned to this topic in more general way:
Как дорога должна быть человеку его Selbstheit. Как он должен быть 
всегда он и везде сохранить ее, хотя бы наставником его был Руссо 
4. I. I. Panaev quoted in Douglas Smith, Working the Rough Stone: Freemasonry and Soci-
ety in Eighteenth-Century Russia (DeKalb, 1999), 40. See also Lydia Ginzburg, On Psychologi-
cal Prose, trans. and ed. Judson Rosengrant (Princeton, 1991), 30–33.
5. Ioann Mason, Poznanie samogo sebia, 3d ed. (Moscow 1800), iv.
6. Smith, Working the Rough Stone, 40– 41.
7. Andrei Turgenev, The Diaries, Rukopisnyi otdel, Institut russkoi literatury (Push-
kinskii Dom), St. Petersburg (RO IRLI), f. 309, d. 271, l. 2ob.






и Фенелон. Виланд сказал ето, даже говоря о Христе. Не я (человек) 
должен войти в Руссо, но Руссо в меня и сделать меня собою.
How dear should one’s Selbstheit be to a person[?] How should he be 
always himself and preserve it everywhere even if Rousseau and Fenelon 
were his mentors[?] Wieland said it even about Christ. Not I (a person) 
should come into Rousseau, but Rousseau into me and he should turn 
me into himself.8
According to Turgenev, the need to cherish your own selfhood does not 
preclude accepting universally valid models. These models, however, were 
not to be simply imitated; instead one should imbibe the teachings and 
actions of one’s spiritual mentor and thus gradually draw closer to him. 
In this process, one’s distinct individuality is asserted by the choice of an 
object of emulation that is based on personal afﬁ nity with one’s ideal.
The explicit equation between Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Christ 
clearly shows that young Turgenev’s Persönlichkeitideal (to use Alfred Adler’s 
terminology) was radically different from the ideal of his elders.9 He as-
pired to become not so much an ascetic moralist and mystic of Masonic 
breed as an enthusiastic genius of the Sturm und Drang, like Friedrich 
von Schiller and his main characters.
Turgenev’s adoration of Schiller has been interpreted in different 
ways. While Vasilii Istrin has suggested that Turgenev was primarily inter-
ested in the psychological descriptions of Schiller’s characters, Iurii Lot-
man has insisted that the political character of Turgenev’s interest focused 
on rebellion against tyranny and injustice.10 Schiller and his works are 
mentioned dozens of times in the diary, providing enough material for 
both points of view. Still, it is important to keep in mind that, for Tur-
genev, Schiller was ﬁ rst and foremost a poet, a literary genius. The follower 
of Sturm und Drang would naturally regard artistic creativity as an em-
bodiment of the creative spirit governing the universe—Turgenev called 
Schiller “the true monarch” who “rules hearts at his will” at the distance 
of “hundreds and thousands of miles and years.” 11
Turgenev dreamed of becoming one of those creative geniuses, but 
he was never sure whether he would be able to live up to the ideal he had 
set for himself. He alternated between fervent hope and terrifying doubts 
verging on total despair. Given the level of his personal and literary ambi-
tions, failing to qualify for the desired status meant not to deserve to be 
alive. The diary became the main tool for his obsessive self-examination.
One of the most revered principles of Sturm und Drang ideology and 
aesthetics absorbed by young Schiller was the demand of “the fullness of 
8. RO IRLI, f. 309, d. 272, l. 55ob.
9. See Heinz L. Ansbacher and Rowena R. Ansbacher, eds., The Individual Psychology of 
Alfred Adler: A Systematic Presentation in Selections from His Writings (1956; New York, 1964), 94.
10. Istrin, “Mladshii turgenevskii kruzhok,” 22; Lotman, Andrei Sergeevich Kaisarov, 
71–75. The literature on Schiller and Turgenev is presented above; on Schiller and Rus-
sian literature and ideology, see Martin Malia, “Schiller and the Early Russian Left,” Har-
vard Slavic Studies 4 (1957): 172–200; Harder, Schiller in Russland; Nikolai Vilmont, “Do-
stoevskii i Schiller,” Velikie sputniki (Moscow, 1966).
11. Virolainen, ed., “Iz dnevnika Andreia Ivanovicha Turgeneva,” 100.
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heart” (“die Fülle des Herzens”); the distinctive feature of a true genius 
was the ability to be passionate.12 This ability was often expressed through 
the metaphor of temperature, the juxtaposition of “hotness” and “cold-
ness” in the human soul and in nature.
The use of this metaphor to describe human character goes back to 
Aristotle, but in the age of sensibility it became especially widespread and 
was supplemented by the equally value-charged opposition between soft-
ness and hardness.13 This metaphorical constellation enabled the moral 
transformation of an individual to be understood as a process of “melt-
ing,” when cold and hardened hearts suddenly become hot and soft un-
der the transformative heat of nature, religion, art, love, or even great 
misfortune. According to Edward Young, suffering was sent by Divine 
Providence to “melt [a man] like wax.” 14 At the same time the capacity to 
feel this melting brought about the most reﬁ ned pleasure and could serve 
to distinguish a truly sensible man. “Is there an emotion more delicious 
than to feel your heart pour and melt [ . . . ] Where is the unfortunate who 
cannot feel that sweet and intimate heat?” wrote Louis Sebastian Mercier, 
and Rousseau in his Confessions insisted that, “If anyone can read these 
letters without feeling his heart softened or melted by the same emotion 
that dictated them to me, he had better shut the book; he is incapable of 
judging matters of sentiment.” 15
It is not completely clear to what extent the young Russian enthusiast 
was able to differentiate between the sentimental didactics of tender feel-
ings leading to virtue and the apology of unrestricted passion character-
istic of Schiller, but he never challenged the valorization of inner “heat” 
itself. Turgenev constantly measured the temperature of his soul in order 
to assure himself that its level was above average. His main concern was 
to keep himself in a state of self-imposed fever. For him, one of the ways 
of achieving this state involved reading, rereading, reacting to, copying 
in his diary, and translating the great works of the literature of sensibility. 
Turgenev was sure that these works were the direct expressions of passion-
ate hearts, thus getting immersed in them was an exercise in arousing in 
him the feelings experienced by their authors. Once, trying to translate 
Schiller’s “Ode to Joy,” his favorite poem, he covered all the margins of 
the sheet he was writing on with the word Joy written several dozen times.16 
Clearly this was an effort to bring himself into the emotional state experi-
enced by the author of the original.
On 29 November 1799, Turgenev was translating or paraphrasing from 
12. See Benno von Wiese, Friedrich Schiller (Stuttgart, 1959), 109–76; Arthur W Mc-
Cardle, Friedrich Schiller and Swabian Pietism (New York, 1986), 205–13.
13. See Raymond Klibansky, Erwin Panofsky, and Fritz Saxl, Saturn and Melancholy: 
Studies in the History of Natural Philosophy, Religion, and Art (New York, 1964).
14. Edward Young, Complete Works in Two Volumes (London, 1854), 2:78.
15. Louis Sébastien Mercier, Du théâtre, ou, nouvelle essai sur l’art dramatique (Am-
sterdam, 1773), 72, and Bernard Gagnebin and Marcel Raymond, eds., Oeuvres Complètes 
de Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Paris, 1959), 1:438; Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Confessions, ed. 
Christopher Kelly, Roger D. Masters, and Peter G. Stillman (London, 1996), 5:427.
16. Rukopisnyi otdel Rossiiskaia natsionalnaia biblioteka, St. Petersburg (RO RNB), 
f. 386, op. 2, d. 330, l. 20.






German the fragment that he entitled “The Winter,” which was actually 
an ecstatic description of the beginning of spring. The exact source of the 
quotation remains unidentiﬁ ed, but most likely it was written by one of the 
numerous German imitators of James Thomson’s The Seasons. Turgenev 
used the image to describe the birth of a tender sensibility in the soul:
Весна низлетит к нам в дыхании любви Отeческой.—Огoнь любви 
разольется во вселенной, счастие озарит людей светлыми лучами в 
объятиях любви; дух жизни—будет дух любви.
Все восторжествует, все исполнится радости.
The spring will ﬂ y down to us in a breath of Fatherly love. The ﬂ ame of 
love will spread over the universe, happiness will brighten the people 
with radiant rays in love’s embrace; the spirit of life will be the spirit 
of love.
Everything will triumph and rejoice.17
In this sentimental piece, warm feelings are equated with virtue, but 
six weeks later, on 17 January 1800, Turgenev copied in full in his diary 
Schiller’s long poem Freygeisterey der Leidenschaft where “Herzens Flam-
mentrieb” (heart’s ﬂ ame), “heißen Blut” (hot blood) and “die Feuer, die 
electrics mich durchwallten” (the ﬁ re that ﬂ ows electrically through me) 
were gloriﬁ ed at the expense of “die Tugend” (Virtue).18 Turgenev’s ﬁ rst 
sexual experience, which he interpreted as the fall that forever severed 
him from the age of childhood and innocence, left him feeling deeply 
scarred by the imminent consequences of his transgression, and he tried 
to make sense of his misfortunes: “Misfortunes soften hearts; they can 
transform a sharp cold wit into a kind and tender brother of his broth-
ers.” 19 Viewing himself with utter dismay as a sort of “sharp cold wit,” Tur-
genev aspired to be transformed into a warm and sensible person. On 
27 March he noted in his diary that “several days ago I again took up 
the intention to rid myself of my inclination to mockery.” 20 This “inclina-
tion to mockery” of which he accused himself was for him an attribute 
of the culture of triviality and emptiness characteristic of the aristocratic 
salon—a culture not only fully incompatible with the idea of the sensible 
heart but completely opposed to it.
The ultimate test of the real temperature of one’s soul was its ability 
to experience love, the passion that since the classical age had been com-
pared with burning ﬁ re. These metaphorical representations abound in 
Schiller’s Freygeisterey der Leidenschaft, which appealed so strongly to young 
Turgenev, as well as in Wolfgang von Goethe’s Werther.21 Thus, the poten-
17. RO IRLI, f. 309, d. 271, l. 16.
18. Ibid., ll. 38–38ob.
19. Ibid., l. 42ob. See Andrei Zorin, “Pokhod v bordel v Moskve v ianuare 1800 goda 
(Schiller, gonoreia i pervorodnyi grekh v emotsionalnom mire russkogo dvorianina),” 
Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie 92, no. 4 (2008).
20. RO IRLI, f. 309, d. 271, l. 53.
21. “The sacred ﬁ re they received from yours is still aﬂ ame on my lips, and a new and 
ardent joy is in my heart,” wrote Werther to Lotta in one of his last letters. Johann Wolfgang 
Goethe, Die Leiden des jungen Werthers, ed. Roger Paulin (London, 1993), 93.
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tial to experience passionate love and feel its noble ﬂ ame in your breast 
was the most self-evident proof of one’s sensibility. In June, Turgenev re-
corded his “highly interesting” conversation with his friend Zhukovskii:
о моем характере и о нечувствительности моей. Я думаю, что я 
никогда не могу влюбиться. Этот источник приятнейших наслаждений 
Природы для меня закрыт. Как беден ум без души! Может быть, я 
слишком обвиняю себя. Я бы желал несколькими годами жизни моей, 
желал бы счастием своим пожертвовать для сего. Чувствительный 
человек и в несчастьи счастливей холодного. Ах! естьли бы я когда-
нибудь нашел свое блаженство, нашел свою Луизу, свою Шарлоту, 
какие сладкие слезы стал–
Нет: Dieses Herz ist nun todt, aus ihm ﬂ ießen keine Entzückungen 
mehr [ . . . ] Эта ужасная холодность! Отчего это?
about my character and my insensitivity. I think that I can never fall in 
love. This source of the most agreeable joys of Nature is closed to me. 
How poor is the mind without the soul! Perhaps I accuse myself too 
much. I would sacriﬁ ce several years of my life, my happiness, for it to 
be true. The sensible person is happier than the cold one even in mis-
fortune. Ah! If I could ever ﬁ nd my bliss, ﬁ nd my Louise, my Charlotte, 
what sweet tears would I . . . 
No, now my heart is dead. It does not experience raptures, feelings 
are no longer washed by joyous tears [ . . . ] This horrible coldness! Where 
does it come from? 22
To support his self-analysis, Turgenev quoted Werther’s letter from 
the second part of Goethe’s Die Leiden des jungen Werther. This passionate 
character’s sensibility had also hardened under the burden of terrible 
calamities and life at court. Turgenev admired Goethe’s ﬁ rst masterpiece 
and tried, together with Zhukovskii and Merzliakov, to produce a joint 
translation of the book. Werther became a life model for him.23 Later he 
even bought an extra copy of the book and ordered it bound with sheets 
of white paper between the pages. He planned to continue his diary on 
these blank pages so that he could compare his own feelings with those of 
his favorite literary hero.24 Werther had ﬁ nally managed to regain his abil-
ity to feel deeply and passionately, so Turgenev was not entirely hopeless 
about himself. He continued the quoted entry by noting that he “was still 
able to shed tears when witnessing an unfortunate father speaking about 
the loss of his daughter.” 25
No doubt this reference contains an allusion to Schiller’s Kabale und 
22. RO IRLI, f. 309, d. 271, l. 61.
23. See Zhirmunskii, Gete v russkoi literature, 60– 64.
24. RO IRLI, f. 309, d. 272, l. 12. On the poetics of behavior structured on literary 
models in Russian culture of the period, see Iurii M. Lotman, “Poetika bytovogo povede-
niia v Russkoi kulture XVIII veka,” “Dekabrist v povsednevnoi zhizni (bytovoe povedenie 
kak istoriko-psikhologicheskaia kategoriia)” and “O Khlestakove,” all in Lotman, Izbrannye 
stati (Tallinn, 1992), 1:248–364. Lotman discussed the inﬂ uence of literary patterns only 
on behavioral strategies and not on actual emotional experience. See Andrei Zorin, “Po-
niatie ‘literaturnovo perezhivaniia’ i konstruktsiia psikhologicheskogo protonarrativa,” in 
G. Obatnin and P. Pesonen, eds., Istoriia i povestvovanie (Moscow, 2006), 11–15. 
25. RO IRLI, f. 309, d. 271, l. 61.






Liebe, another classical work of German Sturm und Drang that Turgenev 
was translating with Merzliakov. He was also describing his personal ex-
perience, however. Several months earlier, on 9 December 1799, he had 
paid a visit to Moscow University law professor Feodor Bauze who had lost 
his daughter.
Вчера был у Баузе и был тронут до слез его горестию [ . . . ] С 
каким жаром, с какою скорбию говорил он о своей потере! и после 
(что меня тронуло больше всего и заставило утереть слезы) с каким 
уверением, с каким жаром говорил он, что ей лучше, что она перешла 
из рук отца в руки ОТЦА, и что некогда она встретит его у престола 
Божия.—Но горесть изображалась во всех чертах его.
Я плакал и радовался слезам своим.—Дотронувшись до 
раскаленной печки, он обжег руку, так что вздулись пузыри, и от 
сильной душевной горести и не почувствовал этого.—Уже через час 
сказала ему об этом жена.
Yesterday I visited Bauze and was moved to tears by his grief. [ . . . ] 
He spoke about his loss with such heat and such sorrow! and later (and 
this touched me the most and made me wipe away my tears) he said 
with such certitude and such heat that she is better now and that she has 
passed from the hands of her father to the hands of the FATHER and 
some day she will meet him near God’s throne. But grief showed itself in 
his every feature.
I wept and rejoiced in my tears.—Having touched the scorching 
oven, he burnt his hand, blisters appeared, but because of the powerful 
sorrow in his heart he did not notice. An hour later his wife told him 
about it.26
This fragment is highly representative. The diarist repeats twice that 
Bauze spoke with passion, literally “with heat” (s zharom) about the loss 
of his daughter and his hope for her eternal salvation. The temperature 
of his discourse reﬂ ected his inner heat, which was so unbearable that 
he failed to notice being burned by the oven. What is more, the heat of 
Bauze’s feelings made Turgenev’s heart melt and the latter rejoiced in his 
tears as they proved that his own soul had not hardened for good and was 
still capable of real sensibility. This experience was so important to Tur-
genev that a year later he was still referring to it.
The difﬁ cult problem of the correlation between passion and virtue, 
between “hot” and noble feelings, continued to worry Turgenev deeply 
as it was of utmost relevance to his self-analysis and self-assessment. On 
2 August 1800 he recorded in his diary a “strange thought” from a French 
poem claiming that “even a criminal may fall in love, while only the noble 
heart can feel friendship.” Turgenev continued
Мне кажется, что тут автор хотел разуметь и злого человека! 
Но я не знаю, всякий ли злой человек может влюбиться. Например, 
холодный, ни злой, ни добрый, и, следственно, более злой (tiéde), не 
так скоро, по крайней мере, влюбится, как Разбойник Карл Моор. 
(Пусть мне скажут, что это только идеальное существо, но могут 
26. Ibid., ll. 29–29ob.
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быть подобные ему в основании и начальном расположении, хотя и 
не в такой мере и не с такими accessoires). Почему же такой человек 
скорее почувствует любовь, нежели дружбу? Может быть потому, что 
любовь больше имеет огня, пылкости и не столько рассуждает.
It seems to me that the author meant to include here even an evil 
person. But I am not sure whether every evil person can fall in love. For 
example, a cold person, who is neither good nor evil and consequently 
more evil (tiéde), would not fall in love as quickly as Robber Karl Moor. 
(Let them tell me that this is only an ideal being, but there can exist 
people who are like him in the foundation of their characters and in 
initial disposition, even if not to such a degree or with such accessoires). 
Why then would such a man sooner feel love than friendship? Probably 
because love has more ﬁ re, more ardor and reasons less.27
Here the diarist uses both French and Russian, choosing adjectives that 
describe “temperature” with different meanings from both. Turgenev 
searches for a word to express the idea of despicable mediocrity; when a 
person is unable to be either good or evil, the diarist sees him as “more 
evil.” In Russian, he describes such a person as “cold” and at the same 
time puts the French word tiéde meaning “slightly warm,” in parentheses. 
Turgenev could not use the Russian equivalent for warm (teplyi) as this 
word had positive connotations in the Russian discourse of sensibility, 
while Rousseau had used the expression “l’âme tiéde” with derogatory 
overtones. In the same manner Turgenev also tried to substitute the word 
criminal, used by the unknown French poet, with the vaguer notion of 
“vile person.” He strove to identify himself with Schiller’s Karl Moor and 
insisted that comparable characters may exist in real life; thus for him the 
idea of criminality was connected, not with cold indifference, but with 
strong and somewhat noble passions.
Turgenev had intimate friendships but was unable to regard himself 
as a genuinely “hot” person.28 Only passionate love could serve as the test 
of his real nature.
On 23 August 1800, Turgenev made an entry summarizing the main 
motives of his diary for the nearly ten months he had been keeping it:
Сейчас (после обеда, вечером) получил письмо от Жуковского и 
читал его с самым холодным духом! Боже мой! Это ужасно. Естьли?? 
бы, думаю, надобно было расставаться с ним, я бы расстался без 
слез! Что со мной?—Мне беспрестанно казалось, что я не могу 
чувствовать так, как он; так благородно и, особливо, так нежно. 
Часто сам восхищаюсь я великою, чувствительною мыслию и в ту же 
минуту в состоянии смеяться над нею. По крайней мере—проклинаю 
мою нечувствительность!
Я несчастен; больше, нежели несчастен, потому что источник 
приятнейших наслаждений для меня иссяк! Злосчастный плачущий, 
проливающий тихие неизвестные слезы сердца,—не меняйся на 
довольную улыбку нечувствительности, мертвой холодности.
27. Ibid., ll. 63 – 63ob.
28. On the cult of friendship in this circle, see Raeff, “Russian Youth on the Eve of 
Romanticism,” and Lotman, Andrei Sergeevich Kaisarov.






Just now (in the evening after the dinner) I received a letter from 
Zhukovskii which I read with the coldest spirit. My god! This is terrible. 
I think that if I had to part with him, I would part without tears! What’s 
happening to me? It always seemed to me that I couldn’t feel like he does, 
as nobly and especially as tenderly. Sometimes I am enraptured by a great 
thought and at the same time I am ready to laugh at it. At the least, I curse 
my insensibility!
I am unfortunate, more than unfortunate, because the source of 
tender feelings has dried up for me! Miserable wretch, shedding quiet, 
unknown tears of your heart, do not change your situation for the satis-
ﬁ ed smile of insensibility, dead coldness.29
This technique of self-ﬂ agellation, based on comparing one’s soul 
with an unachievable object, was typical of Freemasons. Turgenev uses 
it, however, not to confess his sins and express aspirations for moral im-
provement, but to complain about his lack of sensibility. Thus, his main 
hope is that future love will revive him, not only emotionally, but also 
morally and even religiously, as only love can resurrect a “fervent belief” 
in his soul:
Я прежде был не таков, сколько могу помнить,—или нет, все то же.
Не могу, однако ж, сказать о себе ничего решительного, хотя не 
предвижу ничего отрадного.—Кто будет та, которая разрешит мне 
загадку?
Боже мой! Перемени сердце мое—нет в сердце моем и веры 
пламенной. [ . . . ]
(Несколько часов спустя).
Однако ж я все в нерешимости; после этого сердце мое начало 
развертываться, и не так уже было холодно.—Буду ли я когда-нибудь 
истинно влюблен? Это одно, думаю, может переменить меня.
I was different before, as far as I can remember. No, always the same. 
However, I can’t say anything decisive about myself, though I do not ex-
pect anything good. Who will she be who will solve my riddle?
My God, change my heart. There is no fervent belief in it! [ . . . ]
(several hours later)
However I am still in a state of irresolution. After this, my heart be-
gan to unfold and was not that cold. Shall I ever be truly in love? Only 
this, I think, can change me.30
Investing love with such ardent expectations for transformation could not 
fail to produce totally unexpected and rather bizarre results. Turgenev 
found himself in love with three sisters at nearly the same time. His feel-
ings in all these interrelated “love stories,” though, were based on entirely 
different literary patterns that he had assimilated during the preceding 
period. To understand these patterns, it is also important to reconstruct 
the actual circumstances of Turgenev’s romance as the only existing re-
construction by Istrin is full of mistakes and misreadings.31
29. RO IRLI, f. 309, d. 271, ll. 64 – 64ob. Emphasis in the original.
30. Ibid., ll. 64 – 65. Emphasis in the original.
31. Istrin, “Mladshii turgenevskii kruzhok,” 106 –14.
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On 18 September 1800, Turgenev heard the story of Varvara Mikhailovna 
Sokovnina, a young woman of noble birth who had escaped from her 
house in Moscow to a nearby village, vowing never to return. (She later 
entered a monastery, took the veil in 1808, and eventually became the 
prioress of the convent.)32 The same day Turgenev wrote to Zhukovskii 
about this incident, claiming that Sokovnina had taken the Bible and 
Rousseau with her on her journey.33 According to Turgenev, her father’s 
death several years earlier had afﬂ icted her so strongly that she could 
never reconcile herself to the world. The whole story provided Turgenev 
with one more chance to compare Sokovnina’s tender heart with his own 
insensibility:
Я досадую на себя: я бы желал быть в сто раз чувствительнее, 
чтобы сожалеть о ней, чтобы проливать над ней слезы и утешать 
ее слезами. Какая нежность к отцу! Кто способен к этому? Кто не 
позавидует и ее помешательству? По крайней мере, не я . . . 
Но зачем я так нечувствителен? Теперь это самым мучительным 
образом беспокоит меня.
I bewail myself: I would like to be one hundred times more sensible 
in order to pity her, to shed tears over her and try to comfort her with 
tears. What tenderness towards her father! Who is capable of that? Who 
can help envying even her madness? In any case, not I . . . 
But why am I so insensitive? Now this preoccupies me in the most 
painful way.34
Turgenev decided to dedicate his translation of Werther to Sokovnina 
and, in his diary, wrote two versions of a dedication expressing his desire 
to present Sokovnina with this “representation of ﬁ ery [plamennoi], un-
fortunate love.”  35 Sokovnina, who had behaved like the literary martyrs of 
sensibility, acquired in his eyes an almost saintly status; in his diary Tur-
genev compared her to Laurence Sterne’s Maria—the famous character 
of both Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy and Sentimental Journey, who 
became mentally deranged because of her misfortunes in love.36
By equating the sufferings Sokovnina experienced at the loss of her 
father with the amorous mishaps of his favorite literary characters, like 
Werther and Maria, Turgenev aspired to initiate a kind of a “local cult” of 
Sokovnina. He became the most ardent adept of this cult and, apart from 
dedicating his translation of Goethe to Sokovnina; he began writing an 
“Elegy” to her, glorifying her feelings. Turgenev worked on the “Elegy” 
32. See Georgii Piasetskii, Zhizneopisanie blazhennoi pamiati igumenii i shimomonakhini 
Seraﬁ my (Orel, 1886).
33. Vatsuro and Virolainen, eds., “Pisma Andreia Turgeneva k Zhukovskomu,” 372.
34. RO IRLI, f. 309, d. 271, l. 71ob.
35. Ibid., l. 72ob.
36. Ibid., l. 71ob. See Vadim Vatsuro, Lirika pushkinskoi pory: Elegicheskaia shkola (St. 
Petersburg, 1994), 38.






for nearly two years; it remained his single most important literary venture 
and one of only two poems published in his lifetime.37 It is worth noting 
that the text of the poem gives no clue as to whether the main character 
laments her deceased father or her late lover. Likewise when Maria in Sen-
timental Journey was speaking about her loss, Yorick, the sentimental trav-
eler, believed “she was thinking more of her father than of her lover.” 38 
Turgenev tended to merge these two types of sorrow, subtly eroticising 
Sokovnina’s image.
Representing Sokovnina as a version of Maria was also relevant for 
Turgenev as his attitude towards her was modeled on the reactions of the 
sentimental travelers in both of Sterne’s novels, combining pity, admira-
tion, remote erotic infatuation—Yorick explicitly imagined Maria “lying 
on his bosom”—and full understanding of the complete impossibility of 
interfering in the poor girl’s fate.39
Unlike Yorick, who had one brief encounter with Maria, Turgenev 
never met Sokovnina. He knew her family quite well, however, for his 
younger brother Aleksandr was secretly engaged to Varvara’s younger 
sister Anna. Through some sort of “mimetic desire,” Turgenev also de-
veloped a strong interest in Anna. Unlike the self-reﬂ ective and sublime 
Varvara, Anna was lively, extraverted, highly social and enjoyed giving 
signs of mild encouragement to her admirers who, in addition to both 
Turgenevs, included Zhukovskii.40 But this liveliness did not disappoint 
Turgenev, since he interpreted it as the manifestation of the childlike 
simplicity and innocence of Anna’s heart.
Varvara’s Romantic story immensely increased her sister’s attraction 
for the young enthusiast. During the winter of 1800–1801, Turgenev’s 
feelings for Anna grew stronger and stronger. After a family dinner on 
9 February 1801, he admired Anna’s “playfulness and naiveté” and con-
fessed to a secret wish “to hug her in his embrace.” He added that he did 
not “know a single beauty for whom” he would “exchange her.” 41
Turgenev felt that Anna could become “his Louise and his Charlotte,” 
the maiden whose love saves the weary sinner. Several times in his diaries 
he recalled the monologue of Karl Moor who found temporary bliss in the 
arms of Amalia.42 Unfortunately, being his brother’s bride, Anna was no 
more available to Turgenev than Varvara, who by that time had become a 
novice in the convent. On 1 November 1801, several days before he was to 
depart from Moscow to St. Petersburg where he was to start his career in 
the diplomatic service, Turgenev wrote in a state of ecstatic despair: “Kak 
ia liubliu Annu Mikh[ailovnu]. Samoi bratskoi liuboviu! Kak ona mila, 
37. Andrei Turgenev, “Elegia,” in Iurii M. Lotman and Mark G. Altshuller, eds., Poety 
1790-kh–1810-kh godov (Leningrad, 1971), 241– 44. See also Vatsuro, Lirika pushkinskoi 
pory, 38– 48.
38. David Herbert, ed., The Complete Works of Laurence Sterne (Edinburgh, 1872), 246.
39. Ibid.
40. See Aleksandr N. Veselovskii, V. A. Zhukovskii: Poeziia chuvstva i “serdechnogo voo-
brazheniia” (St. Petersburg, 1904), 73 –74.
41. RO IRLI, f. 309, d. 272, l. 3.
42. RO IRLI, f. 309, d. 276, l. 29ob. and d. 271, l. 45ob.
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kakoi um, kakoe serdtse!” (What familiarity did I acquire with them! How 
I love Anna Mikh[ailovna]. With true brotherly love! How nice is she, what 
a mind, what a heart!)43
Schiller, desperately in love with the wife of his closest friend, expressed 
in Freygeisterey der Leidenschaft and Resignation, two poems Turgenev earlier 
copied in his diary, his clear preference for the “heart’s ﬂ ame” over “vir-
tue.” This choice, however, was totally beyond Turgenev’s imagination, 
and he felt obliged even in his diary to qualify his emotional outbursts 
with half-hearted insistence on the “brotherly” character of his love for 
Anna. He needed such devices and self-assurances, not only because of 
his obligations toward Aleksandr, but also because by that time he had de-
veloped strange semi-romantic relations with the middle Sokovnin sister, 
Ekaterina or, as he referred to her in his diary, Katerina Mikhailovna.
Torn between exalted admiration for the sublime shadow of the ab-
sent Varvara and a growing passion for the lively and childlike Anna who 
was quite present, but equally tabooed, Turgenev lamented to Katerina 
Mikhailovna about his broken heart and lost happiness, most likely with-
out explaining the exact reasons for his despair. The young woman in-
terpreted his misplaced confessions as a veiled declaration of love and 
developed a strong attachment to him.
Initially Ekaterina must have regarded these relations as entirely hope-
less. Not only would it have been extremely difﬁ cult to persuade the elder 
Turgenevs to agree to the marriage of either of their sons to the penniless 
Sokovnins, but according to Russian family legislation, marriages between 
members of the same families were forbidden as incestuous. One of the 
couples would have had to sacriﬁ ce itself for the other. In these circum-
stances, Turgenev was able to allow this strange romance to go much fur-
ther than would otherwise have been possible.
On 6 June 1801, Turgenev recorded his impressions of one of their 
ﬁ rst conversations:
Я слушал ее со стесненным сердцем. [ . . . ]
Боже мой! Что ето! Что совершенней, что блаженней, что святее 
любви! И самая эта любовь больше, больше, нежели что-нибудь, 
делает нещастными! Не для чего бы и жить без любви в сем мире. У 
тебя в сердце пламя, и судьба налагает на тебя холодную руку, и люди 
гонят тебя и ты ни в каком углу земли не найдешь спокойствия сердцу. 
[ . . . ]
Зачем я не знал тебя! Зачем могу издали только следовать за 
тобою! Святая дружба! Здесь ты изливаешь свое благословение. Здесь 
ты возносишь сердце слабой девушки выше всех геройских подвигов! 
ты горишь в ее сердце.
I listened to her with an oppressed heart! [ . . . ]
My God! What is this! What is more perfect, more blissful, and more 
holy than love! And this is the same love that more, more that anything 
else makes us unhappy! But there is no use living in this world without 
love. You have a ﬂ ame in your heart and fate lays its cold hand upon you 
43. RO IRLI, f. 309, d. 272, l. 13ob.






and people are persecuting you and nowhere will you ﬁ nd repose for 
your heart. [ . . . ]
Why did not I know you! Why can I only follow you from afar! Holy 
friendship! Here you pour out your blessings. Here you lift the heart of a 
weak girl higher than all heroic deeds, you burn in her heart!44
At this point Turgenev envisaged his future relations with Ekaterina 
as a “holy friendship” joining two congenial and unhappy souls. Several 
days later he wrote in his diary that while “ﬁ ve years ago [Ekaterina] had 
been as lively and careless as Anna Mikhailovna,” she had recently become 
“more pensive and solemn” and, in another ﬁ ve years, would probably 
“wither in her separation from the world.” At the same time he worried 
that the tenderness of Anna’s heart could contain the “seed of her future 
misfortunes.” But having indulged in such feelings Turgenev immediately 
doubted whether he was worthy of having them:
Здесь я обвиняю сам себя. Что естьли бы это увидел кто-нибудь, 
кто знает мою насмешливость, кто сам терпит, может быть, от моей 
холодности! Но что же делать. Я это чувствую и хочу питать в себе 
всякое такое чувство. [ . . . ] Я и так больше склонен к холодной 
насмешливости; надобно умножать, а не потушать в себе чувства 
доброты и задумчивости.
Here I ﬁ nd myself guilty. What if someone saw this who knows my 
inclination to mockery, who himself, perhaps, suffers from my coldness! 
But what is to be done[?] I feel this and want to nurture in myself these 
kinds of feelings [ . . . ] Even so I am more inclined to cold mockery; I 
need to multiply, and not to quell in myself the feelings of goodness and 
pensiveness.45
Not surprisingly, “the holy friendship” project never materialized. 
Relations between Turgenev and Ekaterina soon became quite dubious 
and risky. Turgenev most likely believed that his imminent departure for 
St. Petersburg would somehow solve the problem, but the results turned 
out to be exactly the opposite. Their separation allowed Ekaterina to aban-
don all her previous reserve. She engaged in a secret correspondence with 
Turgenev, and her letters grew more and more passionate, completely 
defying the conventions of behavior appropriate for a noble maiden. She 
also disclosed her feelings to her younger sister, who volunteered to sacri-
ﬁ ce her own relations with Turgenev’s brother for the sake of her sister’s 
happiness.
Turgenev had to adapt his plans and his emotions to these new devel-
opments. Two weeks after his arrival in St. Petersburg, he started to copy 
Ekaterina’s letters into his diary, probably willing himself to experience 
some sort of empathy with the passion that dictated them. Earlier, he had 
planned to write his diary between the pages of Werther, so that he could 
compare his feelings with the experiences of the famous literary charac-
44. RO IRLI, f. 209, d. 276, l. 24. Emphasis added.
45. Ibid., ll. 10–10ob.
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ter. Now he had a different object for comparison, and it proved to be 
highly unfavorable to him:
Перечитываю ее письмы и мучусь своей холодностью! Сегодня 
пришла мне в голову мысль замечать здесь часы и минуты, когда 
я буду думать о своей нечувствительности, буду сожалеть о себе и 
почитать себя от этого искренне нечастным. Ах! Если бы почаще они 
приходили!
I am rereading her letters and suffer from my coldness! Today I had 
an idea of marking here the hours and minutes I spend thinking about 
my insensibility, and I pity myself and consider myself truly unhappy be-
cause of this. Ah! If these minutes would come more often!46
He wrote this on 25 January 1802, and four days later, facing the horrify-
ing necessity of making the fatal decision, he made the same comparison 
again:
Это величайшее пятно в моей жизни. Я не любил ее, не был 
влюблен, и говорил ей о нежности и с таким притворством. Она 
предавалась мне, забывая себя со всем жаром святой невинной, 
пламенной страсти! [ . . . ] Что будет тогда, когда я потеряю и чувство 
моей холодности, и чувство моей низости! Когда буду доволен собою? 
Может быть и это с летами будет.
This is the greatest stain on my life. I did not love her, was not in love, 
and spoke to her about tenderness and with such dissembling. She gave 
herself to me, forgetting herself with all the heat of holy, innocent, ﬂ am-
ing passion. [ . . . ] What will happen when I lose even the sense of my 
coldness, the sense of my baseness? When will I be content with myself ? 
Maybe this will also happen with time.47
Turgenev found himself in a trap. To marry a girl whom he did not 
love was for him akin to admitting that he was not the passionate enthu-
siast he aspired to be. More than that, it would inadvertently ruin his 
brother’s relations with Anna. To betray Ekaterina’s sincere and ardent 
love, however, would qualify him as a cold-hearted cynical seducer, which 
he found even more unacceptable. By the end of January he had made 
up his mind. On 1 February he informed Zhukovskii that he had sent 
Ekaterina some sort of formal proposal. He added that his brother, who 
was of course disappointed, started to “believe more in the truth of her 
[Ekaterina’s] feelings” “after he had read her last letter.” 48
During his stay in St. Petersburg Turgenev sought solutions to his 
emotional and moral dilemmas in Rousseau. He reread La Nouvelle Eloise 
and Emile and decided that these books would serve as his “Code de mo-
rale in everything: in love, in virtue, in the duties of public and private 
life.” He was especially impressed by Emile’s characterization of the per-
46. Virolainen, ed., “Iz dnevnika Andreia Ivanovicha Turgeneva,” 117–18.
47. Ibid., 118.
48. Vatsuro and Virolainen, eds., “Pisma Andreia Turgeneva k Zhukovskomu,” 308. 
Emphasis in the original.






son who cannot feel the pain of injured love: “une âme étroite, un coeur tiède 
‘Are not those my features?’ ” Turgenev asked himself and answered, “Ah! 
I don’t know.” 49 The tortured emotional relations that he had initiated 
with Ekaterina in order to convince himself that he really was a person 
endowed with “a ﬂ aming heart” backﬁ red and served as the ﬁ nal proof of 
his coldness.
Actually La Nouvelle Eloise could offer Turgenev a ﬂ attering description 
of a marriage between a “cold” man and a “hot” woman—the family of 
Volmar and Julie. But these idealized relations could not serve as a pat-
tern for Turgenev, as Julie’s husband never aspired to be an enthusiastic 
genius and never became an object of passionate love. In his search for a 
model for his traumatic situation Turgenev turned from the new Eloise 
to an old one.
New Abelard
Deliberating on his situation a month and a half after deciding to propose 
to Ekaterina, Turgenev remarked that the prospect of family life had be-
come more attractive for him. This change was gratifying and frightening 
at the same time. Turgenev feared that the pleasures and obligations of 
family life would stiﬂ e his poetic vocation, which for him constituted the 
only goal and justiﬁ cation of his existence:
Будучи один, часто размышлял я, представляя себе семейственную 
жизнь [ . . . ] И все это мне мало-помалу больше начинало нравиться. 
Но еще не равняется с другими представлениями. Иногда я мог 
concevoir радости и счастье отца, сравнивая любовь к детям с 
любовью, которую я имею к маленьким братьям. Но все я с большею 
приятностью думаю о К.М. и радуюсь ее любовью. Только все 
думаю, что нельзя мне будет с такими живыми чувствами заниматься 
литературой и поэзией. [ . . . ]
К чему теперь главные стремления моего духа? Быть известным 
в литературе! [ . . . ] Кажется оно никогда не оставит меня, но тогда 
бы я умер духом.
Being alone, I often abandoned myself to reﬂ ections, contemplating 
family life. [ . . . ] All this started gradually to please me more and more. 
But it still does not equal other conceptions. Sometimes I could conceive 
of the joys and happiness of a father, comparing love for children with 
the love I have for my younger brothers. But it is more agreeable to think 
about K.M., to rejoice in her love. Still I keep thinking that with such 
lively feelings I will not be able to engage in literature and poetry. [ . . . ]
What are the main aspirations of my spirit? To make myself known 
through literature! [ . . . ] It seems this aspiration will never leave me, but 
if it did my soul would be dead.50
The idea that “lively feelings” were somehow incompatible with liter-
ary or poetic activity might seem counterintuitive, but Turgenev was afraid 
49. Virolainen, ed., “Iz dnevnika Andreia Ivanovicha Turgeneva,” 107, 111.
50. Ibid., 119.
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that the ability to enjoy the small pleasures of family life would jeopardize 
his ambition to become a literary genius. This perception was reﬂ ected in 
his new literary enterprise, his ﬁ nal attempt at emotional redemption.
After his initial conversation with Ekaterina in June 1801, Turgenev 
ended his lyrical outburst in his diary with a literary quotation. Usually 
Turgenev looked to Schiller or Goethe for models for his emotional ex-
perience, but this time he tried to interpret the Sokovnina sisters’ misery 
through the prism of Alexander Pope’s Eloisa to Abelard:
Now warm in youth, now withering in my bloom
Lost in a convent’s solitary gloom.51
The mistakes in the quote, as is generally the case, show that Turgenev was 
quoting from memory and knew these lines by heart. The image of the 
poor nun whose loving heart was fading in the gloom of the convent was 
ﬁ rst and foremost associated with Varvara, but at the same time the contrast 
between the ﬂ ame of passion burning in Eloisa’s soul and the coldness of 
her castrated lover also reminded him of the rupture between Ekaterina’s 
sincere passion and his own inability to respond to it. At roughly the same 
time, Turgenev began translating Pope’s epistle and wrote in his note-
book a prosaic rendering of the ﬁ rst ten lines and a verse translation of 
lines 257–262. It is worth noting that he started the translation with the 
fragment that was especially full of temperature metaphors:
Приди мой Абеляр! Чего тебе страшиться
Для мертвых пламенник Венеры не горит
Хлад вечный во груди твоей навеки обитает,
Но Элоиза вся любовию сгарает,
Подобно тем огням, которы освещают
Унылые гроба, но их не согревают.52
At that point Turgenev did not go much further in his translation, but 
the next year, in April 1802, he once more felt the urge to translate Eloisa 
to Abelard as he noted that Ekaterina wrote to him “opiat s prezhnim zha-
rom kak budto proshlogo gody [again with the same heat as if it were last 
year].” These thoughts about Ekaterina inevitably brought him to Pope’s 
poem. This translation became especially meaningful to him since in early 
May, following more than a year of labor, he ﬁ nally completed his “Elegy” 
dedicated to Varvara. On 17 May, having received the information that he 
was to be dispatched to the Russian embassy in Vienna, Turgenev decided 
51. RO IRLI, f. 309, d. 276, ll. 23ob.–24, 41. As Pope wrote it, the ﬁ rst line reads: “Now 
warm in love, now withering in thy bloom.” Alexander Pope, The Rape of the Lock, and Other 
Poems, ed. Geoffrey Tillotson (New Haven, 1954), 322, ll. 37–38. At least one of Turgenev’s 
mistakes was not totally arbitrary, however, as the expression “warm in youth” can also be 
found in the text. Ibid., 329, l. 110.
52. RO IRLI, f. 309, d. 276, l. 39. “Come Abelard! for what hast though to dread? / The 
torch of Venus burns not for the dead; / Nature stands check’d, Religion disapproves; / 
Ev’n thou art cold—yet Eloisa loves. / Ah! hopeless lasting ﬂ ames like those that burn / 
To light the dead, and warm th’ unfruitful urn.” Pope, Rape of the Lock, 340– 41. Emphasis 
in the original.






to use his sojourn there to “occupy himself with Eloisa.” 53 The translation 
he wanted to resume was for him a test of whether he indeed had a poetic 
soul and could achieve something meaningful in literature and therefore 
in life.
Turgenev began his Viennese diaries in early September, and over 
the next ﬁ ve months through the end of January, when he was suddenly 
sent back to St. Petersburg, he mentions his translation of Pope’s epistle 
thirty-six times. The ﬁ rst reference is on 10 (23) September: “I’ll dedicate 
my nights to Eloisa, the important time has arrived. Is something going to 
come of it? Don’t be despondent and remember that the second half will 
be easier than the ﬁ rst.” 54
In three days, as a warm-up exercise, Turgenev copied the opening 
lines of the poem again, together with the corresponding verses of its 
most famous translation in French by P.-C. Colardeau.55 A month later 
he again tried to inspire himself by copying exactly the same lines, this 
time accompanied by two German translations by I. Eschenburg and G. 
Bürger. He doubtless found the texts in the Viennese edition of 1799 
where both were published together with the English original.56
Because he could not make any progress in his work, Turgenev 
reworked the opening verses of the epistle again. On the next day he 
wrote:
Вот ровно меcяц, как я начал переводить Элоизу и еще ничего не 
сделал. [ . . . ] Есть ли б я только не забывал, не пренебрегал того, 
что сам себе обещаю. Есть ли б я всякую минуту чувствовал всю 
важность этого перевода.
It has been exactly a month since I started translating Eloisa, but have 
not accomplished anything. [ . . . ] If only I would never forget, never 
neglect the promise I made to myself. If I could feel the importance of 
this translation every minute.57
The more important this project became for Turgenev, the more desper-
ate he became at his total lack of success. For several months he contin-
ued to record the number of hours he spent on the translation “without 
success” and how much time had passed since he had started his work. 
He also kept constructing for himself his ideal daily schedules where the 
translation of Pope’s Eloisa to Abelard ﬁ gured prominently. The dismal re-
sults of this undertaking convinced him that his hopes for a literary career 
were doomed.
Сижу за Елоизой. Успехов нет. Но что еще прискорбнее, я боюсь, 
чтоб не простыла во мне ревность переводить ее. Мне кажется, что 
я и теперь чувствую какое-то прохлаждение; но очень может быть, 
53. Virolainen, ed., “Iz dnevnika Andreia Ivanovicha Turgeneva,” 125, 128.
54. RO IRLI, f. 309, d. 1239, l. 10.
55. Ibid., l. 12ob. On Colardeau’s translation, see Peter France, “The French Pope,” in 
Colin Nicholson, ed., Alexander Pope: Essays for the Tercentenary (Aberdeen, 1988), 117–29.
56. RO IRLI, f. 309, d. 1239, l. 23. For the German, see Alexander Pope, Eloisa an 
Abelard, trans. I. Eschenburg and G. Bürger (Vienna, 1799).
57. RO IRLI, f. 309, d. 1239, l. 23ob.
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что мне только так кажется. [ . . . ] Все еще кажется мне, что я как-то 
равнодушен не только к Ел[оизе], но ко всяким успехам в Литературе. 
[ . . . ] Сколько радостей, сколько наслаждений в будущем потеряю 
я в тот день, как решится мое сомнение не в пользу Литературы. Но, 
может быть, всем этим радостям и без того суждено быть только в 
моем воображении.
I am working on Eloisa. No success. But what is more sorrowful, I am 
afraid that the desire to translate it will freeze in me. It seems to me that I 
am now feeling a certain cooling, but maybe it only seems so [ . . . ] It still 
seems to me that I am indifferent, not only to Eloisa, but to any success 
in Literature in general. [ . . . ] How many joys, how many delights will I 
lose in the future on the day when my doubts would be resolved not in 
Literature’s favor. But maybe all these joys are destined to exist only in 
my imagination anyway.58
Turgenev made this entry in January 1803, two weeks before his departure 
from Vienna. He returned to Petersburg without having accomplished 
anything. Still when he found out that Zhukovskii intended to translate 
the same epistle he begged him not to proceed:
Брат, оставь мне Элоизу. Признаюсь тебе в своей слабости. Я ни к 
чему иному не готов. [ . . . ] Поговори мне об Элоизе, но я просил уже 
тебя, чтоб это между нами осталось.
My brother, leave Eloisa to me. I’ll confess my weakness to you. I am not 
ready for anything else. [ . . . ] Speak with me about Eloisa, but I have 
asked you already to keep it between the two of us.59
Turgenev wanted his plans to remain secret to everyone except Zhu-
kovskii as this work was for him too intimate. Not only had he invested all 
his literary hopes and aspirations in this project; for him it was also deeply 
connected with his emotional life and relations with Ekaterina.
Pope’s heroine was a passionate woman writing to her former lover 
who had grown cold and was unable to respond to her feelings. Turgenev’s 
own identiﬁ cation with Abelard was implicit in the parallels between Ekat-
erina and Eloisa. “She adores and you can’t even love,” he wrote in his 
diary.60 Although this line has no exact match in Pope’s text, it serves as 
a sort of imaginary reaction by Abelard to Eloisa’s letter and at the same 
time as a commentary on Turgenev’s own situation. Translating Eloisa to 
Abelard was one more exercise in empathy, like copying Ekaterina’s letters 
into his diary.
Following Rousseau and Schiller, Turgenev always considered poetry 
to be the direct reﬂ ection of an author’s soul. Pope’s epistle provided 
encouragement for this perception: it ends with Eloisa imagining “some 
future Bard” who would write about their “sad, tender story.” These lines 
directly connect the poet’s ability to write about love with the intensity of 
his personal emotional history:
58. Ibid., ll. 53ob.–54ob.
59. Vatsuro and Virolainen, eds., “Pisma Andreia Turgeneva k Zhukovskomu,” 420.
60. RO IRLI, f. 309, d. 1239, l. 39ob.






Such, if there be, who loves so long so well;
Let him our sad, our tender story tell;
The well-sung woes will soothe my pensive ghost
He best can paint ’em who shall feel ’em most.61
By the same token, the poet who would be able to ﬁ nd Russian words to 
express Eloisa’s passions would have to be capable of love and worthy of 
being loved. Turgenev sought to convince himself, the Sokovnin sisters, 
and the narrow circle of his close friends as well, that he could understand 
real passion and was thus also able to experience it.
The cluster of meanings that Turgenev associated with this translation 
project included some more important components. Eighteenth-century 
admirers of the story of Eloisa and Abelard were especially fascinated and 
struck by Eloisa’s initial rejection of Abelard’s proposal to marry her and 
her insistence that “the quality of mistress” was “a hundred times more 
pleasing” to her “than that of wife.” “Indeed a refusal of this nature is 
so extraordinary a thing that perhaps another instance of it is not to be 
found in history,” wrote John Hughes, the author of the standard life of 
Eloisa and Abelard that was published together with all English transla-
tions of their correspondence during the eighteenth century. (The text 
of Pope’s epistle was customarily also appended to the edition.)62 Hughes 
dedicated several pages of his preface to explaining Eloisa’s arguments. 
According to him, she did not want to “rob the world of so eminent a 
person,” being certain that “the study of divinity and philosophy” did not 
“comport with the cries of children, the songs of nurses and the rush of 
the family.” As Hughes summed it up, her reasons were “chieﬂ y grounded 
upon her preference of love to marriage, of liberty to necessity.” 63 Pope’s 
Eloisa wrote to Abelard that: “Love, free as air; at sight of human ties, / 
Spreads his light wings and in a moment ﬂ ies.” 64
The romance of Andrei Turgenev and Ekaterina Sokovnina, though 
they seem never to have gone as far as Abelard and Eloisa, also developed 
in an unconventional manner that transgressed the norms of accepted 
behavior. Expressing her passionate confessions in secret correspondence 
with a young man could irrevocably ruin the reputation of a noble young 
woman like Ekaterina.
It is impossible to say whether Turgenev truly hoped that his transla-
tion of Eloisa to Abelard would convince Ekaterina that she should reject 
his proposal; it is also unlikely that he was urging her to become his mis-
tress instead. But in this literary venture it was possible for him to seek 
the proof that his unwillingness to marry a young woman, whose sincere 
love and ardent soul he did not doubt in the least, was dictated not by the 
mean-spiritedness of a seducer, but by much loftier aspirations. He also 
needed to validate his belief that his literary future would be threatened 
61. Pope, Rape of the Lock, 348– 49.
62. Letters of Abelard and Heloise, To which is preﬁ x’d a particular account of their lives, 
amours, and misfortunes. By the late John Hughes, Esq. To which is now ﬁ rst added, the poem of 
Eloisa to Abelard by Mr. Pope, 9th ed. (London, 1775), 16.
63. Ibid., 18–20.
64. Pope, Rape of the Lock, 325–26.
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by the “lively feelings” of family happiness that were totally incompatible 
with his exalted pursuits.
Turgenev had staked all his ambitions on this poetic enterprise and 
lost. He never managed to translate more than several lines of the epistle 
and gradually became convinced that he had failed this self-imposed test 
and was hopelessly torn from the source of real bliss available only to 
“heated” enthusiasts endowed with poetic sensibility. He intended to show 
himself and others that he could emote like Eloisa and ended by believing 
himself to be emotionally castrated like Abelard:
Пустота и холодность души, самолюбие, эгоизм, сжимающий сердце 
[ . . . ] Творец! Зачем закрыты во мне сии источники слез; ты мог 
меня сделать способнее к счастию, зачем же эта бесчувственность, 
эта тягостная холодность души?
Emptiness and coldness of the soul, vanity, egoism that grips my heart. O 
Creator, why are the sources of tears cut off in me; you could make me more capable 
of happiness; why then this insensibility, this burdensome coldness of the soul? 65
All of the moral and existential dilemmas that the young Turgenev 
faced dramatically intensiﬁ ed after his return to Russia. Rumors about 
his secret correspondence with Ekaterina had begun to leak out and had 
reached his parents. Turgenev knew that it would be immensely difﬁ cult 
to convince them to consent to his marriage. The idea of explaining the 
details of the situation to them was even more terrifying for him because 
deep in his heart he felt that he was not at all inclined toward this union 
himself. At the same time he understood that his relations with Ekaterina 
had long ago passed the point of no return. His only desire now was to 
escape. On 19 May he wrote in his diary:
Новой план: через год ехать путешествовать с Кайсаровым и с 
Воейковым на два года. После я вздумал, что мало еще имею 
познаний, и нет Элоизы на русском, но кажется это не помешает. [ . . . ]
А Елоиза! О!
A new plan: to leave in a year for a two-year journey with Kaisarov and 
Voeikov. I’ve decided that I don’t yet have enough knowledge and there 
is still no Eloisa in Russian, but that seems not to be an impediment. [ . . . ] 
And Eloisa! Oh!66
The choice of exclamation rather than question marks in the two con-
cluding sentences shows that Turgenev did not believe any longer in his 
ability to translate Pope or to produce anything worthy of the Sturm und 
Drang type genius he had once aspired to be. His future existence was 
losing all of its meaning and gratiﬁ cation. He dreamt of journeys to more 
and more exotic and remote destinations—the United States, China, Ja-
pan, or even further: “How invigorating and pleasant it can sometimes be 
to think about death,” he wrote in his diary on 10 June 1803, adding, es-
65. RO IRLI, f. 309, d. 1239, l. 40ob. Emphasis in the original.
66. RO IRLI, f. 309, d. 272, l. 55.






pecially “at night.” 67 He died a month later, on 8 July, from “sudden fever” 
at the age of 21. As Vladimir Toporov perceptively noted, “The real causes 
of his death cannot be considered completely known.” 68 The existing evi-
dence seems to exclude planned suicide, although the parallels between 
Turgenev’s untimely end and the last days of Werther, one of his favorite 
literary characters, may not be purely coincidental.69
Turgenev dreamed of literally writing his diary between the pages of 
Die Leiden des Jungen Werthers. In a symbolic sense, he wrote his entire emo-
tional life between the pages of the great works of eighteenth-century Eu-
ropean literature. Having removed the diary from the institutional frame-
work of Masonic self-disciplining, he inevitably brought it into the literary 
ﬁ eld. This transformation of the form of the diary into a purely intimate 
enterprise made it a powerful vehicle for self-examination and psycholog-
ical analysis, releasing the artistic potential of the form that within several 
decades became the established literary genre used by Mikhail Lermon-
tov, Nikolai Gogol, Fedor Dostoevskii, Lev Tolstoi, and many other major 
Russian writers.70
For the entire nineteenth century, Turgenev’s diaries were totally 
unknown to the Russian reader, and they remain largely unknown even 
today. Thus his diaries could not have had any direct inﬂ uence on the 
process of literary evolution. But the type of personality reﬂ ected on its 
pages and to some extent formed by the process of keeping the diary 
was brought into the cultural mainstream by the circle of his friends in 
Druzheskoe literaturnoe obshchestvo who became leading ﬁ gures in the 
Russian literary world.
What is even more important, young Turgenev seems to be one of the 
ﬁ rst ﬁ gures who perceived and embodied the major trend that resonated 
in Russian culture for decades to come. He passionately believed that 
literary, aesthetic, and philosophic ideals borrowed from western, espe-
cially German, authors should deﬁ ne his personal life in its most intimate 
manifestations and, primarily, in love, which he understood both as an 
earthly projection of the celestial fullness of being and as a litmus test of 
the inherent value of one’s personality.71 He paid for these beliefs with his 
happiness and his life, but for the generations of young Russian idealists 
and Romantic individualists to come, this price never seemed excessive.
67. RO IRLI, f. 309, d. 1239, l. 59ob.
68. Vladimir Toporov, “Dva dnevnika (Andrei Turgenev i Isikava Takuboku),” in 
E. M. Diakonova, ed., Vostok—Zapad: Literaturnye vzaimosviazi v zarubezhnykh issledovaniiakh 
(Moscow, 1989), 99.
69. See Andrei Zorin, “Smert Andreia Turgeneva,” in G. Obatnin and P. Pesonen, 
eds., Evropa v Rossii/Rossiia v Evrope (Moscow, forthcoming).
70. Ibid., 83 – 85. On the literary status of personal documents as “intermediary lit-
erature” with special reference to nineteen-century Russian literature, see Ginzburg, On 
Psychological Prose.
71. On individual manifestations of this set of attitudes in Russian culture, see Ves-
elovskii, V. A. Zhukovskii; Aleksandr A. Kornilov, Molodye gody Mikhaila Bakunina: Iz istorii 
russkago romantizma (Moscow, 1915); John Randolph, The House in the Garden: The Bakunin 
Family and the Romance of Russian Idealism (Ithaca, 2007); Ginzburg, On Psychological Prose; 
and an entire joint issue of Russian Literature 61, nos. 1–2 (2007).
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Fear: Soldiers and Emotion in Early 
Twentieth-Century Russian Military Psychology
Jan Plamper
The main feature of the Suvorov school of drill was the eradication from the 
heart and banishment from the human head, not just of the emotion of fear, but 
of the very idea of this feeling, which is so disgraceful for the soldier.
—[V. P.?] Prasalov, in Voennyi sbornik, 1911
Just as I cannot imagine a plesiosaurus on Nevskii Prospekt, I cannot imagine 
that anyone does not know what fear is and how it affects the organism.
—A. [M.] Dmitrevskii, editor of Voennyi sbornik, 1913
Looking for the emotion of soldierly fear in ﬁ rst-person accounts of the 
War of 1812 resembles the proverbial search for a needle in the haystack. 
One is more likely to discover overt absences, which sound like this com-
ment made by ofﬁ cer Mikhail Petrov: “Yet the Russian soldiers looked at 
the huge enemy hordes with an unﬂ inching spirit. With Faith, Hope, and 
Love, and with the Great Suvorov implanted in our hearts, our souls were 
prepared for sacriﬁ ces to save the Fatherland.” 1 Only the following quote 
from Petrov offers a deeper glimpse into the soul of the soldier in Alex-
ander I’s times: in the Battle of Borodino, Petrov’s men were ordered to 
destroy two bridges, which they did “under heavy enemy ﬁ re at close quar-
ters; the enemy shot at us with eight cannons from the hills of the village 
and with guns from the outermost houses and fences. But I executed this 
order successfully thanks to my ofﬁ cers’ special striving for honor [chrez 
osobennoe sorevnovanie k chesti moikh oﬁ tserov].” 2
Research for this article was supported by Sonderforschungsbereich 437 “Kriegserfahrun-
gen: Krieg und Gesellschaft in der Neuzeit” at the University of Tübingen. It was written in 
2007–08 during a fellowship at Historisches Kolleg, Munich, and revised at Ute Frevert’s 
Center for the History of Emotions at Max Planck Institute for Human Development, 
Berlin, with generous support from a Dilthey Fellowship (Fritz Thyssen Foundation). My 
greatest debt is to Kim ( Jacqueline) Friedlander for extensive comments on substance and 
style, and for letting me read her dissertation before it became publicly available. For their 
comments I would also like to thank Dietrich Beyrau, Frank Biess, Olga Edelman, Jochen 
Hellbeck, Susan Morrissey, Monique Scheer, Benjamin Schenk, Irina Sirotkina, Mark D. 
Steinberg, and Glennys Young.
The two epigraphs are taken from [V. P.?] Prasalov, “Neskolko slov k state V. 
Polianskogo—‘Moralnyi element v oblasti fortiﬁ katsii,’ ” Voennyi sbornik 54, no. 5 (1911): 
89, and A. [M.] Dmitrevskii, “Vospitanie voina mozhet byt tolko v styde nakazaniia, a ne v 
strakhe nakazaniia,” Voennyi sbornik 56, no. 10 (1913): 100.
1. Mikhail Petrov, 1812 god: Vospominaniia voinov russkoi armii; iz sobraniia Otdela 
Pismennykh Istochnikov Gosudarstvennogo Istoricheskogo Muzeia, eds. F. A. Petrov et al. (Mos-
cow, 1991), 180. Thanks to Ingrid Schierle for pointing me to this source.
2. Ibid., 183. Sorevnovanie k chesti at this point indeed signiﬁ ed “striving for honor” 
(rather than “ambition”).






A hundred years later descriptions of fear were legion. Consider this 
Russian World War I memoir:
“What kind of fear is that supposed to be?” a bearded guy in rags in-
terrupted Semenych. “You don’t croak from that kind of fear. In the 
trenches—that is where the real fear is! It creeps under your very skin. I 
once crawled out of my trench. Boom! Shells are exploding with terrible 
noise. Around me there is lots of groaning. I want to walk away, but can’t 
lift my leg; it’s as if someone grabbed my ankle. I can’t look left, can’t look 
right—I’m afraid. Fear of death has taken hold of me, has overwhelmed 
my heart, and no fear is more brutal than this kind of fear. It’s as though 
someone poured cold snow under your skin; your jaw starts chattering, 
and your blood stops ﬂ owing in your veins: it has frozen. I wanted to aim 
with my riﬂ e, but it was so damn’ heavy, like a pud; I wanted to scream, 
but I could only rattle like an animal, I wanted to pull the trigger, but I 
couldn’t.” 3
Clearly, something changed between 1812 and 1914. Either soldiers 
at some point began to experience more fear, and in different ways, or 
the boundaries of what could be and actually was said about soldierly 
fear in personal documents profoundly shifted, or a new and real experi-
ence of fear came together with a discursive shift.4 One thing is certain: 
constituting fear as a legitimate object of scientiﬁ c inquiry was crucial in 
this change. Here the disciplines of neuropathology, psychiatry, psychol-
ogy, psychoanalysis, and pedagogy, which for purposes of simplicity I will 
collectively call “military psychology,” played a pivotal role. These ﬁ elds 
formed in the late nineteenth century and underwent complex processes 
of cultural transfer, entanglement, and professionalization. Just how the 
practitioners of these ﬁ elds wrote about fear is my main emphasis, but I 
will also ask why it became possible to speak of fear in the ﬁ rst place and 
provide short answers.
The chief sources for this article are publications ( journal articles and 
books) by military psychiatrists and psychologists.5 Since the historical and 
cultural speciﬁ city of emotional expression becomes visible in sharper re-
lief when compared with other cultures and over the longue durée, there 
3. L. N. Voitolovskii, Po sledam voiny: Pokhodnye zapiski. 1914 –1917 (Leningrad, 1925), 
69. The opening of the discursive gates regarding soldierly fear was accompanied by pro-
fessions made by soldiers, ofﬁ cers, and doctors that fear escaped all attempts at verbaliza-
tion. Consider, for instance, this Russian soldier who suffered a surprise attack by an enemy 
soldier in World War I: “He attacked me from behind, and there are no words to describe 
my fear.” Sofja Fedortschenko, Der Russe redet: Aufzeichnungen nach dem Stenogramm, trans. 
Alexander Eliasberg (Munich, 1923), 19–20.
4. On the “boundaries of what could be said,” see foundational texts of Begriffs-
geschichte, such as Reinhart Koselleck, Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time, trans. 
Keith Tribe (Cambridge, Mass., 1985); Koselleck, The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing 
History, Spacing Concepts, trans. Todd Samuel Presner et al. (Stanford, 2002); and Willibald 
Steinmetz, Das Sagbare und das Machbare: Zum Wandel politischer Handlungsspielräume. Eng-
land 1780 –1867 (Stuttgart, 1993).
5. Medical case records are the major lacuna in the documentary record; they only 
become available for the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939–1940 and are used in the publica-
tions of D. A. Zhuravlev, such as “Osnovnye etapy razvitiia gosudarstvennogo voennogo 
zdravookhraneniia Rossii,” Voenno-meditsinskii zhurnal, no. 2 (2004): 4 –12.
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will be several side-glances at Germany, France, Britain, and the United 
States as well as a look back to the early nineteenth century. The chrono-
logical focus, however, is the ﬁ rst two decades of the twentieth century, 
when Russia fought two major wars (the Russo-Japanese War, 1904 –1905 
and World War I, 1914 –1918). In these years it became the ﬁ rst nation 
in history to deploy front-line military psychiatrists to treat the fear-
induced symptoms of soldiers that would later come to ﬁ gure as “military 
contusion” or “traumatic neurosis” (voennaia kontuziia, travmaticheskii ne-
vroz) in Russia, “shell shock” in Britain, “war commotion” or “war emotion” 
(commotion de la guerre, émotion de la guerre) in France, and “war neurosis” 
(Kriegsneurose) in Germany and Austro-Hungary.6
How Soldiers Learned to Articulate Fear: Six Causes
What accounts for the striking ﬁ n-de-siècle expansion of fear in soldiers’ 
textual artifacts? I believe there are six explanations, which I will sketch 
brieﬂ y. Most important, since this expansion coincided with the modern-
ization of warfare, it was connected with an increase in the real psycho-
logical stress that modern war produces. Modern war exposes soldiers to 
drastically longer periods of riﬂ e and machine gun shooting, shelling, 
and air bombardment. It makes the source of the attack difﬁ cult to locate. 
Trench warfare, a major feature of World War I, immobilizes soldiers, thus 
incapacitating the reﬂ ex to ﬂ ee from the source of danger; by contrast, 
a premodern open battleﬁ eld and one-on-one bayonet combat offered 
the—shame-free— option of forward attack as an outlet for ﬁ ght-or-
6. The literature on shell shock is considerable and still growing. For a study of mul-
tiple countries, see Mark S. Micale and Paul Lerner, Traumatic Pasts: History, Psychiatry, 
and Trauma in the Modern Age, 1870 –1930 (Cambridge, Eng., 2001). For Russia, see A. B. 
Astashov, “Voina kak kulturnyi shok: Analiz psikhopatologicheskogo sostoianiia russkoi 
armii v Pervuiu mirovuiu voinu,” in E. S. Seniavskaia, ed., Voenno-istoricheskaia antologiia: 
Ezhegodnik (Moscow, 2002), 268– 81; Jacqueline Lee [Kim] Friedlander, “Psychiatrists and 
Crisis in Russia, 1880–1917” (PhD diss., University of California, Berkeley, 2007); Fried-
lander, “Approaching War Trauma: Russian Psychiatrists Look at Battleﬁ eld Breakdown 
during World War I,” Newsletter of the Institute of Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Stud-
ies (University of California, Berkeley) 21, no. 3 (Fall 2004): 3 – 4, 19–22; Kim Fridlender 
[ Jacqueline Friedlander], “Neskolko aspektov shellshocka v Rossii, 1914 –1916,” in N. N. 
Smirnov et al., eds., Rossiia i pervaia mirovaia voina (materialy mezhdunarodnogo nauchnogo 
kollokviuma) (St. Petersburg, 1999), 315–25; Catherine Merridale, “The Collective Mind: 
Trauma and Shell-Shock in Twentieth-Century Russia,” Journal of Contemporary History 35, 
no. 1 ( January 2000): 39–55; Elena S. Seniavskaia, Psikhologiia voiny v XX veke: Istoricheskii 
opyt Rossii (Moscow, 1999); Irina Sirotkina, “The Politics of Etiology: Shell Shock in the 
Russian Army, 1914 –1918,” in Angela Brintlinger and Ilya Vinitsky, eds., Madness and the 
Mad in Russian Culture (Toronto, 2007), 117–29; Laura L. Phillips, “Gendered Dis/abil-
ity: Perspectives from the Treatment of Psychiatric Casualties in Russia’s Early Twentieth-
Century Wars,” Social History of Medicine 20, no. 2 (August 2007): 333 –50. For Britain, see 
Peter Leese, Shell Shock: Traumatic Neurosis and the British Soldiers of the First World War (New 
York, 2002). For France, see Marc Roudebush, “A Battle of Nerves: Hysteria and Its Treat-
ment in France during World War I” (PhD diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1995); 
Susanne Michl, Im Dienste des “Volkskörpers”: Deutsche und französische Ärzte im Ersten Weltkrieg 
(Göttingen, 2007), pt. 3. For Germany, see Paul Frederick Lerner, Hysterical Men: War, 
Psychiatry, and the Politics of Trauma in Germany, 1890 –1930 (Ithaca, 2003).






ﬂ ight reactions. And modern war is fought by national, mass-conscripted 
armies, whose soldiers serve for comparatively short periods of time, can 
hope for a return to civilian life, and lack much of the esprit de corps that 
united standing armies.7 All of these factors amount to a real and signiﬁ -
cant increase in psychological stress that had to spill over into the ways 
soldiers felt—and sometimes wrote—about what they endured.
Also connected with the onset of modernity was the emergence of an 
image of man as a creature who fashions his world and ultimately himself, 
of, in short, an autonomous self. The possibility of destruction of self—for 
example, by death in a war—then produces much greater anxiety than if 
the potential for death remained in the realm of transcendent forces that 
control man and his world; it is no longer the will of a god, just as a busi-
ness success or horse-riding accident is no longer the will of a god, but a 
threat to the autonomy of selfhood, the very foundation upon which man 
rests in the modern world.8
Another explanation, a Foucauldian explanation, points to the interi-
orization of feelings that was a hallmark of modernity. As soon as soldiers 
became autonomous subjects and ceased to think of themselves as caught 
in webs of dependence, intent on saving their honor in front of fellow hu-
man beings, feelings moved from the body surface to the body interior. 
Linked with this shift was the invention of “sciences” of the interior, psy-
chology and psychiatry. The psychological sciences, in this explanation, 
not only furnished some of the language in which emotions could be ex-
pressed, but their own emergence legitimized, if not invented, the public 
communicability of soldierly fear.9
It can further be argued that the Russian case differs from the western 
European case in that it imported the change in speaking about fear re-
lated to modernity. Russia, in other words, widened the limits of the say-
7. On the 1874 military reform and Russian mass conscription, see Werner Benecke, 
Militär, Reform und Gesellschaft im Zarenreich: Die Wehrpﬂ icht in Russland 1874 –1914 (Pa-
derborn, 2006). One might also emphasize that in the creation of the national army, 
service in this army and death for the nation become endowed with different meaning. 
If in armies of paid mercenaries, fear forms part of an act of economic free will, much as 
a miner’s death is part of his autonomous economic decision and therefore silenced, the 
paid soldier does not talk about his economic decision. Only once this risk becomes not 
his own but part of a decision made by a larger body—the nation—can a discursive space 
be opened for talking about it.
8. This is inspired by Corey Robin, Fear: The History of a Political Idea (New York, 2004), 
11–12. One might also point to the emergence of paciﬁ sm in the nineteenth century. 
As soon as a choice other than war became a thinkable way to solve conﬂ icts, the hard-
ships of warfare and its ever-looming end, death—as well as the attendant fear—became 
options.
9. As Joanna Bourke put it, “psychiatrists, clinical psychologists and social workers 
were highly valued for ‘curing’ men who experienced stress in killing. These social scien-
tists also provided crucial changes to the military terminology: ‘cowardice’ (with its accom-
panying need for execution or punishment) became ‘shell shock’ and then ‘anxiety states’ 
(which called for treatment, albeit stigmatizing).” Joanna Bourke, An Intimate History of 
Killing: Face-to-Face Killing in Twentieth-Century Warfare (New York, 1999), 82. The locus 
classicus for the interiorization thesis is Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilization: A History 
of Insanity in the Age of Reason, trans. Richard Howard (New York, 1965), but also Foucault, 
Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York, 1977).
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able, not because it entered modernity itself, but rather because it aped 
an entrance into modernity—a variant of mimicry. By producing texts 
about soldierly fear, Russia proved to itself and the outside world that it 
had arrived in modernity.
There was also the expansion of literacy and the new mass media, 
which produced not only more soldiers who could write about fear but 
also genres like crime novels and a scandal-hungry yellow press with 
unheard-of possibilities to evoke fear in readers.10 Static media such as 
broadsheets, paintings, and photography are less apt to evoke (as opposed 
to depicting) fear; moving media such as narrative text and especially ﬁ lm 
are ideal for the creation of suspense and fear. This explanation hinges 
on the very characteristics of a genre or medium. The argument goes like 
this: because new genres like crime novels that allowed for the production 
of fear in readers (whose numbers were increasing due to the spread of lit-
eracy) appeared, a new permissibility of fear took hold. This permissibility 
eventually affected medicine, which began turning fear into an object of 
inquiry, as well as soldiers’ ﬁ rst-person accounts.
Finally, and second in importance only to the onset of modern war-
fare, Russian belles lettres played a large part in widening the boundaries 
of what soldiers could publicly say about fear. Lev Tolstoi’s Sevastopolskie 
rasskazy (Sevastopol sketches, ﬁ rst published in 1855) are crucial here. In 
these stories, which build on Stendhal’s Chartreuse de Parme (1839), Tolstoi 
provides three snapshots from different phases of the siege of Sevastopol 
until its fall in September 1855.11
Twenty-seven-year-old Tolstoi experienced the siege of Sevastopol at 
a close distance as an observer. A veteran himself (he was almost killed by 
a shell in the Caucasian Wars), Tolstoi sets his readers on a long road to 
fear, the central emotion in these stories, suggesting that one of his aims 
was to elicit fear in his readers. He starts with a description of the whole 
gamut of sensory impressions that overwhelm the soldier, including the 
howling of bombs, the pinging of bullets, and the booming of bursting 
10. See Jeffrey Brooks, When Russia Learned to Read: Literacy and Popular Literature, 
1861–1917 (Princeton, 1985); Louise McReynolds, The News under Russia’s Old Regime: The 
Development of a Mass-Circulation Press (Princeton, 1991). The ﬁ rst Russian crime story (de-
tektiv) appeared in 1866. See Norbert Franz, Moskauer Mordgeschichte: Der russisch-sowjetische 
Krimi 1953–1983 (Mainz, 1988), 67. For the establishment of a similar link between the 
rise of the genre of gothic novels and new fear modes, see Philip Fisher, The Vehement Pas-
sions (Princeton, 2002), 9–11.
11. On the connection between Stendhal and Tolstoi, see Gottfried Schwarz, Krieg 
und Roman: Untersuchungen zu Stendhal, Hugo, Tolstoj, Zola und Simon (Frankfurt am Main, 
1992), esp. 85. Also see Clarence A. Manning, “The Signiﬁ cance of Tolstoy’s War Stories,” 
PMLA 52, no. 4 (December 1937): 1161– 69 (I am grateful to Benjamin Schenk for di-
recting me to this literature). Tolstoi’s Sevastopol Sketches were widely received. To get an 
inkling of how shocking (because realistic) the description of soldiers’ emotions seemed 
to contemporaries, consider writer Aleksei Pisemskii’s letter to his friend, playwright Alek-
sandr Ostrovskii, about “Sevastopol in May”: “Horror takes hold of you, your hair stands 
on end just from imagining what is happening there. The story is written in such a relent-
lessly honest manner that reading it becomes almost unbearable. Deﬁ nitely read it!” A. F. 
Pisemskii, “Pismo A. N. Ostrovskomu ot 26 iulia 1855 goda,” in A. F. Pisemskii: Materialy i 
issledovaniia (Moscow, 1936), 82.






shells. “Suddenly you realize, in an entirely new way, the true signiﬁ cance 
of those sounds of gunﬁ re you heard from the town. [ . . . ] You start 
thinking more about yourself and less about what you observe around 
you, and are suddenly gripped by an unpleasant sense of indecision. The 
sight of a soldier glissading downhill over the wet mud, waving his arms 
and laughing, silences this cowardly voice that has begun to speak within 
you at the prospect of danger, however, and you ﬁ nd yourself straighten-
ing your chest, lifting your head a little higher.” 12 In what follows, Tolstoi 
creates a sense of mounting danger. Fear in Tolstoi arrives excruciatingly 
slowly; it is as though the narrative strategy of evoking fear overpowers his 
photographic realism, as though a war between two narrative strategies is 
taking place, with realism losing out to emotionally conditioning readers. 
The ﬁ rst utterance of the fear word terror is climactic (and mirrored by the 
narrator’s arrival at the apex of one of Sevastopol’s defensive hills): “You 
think you hear a cannonball land not far from you; all around you seem to 
hear the various sounds that bullets make—from the ones that hum like 
bees to the ones that whistle rapidly by or twang with a noise like a plucked 
string; you hear the terrible boom of an artillery discharge: it shakes you 
to the core and inspires you with a profound sense of dread. ‘So this is it, 
the 4th bastion, that dreadful, truly dreadful place,’ you think to yourself, 
experiencing a slight feeling of pride, and an anything-but-slight feeling 
of suppressed terror.” 13
From now on Tolstoi maps that vast and multifarious terrain he calls 
“a whole world of feelings.” 14 He describes the corporeal aspects of sol-
diers’ fear—the heart-pounding, sweating, breathing difﬁ culties, pallor, 
and cold blood.15 He describes the phenomenon of thrill (Angstlust—as 
Michael Balint called it)—“a strange blend of fear and enjoyment.” 16 He 
describes how both soldiers and ofﬁ cers feign bravery. He describes cow-
ardice and the fear of appearing a coward to others. For Tolstoi there 
is only one hope: religion—its practices (prayer, icons) and its prom-
ise (life after death). At the very end of his second story, “Sevastopol in 
May,” Tolstoi legitimizes his realism in religious terms. “It might be sup-
posed that when these men— Christians, recognizing the same great law 
of love—see what they have done, they will instantly fall to their knees in 
order to repent before Him who, when he gave them life, placed in the 
soul of each, together with the fear of death, a love of the good and the 
beautiful, and that they will embrace one another with tears of joy and 
happiness, like brothers. Not a bit of it! [ . . . ] No, the hero of my story, 
whom I love with all my heart and soul, whom I have attempted to portray 
in his beauty and who has always been, is now and will always be supremely 
12. Leo Tolstoy, The Cossacks and Other Stories, trans. David McDuff and Paul Foote 
(New York, 2006), 196.
13. Ibid., 196 –97.
14. Ibid., 242.
15. Ibid., 231–32, 326.
16. Ibid., 199. On Angstlust, see Rainer Maria Kiesow and Martin Korte, eds., EGB: 
Emotionales Gesetzbuch. Dekalog der Gefühle (Cologne, 2005), 34 –38.
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magniﬁ cent, is truth.” 17 With a love for truth, grounded in the Christian 
virtue of charity, Tolstoi proffered ofﬁ cers—and indirectly soldiers—a 
strong argument to break the silence of their fear. Thus an idiosyncratic 
realism with Christian-Tolstoian undertones contributed to a signiﬁ cant 
expansion of the boundaries of what could be said about soldierly fear in 
nineteenth-century Russia.
The Place of Fear in Russian Military Psychology I: Before the 1860s
In late nineteenth-century North America and Europe (including Rus-
sia), the medical ﬁ elds of psychiatry, neuropathology/neurology, psychol-
ogy, and psychoanalysis developed and differentiated rapidly. The mili-
tary had a much greater part in this than histories of psychiatry usually 
acknowledge.18 The military looked to the psychological medical sciences 
to treat—in order to restore to ﬁ ghting capability—soldiers who suffered 
from nervous disorders, and medical scientists looked to soldier-patients to 
observe, classify, and indeed create the symptoms, causes, and treatments 
of nervous ailments. At the center of it all was fear. How fear moved there 
only becomes clear by taking a closer look at the institutional, political, 
and ideational contours of the evolution of the psychomedical sciences.
Until the early 1920s Russia followed the western and central European 
pattern of development, some time lag and differences notwithstanding.19 
As for institutions, insane people were largely left under the purview of 
their family, local communities, the church, and monasteries until the 
ﬁ rst insane asylums were established during Peter I’s reign. In 1832 an 
insane asylum opened at St. Petersburg’s Hospital of All Mourners under 
the direction of ﬁ rst I. F. Riul, and later F. I. Gertsog, who both have been 
termed the “grandfathers” of Russian psychiatry. In the 1830s psychiatry 
was included in the curriculum of regular medical students but remained 
a marginal subject. The state university statute of 1835 advanced psychia-
try, but it was the Crimean War—and Russia’s 1856 defeat in it—that gave 
17. Tolstoy, The Cossacks and Other Stories, 254 –55.
18. This is probably due to the nonmilitary disciplinary backgrounds of most histo-
rians of psychiatry. There are exceptions to this downplaying of the military’s role. See 
Friedlander, “Psychiatrists and Crisis in Russia, 1880–1917”; Paul Wanke, Russian/Soviet 
Military Psychiatry, 1904 –1945 (London, 2005); Richard A. Gabriel, Soviet Military Psychia-
try: The Theory and Practice of Coping with Battle Stress (New York, 1986). These accounts also 
differ from the story of professsionalization Julie Vail Brown tells in her pioneering “The 
Professionalization of Russian Psychiatry: 1857–1911” (PhD diss., University of Pennsylva-
nia, 1981).
19. This is based above all on Friedlander, “Psychiatrists and Crisis in Russia, 1880–
1917.” Also see Brown, “The Professionalization of Russian Psychiatry: 1857–1911”; Ga-
briel, Soviet Military Psychiatry; Irina Sirotkina, Diagnosing Literary Genius: A Cultural History 
of Psychiatry in Russia, 1880 –1930 (Baltimore, 2002). On psychology, see Daniel Philip 
Todes, “From Radicalism to Scientiﬁ c Convention: Biological Psychology in Russia from 
Sechenov to Pavlov” (PhD diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1981); Seniavskaia, Psikholo-
giia voiny v XX veke. On psychoanalysis, see Aleksandr Etkind, Eros nevozmozhnogo: Istoriia 
psikhoanaliza v Rossii (St. Petersburg, 1993); and Martin A. Miller, Freud and the Bolsheviks: 
Psychoanalysis in Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union (New Haven, 1998).






the greatest boost to psychiatry. The military defeat not only spawned the 
Great Reforms and thus the educational professionalization of psychiatry, 
but it also—and this is often overlooked—made clear to military ofﬁ -
cials that in future wars the psychological sciences would play a crucial 
role in restoring soldiers to full ﬁ ghting power, which would become ever 
more necessary given the elements of modern warfare foreshadowed in 
the Crimean War.
In the greater tree of medical knowledge and institutionally (uni-
versity departments, hospitals, state licensing), a combined psychiatric-
neurological branch began growing out of internal medicine from the 
1850s onward.20 In the 1890s psychiatry and neurology began to separate, 
and later psychoanalysis grew out of psychiatry. By 1900 Russian psychiatry 
could be said to have “come of age.” 21 It is impossible to disentangle the 
military and civilian sides of these developments. Sufﬁ ce it to say that the 
“father” of Russian psychiatry, I. M. Balinskii, was a military physician by 
training; that St. Petersburg was the undisputed center of medical learn-
ing in large measure due to the presence of capital-city state institutions, 
ﬁ rst of all the War Ministry; and that the best-funded institution of medi-
cal education was the Military-Medical Academy in St. Petersburg (later 
Leningrad), which only ceded this position to civilian universities in the 
1940s under Iosif Stalin. The Russo-Japanese War, the First Balkan War 
of 1912, and World War I gave a great boost to military psychiatry; the 
Russo-Japanese War, which produced an estimated 6,225 total Russian 
cases of “hysteria and nervous exhaustion” and is often considered the 
ﬁ rst modern war or World War Zero, was watched closely by the outside 
world because, as the American military psychiatrist Captain R. L. Rich-
ards observed in 1910, “for the ﬁ rst time in the history of the world mental 
diseases were separately cared for by specialists from the ﬁ ring line back 
to the home country.” 22 By the second decade of the twentieth century, 
Russia had become the leader in global military psychiatry.
20. These roots in internal medicine led to the curious fact that such medical jour-
nals as Voenno-meditsinskii zhurnal continued to feature psychiatric articles under a rubric 
of “internal diseases” well into the twentieth century and long after psychiatry had become 
an established branch of medicine.
21. This is attested by its move out of the conﬁ nes of purely medical and psychiatric 
“scientiﬁ c” journals into the premier military journal, Voennyi sbornik, and by its inﬂ uence 
on other branches of knowledge and the arts—literature, painting, and theater. On this, 
see Etkind, Eros nevozmozhnogo, and Sirotkina, Diagnosing Literary Genius.
22. For the number of shell-shocked soldiers, see Wanke, Russian/Soviet Military Psy-
chiatry, 18. For the quote by the American military psychiatrist, see R. L. Richards, “Mental 
and Nervous Diseases in the Russo-Japanese War,” Military Surgeon 26 (1910): 177. The 
western reception of the Russian experience with mental illness in the Russo-Japanese 
War was based not only on the exchange of expert knowledge but also on the treatment of 
Russian ofﬁ cers in German psychiatric sanatoria. On this, see Hans-Georg Hofer, Nerven-
schwäche und Krieg: Modernitätskritik und Krisenbewältigung in der österreichischen Psychiatrie 
(1880 –1920) (Vienna, 2004), 205. The Russo-Japanese War is often regarded as World 
War Zero but in fact many wars have been tagged the “ﬁ rst” modern war (most recently 
the Napoleonic wars), see David A. Bell, The First Total War: Napoleon’s Europe and the Birth 
of Warfare as We Know It (Boston, 2007). Thus the deﬁ nition of what constitutes a modern 
war and, even if one agrees on the criteria, the designation of war, is exceedingly dif-
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Russian psychiatrists themselves frequently turned to the past of their 
own discipline.23 Their histories and periodizations—religious care, 
Peter I, the establishment of the Medical-Surgical Academy in 1798, and 
the inﬂ uence of western psychiatry—resembled each other greatly, but 
the locus of fear in these shifted markedly. In A. L. Shcheglov’s 1899 his-
torical overview of Russian psychiatry, fear surfaced only twice, and one 
of these times, almost, but not quite, as a psychological cause for mental 
disorders. This emerges in his recounting of German psychiatrist Werner 
Nasse’s writing on the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 and once in an account 
of German psychiatrist Rudolf Arndt’s work on the Franco-Prussian War of 
1870–1871, where fear was clearly portrayed as pathogenic. A mere eight 
years later, M. O. Shaikevich squarely placed fear at the center of pathog-
eny for mental disorders and eventually even elevated fear to a cipher for 
a multitude of pathogenic factors in wartime.24 The proliferation of fear, 
now both pathogen and symptom, was spawned and sped up by the Russo-
Japanese War on the one hand and by the 1905 Revolution on the other. 
While the Russo-Japanese War had made it patently obvious that soldiers 
broke down with nervous disorders in modern war, and that fear was critical 
in this, the revolution of 1905 deﬁ nitively opened the discursive ﬂ oodgates: 
widespread talk of fear in society—fear of revolution and chaos—made it 
possible to talk of soldierly fear as well and to insert fear retroactively in 
the Russian psychiatric profession’s version of its own history.25 Psychia-
trists were now able to write self-conﬁ dently that while “the leaders of the 
medical institutions could claim that there were no soldiers suffering from 
nervous disorders” in the Crimean and Russo-Turkish Wars, in truth “of 
course there were nervous disorders; [ . . . ] it is only because the doctors 
at the time had an inadequate knowledge of nervous disease that these 
disorders were not recognized and ﬁ led under other diagnoses.” 26
ﬁ cult as the boundaries are ﬂ uid. For a statistics-based argument that premodern wars 
were more modern than modern wars if the number of involved civilians is the criterion, 
see Dieter Langewiesche, “Eskalierte die Kriegsgewalt im Laufe der Geschichte?” in Jörg 
Baberowski, ed., Moderne Zeiten? Krieg, Revolution und Gewalt im 20. Jahrhundert (Göttingen, 
2006), 12–36.
23. According to Angela Brintlinger, “they also aggressively wrote their own history 
and, by the late nineteenth century, constructing those histories had become a primary 
source of their legitimacy.” Thus history or, rather, a lineage psychiatrists identiﬁ ed for 
themselves was meant to provide stability for a profession that still felt insecure about it-
self. See Angela Brintlinger, “Writing about Madness: Russian Attitudes toward Psyche and 
Psychiatry, 1887–1907,” in Brintlinger and Vinitsky, eds., Madness and the Mad in Russian 
Culture, 173.
24. See A. Shcheglov, “Materialy k izucheniiu dushevnykh rasstroistv v armii,” Vo-
enno-meditsinskii zhurnal 77, no. 11 (1899): 863 (Nasse), 870 (Arndt); M. O. Shaikevich, 
“K voprosu o dushevnykh zabolevaniiakh v voiske v sviazi s Russko-Iaponskoi voinoi,” 
Voenno-meditsinskii zhurnal 85, no. 6 (1907): 276 –92; Shaikevich, “K voprosu o dushevnykh 
zabolevaniiakh v voiske v sviazi s Russko-Iaponskoi voinoi,” Voenno-meditsinskii zhurnal 85, 
no. 9 (1907): 86 (fear as a shorthand for a panoply of pathogenic factors).
25. See, e.g., F. Kh. Gadziatskii, “Dushevnye rasstroistva v sviazi s politicheskimi soby-
tiiami v Rossii,” Voenno-meditsinskii zhurnal 86, no. 9 (1908): 97.
26. G. Shumkov, “Filosofskaia pokornost sudbe i boleznennoe malodushie,” Voennyi 
sbornik 57, no. 1 (1914): 109.






Psychiatrists’ historicizing insider writings on the place of fear in psy-
chiatry are one thing, but what does fear’s trajectory in the psychiatric 
sciences look like from the outside? An 1834 book, The Experience of the 
Military-Medical Police, or: Rules for the Healthcare of the Russian Soldiers of 
the Land Forces, explicitly mentioned fear only once; when discussing the 
advantages of the Russians, Ukrainians, and Cossacks over other ethnic 
groups of the empire, the book stresses the idea that these three particu-
lar peoples tend to be “brought up in fear of God.” 27 True, the book en-
couraged ofﬁ cers to shape the will of their soldiers so that they can “over-
come all needs, difﬁ culties, and dangers in order to defeat the enemy, 
without kindling depressing passions in them or weakening their mental 
powers.” 28 But on the whole the categories in which fear could be dis-
cussed or almost discussed were still in the realm of morality and religion 
rather than medicine and psychology, and the strong ethnic component 
in the description of soldiers deduced national character from climate 
and religion rather than genes or individual personality types. Insofar as 
diseases surface, these are epidemics caused by a lack of hygiene, and 
insofar as feelings surface, these are primarily religious and patriotic feel-
ings caused by national character (“v strakhe Bozhiem, liubvi i pokornosti 
k GOSUDARIU”).29 The emotionalization (“feelingization” would be a 
better term because feelings and passions had yet to turn into scientiﬁ c 
“emotions”) of religion, the tsar cult, and patriotism had gotten under-
way, which, together with such existing physiological feeling categories in 
Russian as organy chuvstv (sensory organs) and obman chuvstv (hallucina-
tion), was crucial in preparing the linguistic ground for the later medi-
calization of soldierly fear.30 This language of emotions is also evident in 
A. Kislov’s Military Morality (1838), in which fear of God and love for tsar 
and fatherland are considered inborn qualities; heroism is depicted as a 
natural outgrowth of these qualities and hence independent of any kind 
of remuneration, material (money), symbolic (medals), or otherwise; of-
ﬁ cer and soldier are said to be bound by feelings of love and gratitude.31
27. Roman Chetyrkin, Opyt voenno-meditsinskoi politsii, ili pravila k sokhraneniiu zdorovia 
russkikh soldat v sukhoputnoi sluzhbe (St. Petersburg, 1834), 66. Politsiia in the title signiﬁ ed 
early modern Policey rather than the contemporary “police.” The very ﬁ rst mentioning of 
strakh was a case unrelated to our concerns, namely a description of a “negro [negr]” who 
lost consciousness in London when lying on the operating table for aneurysm and was 
found dead after the operation, literally as a result of “fear.” “Deistvie strakha,” Voenno-
meditsinskii zhurnal 2 (1823): 285– 86.
28. Chetyrkin, Opyt voenno-meditsinskoi politsii, 62.
29. Ibid., 66. Emphasis in the original.
30. On organy chuvstv and obman chuvstv, see, e.g., F. Kh. Gadziatskii, “O vliianii dush-
evnobolnykh drug na druga,” Voenno-meditsinskii zhurnal 76, no. 12 (1898): 1555, 1567.
31. A. Kislov, Voennaia nravstvennost (St. Petersburg, 1838), 32, 79, 47. Consider also 
the rich lexicon of an ideal soldier’s emotional traits, presented on a mere two pages: 
nenavist towards the enemy, zapalchivost, smelost, revnost k dolzhnosti, chuvstvo obiazannosti. 
Ibid., 72–73. The taxonomy of feelings, to be sure, is still confused and replete with non 
sequiturs: despite the religiosity and patriotism with which soldiers are supposedly univer-
sally equipped by birth, the decisive, superordinate feeling of “good nature” or “virtue” 
(velikodushie) is variable according to soldier, which is why, when faced with danger, not 
all soldiers exhibit “fearlessness” (neustrashimost) and some fall prey to the worst of all 
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Despite introducing a language of feelings, then, these 1830s works 
still belong to a universe of honor and the duel, a universe in which the 
negation neustrashimost was sayable but strakh was not and in which Kutu-
zov showed tears not of fear but of grief, and only once, namely, when he 
was forced to condemn two of his soldiers to death.32 This did not change 
overnight. The Crimean War, Tolstoi’s Sevastopol Sketches, and the military 
reform during the Great Reforms, accelerated this continuum of change. 
Part of the military reform was intended to give soldiers better training 
and one result was a new doctrine and a manual of training. Here the 
work of General Mikhail Dragomirov deserves to be singled out.33
General Dragomirov and the Doctrine of Controlled Berserkerdom
Mikhail Dragomirov (1830–1905) quickly rose through the military ranks 
and was sent to western Europe in the late 1850s to study tactics and the 
training of recruits. After his return to Reform-era Russia, not only was 
he instrumental in revising basic military training, but he also served as a 
private tutor to several tsareviches. His active military duty included the 
suppression of the Polish 1863 uprising, his participation in the Second 
Prussian Army during the War of 1866, and especially his command over 
the Fourth Division in the victorious Russo-Turkish War. He was wounded 
in that war and henceforth directed the Military Academy in St. Peters-
burg, where he excelled as Russia’s most productive—and widely read, 
both at home and abroad—military theoretician.34
The fear problem was at the heart of Dragomirov’s inﬂ uential military 
theoretical writings. Dragomirov started from an axiomatic assumption 
about human nature: “the willingness to suffer and to die, that is, self-
sacriﬁ ce,” was universal.35 According to Dragomirov, the Russian variant 
of self-sacriﬁ ce was marked by the soldier’s special loyalty toward his fa-
soldierly feelings, “timidity” (robost). See ibid., 105– 6, 58, 67– 68, 77–78. Kislov also dis-
tinguishes between khrabrost, which he considers an innate quality, and muzhestvo, which 
he describes as a product of training. See ibid., 69–70.
32. See ibid., 92, 90, 98. On honor and the duel, see also Ute Frevert, Men of Honour: 
A Social and Cultural History of the Duel (Cambridge, Eng., 1995); Irina Reyfman, Ritualized 
Violence Russian Style: The Duel in Russian Culture and Literature (Stanford, 1999). The quote 
by Petrov from the War of 1812 cited at the beginning of this article is a typical expression 
of this culture of honor. On the pre-Petrine culture of honor, see Nancy Shields Koll-
mann, By Honor Bound: State and Society in Early Modern Russia (Ithaca, 1999).
33. Dragomirov came not from psychiatry but from military theory, and yet he be-
longs in this genealogy because military psychologists (not so much psychiatrists, but 
the borders between psychologists and psychiatrists were ﬂ uid anyway, as we have seen) 
learned and cited from him liberally.
34. See Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th ed. (New York, 1910–1911), 8:466.
35. Michail Iwanowitsch Dragomirow, “Ausbildung und Erziehung,” in Michail Iwano-
witsch Dragomirow, Gesammelte Aufsätze: Neue Folge, trans. Freiherr von Tettau (Hannover, 
1891), 19. On Dragomirov, see also Joshua Sanborn, “The Short Course for Murder: How 
Soldiers and Criminals Learn to Kill,” in Lonnie Athens and Jeffery T. Ulmer, eds., Violent 
Acts and Violentization: Assessing, Applying, and Developing Lonnie Athens’ Theories (Oxford, 
2003), 109. To be sure, the axiom of a survival instinct as a soldier’s most basic feeling has 
a longer genealogy, going back to Aleksandr Suvorov and Carl von Clausewitz.






therland, embodied in the tsar. The Russian soldier was characterized 
by “a feeling of duty toward tsar and fatherland, a feeling that goes as 
far as self-denial.” 36 Self-denial in Dragomirov’s scheme constituted the 
antipode to self-preservation.37 The key to the victory of self-denial over 
self-preservation was drill, especially the training of obedience. The most 
effective antidote to fear, in other words, was practice and routine. It was 
only logical that maneuvers in peacetime ought to be as realistic—as fear-
inducing—as possible.38
A crucial part of the Dragomirov theory was the doctrine of controlled 
berserkerdom. Dragomirov believed the Russian army differed from west-
ern armies in its emphasis on morale instead of military technology, and 
the Russian soldier differed from the western soldier in his ability to un-
leash and reign in his aggressions without using modern ﬁ re weapons 
and in a manner that was fundamentally superior to that of the western 
soldier, who had become weak and decadent because of modern life.39 
This doctrine is often expressed in the short formula “bayonets before 
bullets” (pulia dura—shtyk molodets).40 At bottom, we have an attempt to 
resuscitate the premodern immediacy of face-to-face warfare. Paradoxi-
cally, Dragomirov’s doctrine was based on an image of self that stemmed 
from the Enlightenment and modernity: only an autonomous, rational 
subject can, on command, start and stop himself from going berserk. Put 
differently, in order to conceive of the subject’s planned retreat from rea-
son, this subject ﬁ rst has to be endowed with reason.
The Dragomirov doctrine was turned into normative documents (for 
example, via the ﬁ rst new infantry regulation since 1831, the Ustav stroevoi 
pekhotnoi sluzhby, published in 1866) and Russian soldiers received their 
training on its basis until World War I. With this doctrine Russia devel-
oped an “emotional regime” that openly revolved around fear surpris-
36. M. I. Dragomirov, “Podgotovka voisk v mirnoe vremia (vospitanie i obrazovanie),” 
in M. I. Dragomirov, Izbrannye trudy: Voprosy vospitaniia i obucheniia voisk (Moscow, 1956), 625.
37. “The express enemy of self-denial is self-preservation. [ . . . ] In fact we are not 
dealing with two different forces, only with two poles of the same power: the self-denial of 
the individual is the precondition for the self-preservation of the masses.” Dragomirow, 
“Ausbildung und Erziehung,” 19. This dialectic proved highly inﬂ uential and had cameo 
appearances as, inter alia, the instinct of self-preservation versus patriotism in V. Zaglu-
khinskii, “Psikhika boitsov vo vremia srazheniia,” Voennyi sbornik 54, no. 1 (1911): 87.
38. Dragomirow, “Ausbildung und Erziehung,” 31. But according to Dragomirov and 
in line with the liberalism of the Reform era, the fear that ofﬁ cers inspired in soldiers 
could also cause harmful soldierly fear. Only just, law-abiding behavior on the part of 
ofﬁ cers could keep this particular fear of soldiers in check: “Is there anything we should 
scorn more in the soldier than the kind of fear that paralyzes spirit and will? This is why 
soldiers must be led in such a way that the feeling of fear can develop in their souls as rarely 
as possible, for he who fears his own men, is taught to fear the enemy, too.” Dragomirov, 
“Podgotovka voisk v mirnoe vremia,” 605.
39. This was, at heart, a conservative view. In a similar vein, forty years later one 
conservative doctor argued that Russia was lucky to boast a 50-plus percent illiteracy rate 
among its soldiers, because this guarded against the corrosive effects of education, which 
invariably had such negative consequences as critical attitudes toward ofﬁ cers. See Zaglu-
khinskii, “Psikhika boitsov vo vremia srazheniia,” 89.
40. See also Bruce W. Menning, Bayonets before Bullets: The Imperial Russian Army, 
1861–1914 (Bloomington, 1992).
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ingly early—with the express goal, of course, of channeling, managing, 
and ultimately overcoming this fear.41 Thus, Tolstoi’s realist ﬁ ction and 
Dragomirov’s military theorizing were the ﬁ rst stages in a wider rhetoric 
of soldierly fear. They prepared the ground for early public talk about 
fear by high-ranking ofﬁ cers in the aftermath of the Russo-Turkish War 
(1877–1878). General Mikhail Skobelev, for example, wrote, “There is no 
one who does not fear death; and if someone tells you that he does not 
fear death—spit in his eye; he is lying. I myself fear death no less than ev-
eryone else. But there are people who have enough willpower not to show 
this, while others cannot restrain themselves and ﬂ ee out of fear of death. 
I have the willpower not to show that I am afraid; but the battle inside me 
is terrifying, and this has a constant effect on my heart.” 42
The Place of Fear in Russian Military Psychology II: After the 1860s
As for the psychomedical sciences proper, Russia ﬁ rst imported the idea 
that fear caused nervous disorders in soldiers from Germany in 1873, that 
is, in the immediate aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War.43 The next 
milestone was A. I. Ozeretskovskii’s 1891 dissertation “On Hysteria in the 
Army.” 44 One of the ﬁ rst Russian commentators to factor fear into the 
equation, Ozeretskovskii denied that fear caused hysteria. The etiology of 
“male hysteria,” which he found occurred mostly in young soldiers, boiled 
down to a notion of psychological trauma stemming from causes under-
stood in exclusively physiological terms—“dropping off the gymnastic lad-
41. “Emotional regime” is from William Reddy, who deﬁ nes it as “the set of normative 
emotions and the ofﬁ cial rituals, practices, and emotives that express and inculcate them; 
a necessary underpinning of any stable political regime.” William M. Reddy, The Navigation 
of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions (Cambridge, Eng., 2001), 129. It is possible 
that other armies developed similar emotional regimes; the role of élan in the French army 
is worth studying from this perspective (I owe this point to Chad Bryant).
42. Quoted from N. N. Golovin, Issledovanie boia: Issledovanie deiatelnosti i svoistv che-
loveka kak boitsa (St. Petersburg, 1907), 52. Note also Skobelev’s pointing to his heart; on 
“soldier’s heart,” see Joel D. Howell, “ ‘Soldier’s Heart’: The Redeﬁ nition of Heart Disease 
and Specialty Formation in Early Twentieth-Century Great Britain,” in Rober Cooter, Mark 
Harrison, and Steve Sturdy, eds., War, Medicine and Modernity (Stroud, Eng., 1998), 85–105. 
Another general, Petr Parensov, confessed after the Russo-Turkish War: “It was only then 
that I noticed Turks, only Turks, who were closing in on me from all sides; there were none 
of our own soldiers in the redoubt. I was all alone. I admit, terror took hold of me [Priznaius, 
uzhas okhvatil menia].” P. D. Parensov, Iz proshlogo: Vospominaniia oﬁ tsera Generalnogo 
Shtaba (St. Petersburg, 1901–1908), 2:135, quoted in Golovin, Issledovanie boia, 141.
43. See the summary of “O. Kots’s” 1873 article in Berliner klinische Wochenschrift, “O 
vliianii strakha na razvitie bolezni,” Voenno-meditsinskii zhurnal 51, no. 9 (1873): 10–11. In 
their later historical efforts, Russian psychiatrists came up with a causal link between fear 
and nervous disorders that dated as far back as Jean Étienne Dominique Esquirol, Johann 
Christian August Heinroth, and Karl Christian Hille, Allgemeine und specielle Pathologie und 
Therapie der Seelenstörungen (Leipzig, 1827). See Shcheglov, “Materialy k izucheniiu dushev-
nykh rasstroistv v armii,” 862.
44. For the avtoreferat, see A. Ozeretskovskii, “Ob isterii v voiskakh,” Voenno-meditsinskii 
zhurnal 69, no. 11 (1891): 371. Ozeretskovskii was later often presented as the Russian 
discoverer of male hysteria. See, for example, Pospelov, “K voprosu ob isterii u soldat,” 
Voenno-meditsinskii zhurnal 76, no. 8 (1898): 1138.






der or trapeze, infelicitous jumps, and similar downfalls or injuries” as well 
as light and sound impressions, in one case “caused by continuous work 
in an electric light factory, where the factory light itself was electrical.” 45 
Ozeretskovskii’s uncoupling of fear from mental disease dominated the 
discussion for about a decade until this uncoupling gave way to an under-
standing of fear as the primary cause of mental illness, an understanding 
that, as we have seen, was around before the Russo-Japanese War but be-
came more common and more highly charged because it was intertwined 
with the massive social crisis of the 1905 Revolution. This shift was not a 
sudden but a gradual move that included such spurts as a physical trauma-
cum-“fright” (ispug) pathogen that saw fear as a symptom of illness (“after 
fright from some loud thunder”); and a patient’s identiﬁ cation of fear as 
a cause of his illness while the doctor denied this causal link.46
As for the image of human nature that lay at the bottom of ﬁ rst 
Ozeretskovskii’s, then others’ etiology, there were, in essence, two options: 
either fear was a component of human nature, or fear was unnatural. This 
binary opposition received a highly inﬂ uential label in 1911, when Voen-
nyi sbornik published an article that identiﬁ ed two “doctrines” regarding 
the fear of soldiers—a “romantic doctrine” and a “realistic doctrine.” As 
the author M. V. Envald explicated it, the romantic doctrine saw fear as 
an aberration from the norm of brave, fearless soldiers, while the realistic 
doctrine assumed that all soldiers experience fear before, during, and 
often after battle.47 This binary of a romantic versus a realistic doctrine 
provided a language for an existing opposition and, after it began to cir-
culate in the military-scientiﬁ c community, was cited again and again. 
Thus fear in military psychiatry was a discursive ﬁ eld demarcated by two 
poles— on the one hand an image of soldiers who were constitutionally 
fearless (the “romantic doctrine”); on the other hand an image of soldiers 
who were constitutionally fearful (the “realistic doctrine”). Over time the 
latter came to dominate, though this was not a linear development and 
one that requires qualiﬁ cation depending on the group one is speaking 
about (generals, ofﬁ cers, soldiers, or military psychiatrists). Unsurpris-
ingly, military psychiatrists always tended toward this latter pole; after all, 
they owed their jobs—treating soldiers for fear-induced disorders—to 
the existence of soldierly fear.
There were other reasons why Russian military psychiatrists were likely 
to believe that their patients’ symptoms resulted, not from personality 
(the “cowardly” type), innate mental disorders merely triggered by an 
eerie moment in war, or mental-cum-moral retardation (the female-coded 
“prissy” or biological “degenerate”), but from war-related events too trau-
45. Ozeretskovskii, “Ob isterii v voiskakh,” 371.
46. See Ia. P. Gorshkov, “K kazuistike psikhozov siﬁ liticheskogo proiskhozhdeniia,” 
Voenno-meditsinskii zhurnal 76, no. 8 (1898): 1168; E. Erikson, “Dva sluchaia tiazheloi isterii 
na pochve samovnusheniia,” Voenno-meditsinskii zhurnal 80, no. 11 (1902): 4185 (“Inciden-
tally, the patient himself traces his [ﬁ ts], not to his head injury or wounds, but to strong 
fright [ne ushibu golovy i raneniiam, a silnomu ispugu]”).
47. M. V. Envald, “Dve doktriny boevogo vospitaniia voisk,” Voennyi sbornik 54, no. 1 
(1911): 101– 6.
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matic to be managed by the coping mechanisms soldiers had at their dis-
posal. Russian military psychiatrists by and large belonged to the liberal 
intelligentsia and the chasm that separated them from the autocracy was 
wider than that between military psychiatrists and the state in western Eu-
rope. Consequently their empathetic hearts and social consciences sided 
with the common soldier. Of consequence too is the fact that Russia never 
produced the kind of veteran pension debate that took place in Germany, 
where breakdown in battle was aggressively essentialized and depicted as 
the phenotypical expression of a preexisting genetic disposition—in or-
der to absolve the state from having to pay the follow-up costs, namely 
veteran pensions, as Paul Lerner has convincingly argued.48
The dominant realistic approach to fear provided plenty of room for 
deﬁ nition, differentiation, and discussion. Scientists customarily began 
with a description of the symptoms and then moved to the deﬁ nitions of 
different kinds of fear (for this they used the Russian terms strakh, ispug, 
trepet, boiazn, trevoga, panika, and others). In an article for the general 
reading public, the head of the psychiatric ward at the military hospital 
in Harbin during the Russo-Japanese War and the preeminent military 
psychiatrist during the ﬁ rst two decades of the twentieth century, Grigorii 
Shumkov, summarized the panorama of feelings a soldier experienced: 
“Soldiers go through a lot; they fear, they get angry, they rejoice, some-
times they despair, they hope, they believe in victory, are disappointed 
and start to believe again. Life in a war is a striking kaleidoscope of differ-
ent feelings, feelings that people experience in time of peace as well, but 
that get expressed more clearly and vividly in war.” 49 From this followed a 
distinct set of tasks for the military psychiatrist, which Shumkov also sum-
marized: “Followers of the second, realistic school [pace Envald] [ . . . ] 
attempt to study man, the psychophysical nature of the soldier, they try to 
penetrate into the realm of psychological phenomena; they try to explore 
the laws of soldiers’ psyches in armed conﬂ icts, and having analyzed these 
laws, they explain to future soldiers the nature of these phenomena and 
recommend means of ﬁ ghting these undesirable phenomena.” Eager to 
elevate nervous disorders to the status that respectable, bacteriological 
diseases enjoyed and to indicate that nervous disorders could be studied 
in a comparable rational manner, Shumkov drew parallels between the 
fear of soldiers and cholera: “In order to ﬁ ght cholera it is essential to 
study cholera. [ . . . ] In order to ﬁ ght fear of death in war, the followers of 
the second, realistic school study the manifestations of this fear; in order 
48. Infamously, in Germany the minority opinion of psychiatrist Max Nonne and oth-
ers that the war merely acted as a catalyst for preexisting psychological disorders and the 
state was thus freed from its monetary obligation to shell-shocked soldiers was elevated 
to majority status at the September 1916 military psychiatry congress in Munich, whereas 
the majority opinion of Hermann Oppenheim that the war itself was the cause of mental 
disease and hence the state responsible for pension claims was relegated to a marginal 
position. On this, see Lerner, Hysterical Men. It is also important to note that Russia never 
had the same kind of prolonged debates about compensation for industrial injuries that 
sowed the ground for German doctors’ attitudes during World War I.
49. See, e.g., Sh—[most likely Grigorii Shumkov], “ ‘Za’ i ‘protiv’ voennoi psikho-
logii,” Voennyi sbornik 55, no. 8 (1912): 72.






to avoid panic, they strive to analyze its nature, genesis, manifestation, 
dissemination, etc.” 50 Shumkov’s ﬁ nal conclusion was that “the science of 
military psychology is indispensable.” 51
As time went by, psychiatrists’ descriptions of the symptoms of fear grew 
more complex and multifaceted.52 Grigorii Shumkov’s study of the “men-
tal state of soldiers” before, during, and after combat is unsurpassed in 
this regard. Drawing upon his own practice and a wealth of other sources, 
Shumkov construed an ideal-typical soldier and followed his psychologi-
cal state through a battle. At least one of his thick descriptions deserves 
closer scrutiny; the pre-combat stage is particularly apt, since if we are 
to believe Shumkov, it exceeds combat and post-combat on the anxiety 
scale. The “psycho-physiological” picture of the soldier before combat 
starts with preparations for battle and the background noise of artillery; 
everybody is waiting for the order to go. “The soldiers all start digging in 
their notebooks, purses, and bags, they pull out the letters and read them. 
Most of them get burned after having been quickly reread. They hand 
each other notes and verbal requests: ‘If I die, send this home and let 
them know that I thought of them’ . . . Many religious soldiers take their 
sacred icons out, cross themselves zealously, kiss the icons, and hang them on 
their chest.” 53 After the “last” tasks of existential signiﬁ cance have been 
completed, soldiers turn to ﬁ xing their uniforms, their equipment, and 
especially their weapon. Because soldiers are so nervous, “boots and belt 
hurt more noticeably than in peacetime.” 54 Throughout it is impossible 
50. Ibid., 76. In line with the liberalism of the military psychiatric establishment, 
Shumkov at times seemed to believe in straightforward enlightenment: If doctors only 
properly explained to soldiers that their physiological signs of fear before combat were 
normal, soldiers would not consider themselves sick and would continue ﬁ ghting. “Some-
times before a battle, during the waiting period when the ﬁ ghting has yet to start, about 
6 – 8 percent are incapacitated, because they seriously believe they are sick. These are 
honest people, not shirkers, who are convinced that they have fallen ill (heart, breath-
ing, involuntary defecation). But their illness is the product of ignorance about the 
psycho-physiological processes in their agitated organisms [pri volneniiakh].” Ibid., 81. 
Shumkov’s liberalism might also stem from his peasant background. See G. E. Shumkov, 
Vosproizvedenie dvigatelnykh razdrazhenii aktivnogo kharaktera v zavisimosti ot istekshego vremeni. 
(Eksperimentalno-psikhologicheskoe issledovanie po metodu obektivnoi psikhologii). Dissertatsiia 
na stepen doktora meditsiny. Iz psikhologicheskoi laboratorii Akademika V. M. Bekhtereva (St. Pe-
tersburg, 1909), 163. I am grateful to Kim Friedlander for this source.
51. Sh—, “ ‘Za’ i ‘protiv’ voennoi psikhologii,” 80. A. Dmitrevskii basically concurred 
with Shumkov’s views but begged to differ in one aspect: yes, all soldiers experience 
fear and it is important that they know it; however, not its expression but its suppres-
sion must be encouraged, because if expressed, fear becomes like a virus and infects all 
other soldiers—Dmitrevskii demanded “that nobody express his fear, because this is aw-
fully infectious.” A. Dmitrevskii, “ ‘Za’ i ‘protiv’ psikhologii g-na Sh-a,” Voennyi sbornik 55, 
no. 11 (1912): 96.
52. Consider, for instance, the elaborate catalogue of soldiers’ emotions in Sh—, 
“Emotsii strakha, pechali, radosti i gneva v period ozhidaniia boia,” Voennyi sbornik 57, no. 
2 (1914): 109–18.
53. Shumkov, “Dushevnoe sostoianie voinov v ozhidanii boia. (Po nabliudeniiam oﬁ t-
serov). Voenno-psikhologicheskii etiud,” Voennyi sbornik 56, no. 5 (1913): 100. Emphasis 
in the original.
54. Ibid.
S5106.indb   274 4/23/09   11:36:53 AM





to concentrate on a single thought, “Thoughts are cascading as rapidly as 
the pictures in a movie.” 55 The atmosphere is characterized by general si-
lence and tense nervousness. “Many run off to relieve themselves, and this 
several times.” 56 Everyone tries to quench their thirst and ﬁ ll their water 
bottles. “The riﬂ e gets examined many times [ . . . ] The bag for bullets is 
also there, and hands go into it more often than necessary.” 57
Finally the unit starts moving and part of the tension disappears. The 
increasing proximity of artillery ﬁ re makes all soldiers feel “that they 
are about to die. ‘But death is better than waiting for death.’ Everybody 
pushes forward and hopes to reach the destination and some kind of end, 
any kind of end.” 58 A few hundred steps in front of the ﬁ ring zone the or-
der comes to stop and wait. “It is precisely this situation—‘stop and wait’ 
for combat—that is the most unbearable of all in war.” 59 “Not only did I 
pace back and forth from all the anxiety,” recounted one ofﬁ cer, “I think I 
rather ran and leaped . . . I couldn’t sit still in any place . . . In my soul . . . 
my heart aches so bad, hurt so much, as never before . . . You start talking 
and jump to the next topic, without ﬁ nishing the previous sentence . . . 
When you ask a comrade about something, you don’t hear his answer, 
and at the same moment it is as though you are intoxicated by your own 
thoughts. As soon as he stops talking, you wake up and ask: ‘what? What 
did you just say?’ ” 60 During this worst waiting period the receptiveness 
for rumors, half-truths, and lies grows strongest. A propaganda newspa-
per item can become the truth. “Suggestibility more than anything else 
is responsible for upswings and downswings in the mood of the troops.” 61 
If there is bad news, everyone falls silent, the mood deteriorates, and sol-
diers go into battle in a depressed state. Good news has the contrary ef-
fect, Shumkov concluded.
The symptoms that doctors observed in the Russo-Japanese War were 
one source of information. Another method of gathering data was to in-
terview soldiers after their return from the war. In 1909–1910 at the be-
hest of the military psychology section of the Society of the Devotees to 
Military Science (Obshchestvo revnitelei voennykh znanii) K. Druzhinin 
distributed a questionnaire to veterans, which included such questions 
as “How did you feel (sad, happy, angry, did you experience fear, were 
you terriﬁ ed [ispytyval li strakh, bylo li zhutko])[?]” and “Were you aware 
of danger, to what extent and when exactly[?]” (see ﬁ gure 1). The rubric 
“How did you feel physically” asked about body temperature, perspira-
tion, heartbeat, breathing, appetite, sleep, urination, and defecation. An-
other rubric, “What did you notice in others at the same time,” inquired 
about the kinds of things fellow soldiers were talking about and in what 














Figure 1. K. M. Druzhinin, Issledovanie dushevnogo sostoianiia voinov v raznykh 
sluchaiakh boevoi obstanovki po opytu russko-iaponskoi voiny 1904 –05 gg. 
(St. Petersburg, 1910), 4 –5.
surrounding you (calm, agitated, sad, pale, cyanotic-pale, etc.),” and “did 
you notice any awkwardness or trembling hands (when lighting matches, 
rolling cigarettes, loading the riﬂ e, etc.)[?]” 62
Druzhinin summarized the results of this questionnaire and inter-
spersed accounts of his own experience as a reconnaissance ofﬁ cer in the 
Russo-Japanese War. Immediately before the beginning of a battle, and 
especially “when cannon and, most important, riﬂ e shots can be heard, 
the anxiety [ . . . ] and fear of the unknown, the consciousness of a pos-
sible close death or injury, becomes maddeningly palpable in soldiers who 
are not being shot at.” 63 There was, to be sure, a learning curve or at least 
some kind of adaptation, which meant that “before the ﬁ rst battle, the 
mood was more nervous; before further battles, calmer.” 64 The soldiers’ 
ability to overcome their fear rested largely on the prospect of victory. As 
long as victory was on the horizon, soldiers were able to endure incred-
ible hardship; logically, therefore, a principal task of the successful ofﬁ cer 
62. K. M. Druzhinin, Issledovanie dushevnogo sostoianiia voinov v raznykh sluchaiakh bo-
evoi obstanovki po opytu russko-iaponskoi voiny 1904 –05 gg. (St. Petersburg, 1910), 4 – 6.
63. Ibid., 14.
64. Ibid., 60.
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was to make soldiers believe that victory was certain, even if things were 
hopeless. A command to retreat is always dangerous, since retreat runs 
the risk of dissolving into chaos and panic. During the Russo-Japanese 
war, Mukden was emblematic of everything gone awry: “To delay the main 
battle, as was the case in Mukden, and then to admit a loss and to order 
the soldiers to turn their backs on the enemy is too dangerous, in fact, it 
is totally impossible.” 65
Druzhinin’s own experience already pointed in the direction of dis-
tinguishing between different kinds of fear. Here is how he differentiated 
between two types of fear that he himself felt before his ﬁ rst-ever battle:
In late March 1904 around noon I was lying on my bed in the dark. A 
dragoon who had been sent from the sea coast appeared at the door and 
reported: “Your Honor, the Japanese have started to disembark!” I didn’t 
have to worry about hiding my excitement [volnenie], because, though I 
was able to see the dragoon standing in the light of the room next door, 
the dragoon could not see me. This message from the dragoon—never 
mind that it turned out to be a false alarm—had special meaning to me: 
for the ﬁ rst time in my army life I heard that I was about to engage in 
combat. I remember clearly that I didn’t get scared, but I did experience 
a highly uneasy feeling [trevozhnoe chuvstvo], perhaps palpitation.66
The term trevozhnoe chuvstvo would resurface three years later, when 
a number of specialists, above all Shumkov, A. S. Rezanov, and Antonii 
Dmitrevskii, the inﬂ uential editor of Voennyi sbornik and an amateur mili-
tary psychologist himself, plunged into a long discussion about the types of 
fear.67 This discussion with its obvious philosophical overtones (Søren Kier-
kegaard!) revolved around Shumkov’s thesis that “anxiety” (trevoga) was 
not goal-oriented—it was impossible to be anxious of some object—and 
ought to be separated from “fear” (strakh), which always had an object.68
A related set of issues that occupied military scientists concerned 
65. Ibid., 29.
66. Ibid., 17.
67. In 1910 Vladimir Polianskii announced in a footnote that his colleague, Shumkov, 
was working on a taxonomy of fear: “The doctor and psychiatrist G. E. Shumkov in one of 
the meetings of the ‘military psychology’ section of the Obshchestvo revinitelei voennykh 
znanii aired an approximate classiﬁ cation of the term of the emotion of fear according to 
its manifestation in the human organism.” Polianskii, “Moralnyi element v oblasti fortiﬁ -
katsii,” Voennyi sbornik 53, no. 11 (1910): note on 136. Emphasis in the original.
68. See A. S. Rezanov, Armiia i tolpa: Opyt voennoi psikhologii (Warsaw, 1910); 
G. E. Shumkov, “ ‘Vzdragivanie’ liudei pri deistvii artileriiskogo ognia (Voenno-psikho-
logicheskie etiudy),” Voennyi sbornik 57, no. 12 (1914): 59–92; G. Shumkov, “Chuvstvo 
trevogi, kak dominiruiushaia emotsiia v period ozhidaniia boia,” Voennyi sbornik 56, 
no. 11 (1913): 95–100; A. Dmitrevskii, “Trevozhnoe ozhidanie—boiazlivoe ili opasnoe 
ozhidanie,” Voennyi sbornik 57, no. 1 (1914): 103 – 6; G. Shumkov, “O vydelenii chuvstva 
trevogi v samostoiatelnoe chuvstvo,” Voennyi sbornik 57, no. 4 (1914): 121–26; G. Shumkov, 
“Psikhika boitsov pod pervym artieleriiskim obstrelom (Voenno-psikhologicheskii etiud),” 
Voennyi sbornik 57, no. 7 (1914): 121; G. Shumkov, “Ugnetenie psikhiki voinov artieleri-
iskim ognem (Voenno-psikhologicheskii etiud),” Voennyi sbornik 57, no. 8 (1914): 105; 
G. Shumkov, “Rol chuvstva trevogi v psikhologii mass, kak nachala, niveliruiushchego 
individualnosti,” Voennyi sbornik 57, no. 9 (1914): 85–94.






questions of heroism, valor (khrabrost), cowardice, and medals.69 While 
some argued that constitutionally fearless soldiers were abnormal and po-
tential sociopaths, unsuited to and even dangerous in civilian life, others, 
such as Shumkov, actively tried to reinterpret the meaning of heroism 
and to forge an image of a soldier who was fearful and heroic at the same 
time.70 After reviewing “heroes of bravery [khrabrosti],” “heroes of audac-
ity [smelosti],” “heroes of decisiveness,” and “heroes of cold-bloodedness,” 
Shumkov introduced a quiet, “unnoticeable” hero, a “hero of patience,” 
as the title of his article announced (based, most certainly, on a medical 
history from his Harbin psychiatric ward in the Russo-Japanese War). Vet-
eran Iushchenko recounted: “I am thirty years old and a peasant [ . . . ] 
and married, I have children [ . . . ] I was always healthy and went to this 
war with pleasure. I didn’t know cowardice and was never afraid, as some-
times happens with others. I knew no fear, not when getting shot at, not 
when ﬁ ghting with a bayonet. What was there to fear! If they kill me, I will 
die for the tsar and the faith; perhaps God will forgive my sins; and if I stay 
alive, thank God!”
Iushchenko was then caught by the Japanese, which he described as 
a great dishonor. After several attempts, he managed to escape. He wan-
dered through the heat for eighteen to twenty days and probably only 
survived because he drank his own urine. Eventually he was rescued by a 
Cossack reconnaissance troop who described this event as follows: “Sud-
denly we see a stark-naked man running down from a hilltop toward us 
and screaming something incomprehensible. He stumbled, fell down, 
and couldn’t get up again. Emaciated, covered with scratches, with bulg-
ing eyes, he lay there mumbling something. Our little Russian soldier has 
gone mad, we thought [ . . . ] He was constantly talking nonsense about 
the Japanese: ‘The Japanese . . . ,’ ‘the Japanese are whistling. . . .’ ” Thanks 
to the Cossacks who picked him up in this state, Iushchenko came to 
Shumkov in Harbin. Shumkov summarized his diagnosis and treatment 
as follows: “On 14 August 1904 Iushchenko was declared nervously feeble 
[nervno-slabym] and emaciated and sent home for recuperation.” Shum-
kov concluded this article, a collage of his own, medical-diagnostic voice, 
his liberal-political voice, the Cossacks’ voice, and Iushchenko’s voice (ex-
tracted from his medical history): “He, yes he, Private Iushchenko, is a 
true hero!” 71
What about the etiology of a collective version of soldier trauma that 
went beyond individual bodies and psyches? Softline liberal doctors were 
fond of locating the larger cause of the epidemic of Russian shell shock in 
the sociopolitical sphere. They reasoned that the Russo-Japanese War was 
69. Indeed, the discussion about true heroism often centered on the distribution of 
medals like the Order of St. George. See, for example, A. Dmitrevskii, “Mozhno igrat na 
slabykh strunakh, no ne vospityvat v nikh,” Voennyi sbornik 57, no. 4 (1914): 117–18.
70. As one author put it, there is such a thing as innate bravery, but “natural bravery is 
seldom sensible bravery.” B. Nikulishchev, “Moralnyi element v oblasti voennogo iskusstva 
(Opyt psikhologicheskogo issledovaniia),” Voennyi sbornik 55, no. 1 (1912): 14.
71. G. E. Shumkov, “Geroi terpeniia: Voenno-psikhologicheskii etiud,” Voennyi sbornik 
54, no. 2 (1911): 148–50.
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unpopular, hence the breakdowns of soldiers. According to these softlin-
ers, a comparison between the Russo-Turkish War and the Russo-Japanese 
War clearly showed the difference: if the narod was motivated by the 
“touching idea” of the Russo-Turkish War to “stand up for their slain Slavic 
brothers,” the “baselessness” of the Russo-Japanese War turned “society” 
against this war, or at least led to “indifference, which had an extremely 
detrimental impact on the morale of the troops.” 72
But this was just a minor strand in the psychiatric community’s discus-
sion about the larger causes of the breakdowns. Like their western col-
leagues, Russian psychiatrists were most likely to attribute this increase to 
the development of modern warfare and technology.
One doctor argued that, although technology had made huge strides, 
“man’s soul, his inner ‘I,’ remains unchanged.” 73 With the old training, 
soldiers “could be victorious at the beginning, perhaps the middle of the 
bygone [nineteenth] century, relying on the Suvorov bayonet and a feel-
ing of unconditional self-sacriﬁ ce, which is characteristic of the Russian 
soldier, but nowadays it would be too hard for them to bear the demoral-
izing impact of modern warfare with its new, destructive factors.” 74 The 
modern soldier was almost as atomized and lonely in the battleﬁ eld as 
modern man in the city: “the battleﬁ eld is empty, you can see neither 
your own soldiers nor the enemy, you don’t feel any support” and, to make 
things worse, neither auditory nor visual diversion is available (“the ban-
ners don’t ﬂ y, the music doesn’t play”).75
This is not to say that the so-called romantic, hardline doctrine ever 
completely disappeared. In fact, this doctrine’s denial of the existence 
of soldierly fear led to a greater silence on this subject, as did something 
else, namely the argument that an open discussion of soldierly fear in the 
mass media would prove infectious and produce more fearful soldiers. 
Both factors skew our view of fear’s place within military psychiatry, factors 
that are ampliﬁ ed by our own liberal bias, which makes us more likely to 
side with the liberal psychiatrists.76 There were, in short, plenty of observ-
ers who plainly denied the idea that all soldiers experienced fear.77 The 
hardliners argued that the best antidote to fear was fear— of punishment 
and shame, and more concretely, of reintroduced military colonies and 
corporeal punishment.78
72. Zaglukhinskii, “Psikhika boitsov vo vremia srazheniia,” 87.
73. Ibid., 86. By “soul” he had in mind a transcendental, religiously infused entity.
74. Druzhinin, Issledovanie dushevnogo sostoianiia voinov, 42.
75. Polianskii, “Moralnyi element v oblasti fortiﬁ katsii,” 101.
76. Ben Shephard has astutely observed about novelist Pat Barker’s Regeneration 
trilogy (and the study that served as its inspiration, Elaine Showalter, The Female Malady: 
Women, Madness, and English Culture, 1830 –1980 [New York, 1986], chap. 7) that we tend to 
overestimate the importance of humane psychiatrists, such as Rivers, the hero of Barker’s 
novels. See Ben Shephard, A War of Nerves: Soldiers and Psychiatrists in the Twentieth Century 
(Cambridge, Mass., 2001), 109.
77. See, e.g., Prasalov, “Neskolko slov k state V. Polianskogo,” 85–95; continued in 
Voennyi sbornik 54, no. 7 (1911): 87–104.
78. This is not to say that the suggested hardline solutions lacked procedural, legal 
regularity. Much of the discussion focused on forensic medicine, especially the deﬁ nition 






The liberals in turn were quick to point out that army training in its 
then-current state, with its reliance on drill and the drill masters (diadki), 
contained enough brutality and fear, which only worsened preexisting 
mental conditions; as N. Butovskii put it in 1888: “Strictness and coarse-
ness are synonyms for such a commander . . . He experiences his greatest 
pleasure when the new recruit stands in front of him at attention and 
shakes under his terrifying stare. He thinks of military service as something 
that is based on the fear that the ofﬁ cer exerts over his subordinate.” 79 As 
the liberal Shumkov demanded, “Means of frightening and intimidation 
should be eliminated from military pedagogy.” 80 Dmitrevskii concurred in 
an article that bore the programmatic title “The Education of the Soldier 
Can Only Rest on Shame of Punishment, Never on Fear of Punishment”: 
“Just as I cannot imagine a plesiosaurus on Nevskii Prospekt, neither can 
I imagine that anyone does not know what fear is and how it affects the 
organism. But I guess I have to reiterate. Fear is the expectation of evil, mis-
fortune, trouble, pain, and so forth.” 81
In the late 1890s the theories of French crowd theorist Gustave Le 
Bon began to inﬁ ltrate the arguments of both hardliners and softliners. 
Army units at all levels were thought to act like Le Bon’s hyperemotional, 
“hysterical,” feminized crowds and show a high susceptibility to external 
stimuli. Only a male ofﬁ cer could shape them and direct their function-
ing.82 From here it was a small step to the outright pathologizing of the act 
of desertion, panic, and the lack of military discipline and the likening of 
rumors to contagious viruses.83 And while Russian specialists continued to 
of recruits as unﬁ t for military service due to mental feebleness according to paragraph 
24, lit. A of the statute military psychiatrists operated with. In a similar vein, imperial Rus-
sian ofﬁ cials often ascribed suicides of serfs to fear of (corporeal) punishment by their 
landlords. See Susan K. Morrissey, Suicide and the Body Politic in Imperial Russia (Cambridge, 
Eng., 2006), chaps. 3 –5, esp. 126 –27.
79. N. Butovskii, O sposobakh obucheniia i vospitaniia sovremennogo soldata, vol. 2 (St. 
Petersburg, 1888), quoted in Shumkov, “Chto delat s porochnym elementom v armii?” 
Voennyi sbornik 54, no. 11 (1911): 112. This was not yet dedovshchina, which emerged later.
80. Shumkov, “Chto delat s porochnym elementom v armii?” 116.
81. Dmitrevskii, “Vospitanie voina mozhet byt tolko v styde nakazaniia, a ne v strakhe 
nakazaniia,” 100. Emphasis in the original. Also see Dmitrevskii, “Mozhno igrat na slabykh 
strunakh,” 116.
82. In one author’s words, “In periods of imminent combat people turn into ma-
chines and, if properly guided, are capable of showing such elemental force, such exam-
ples of total self-sacriﬁ ce and great heroism, that no obstacles can stop them on their path. 
In these minutes the quality of leaders becomes ever more important, for unconscious 
activism, automatism, also has a negative side: under the inﬂ uence of some negative factor 
the elemental pushing forward can reverse its direction and turn into running back that 
is just as hard to stop.Yet the example of the leader, the brave leader, spreads as quickly as 
a psychological infection (suggestibility is heightened) and can again provoke a forward 
rush.” Polianskii, “Moralnyi element v oblasti fortiﬁ katsii,” 101–2. Such books as Rezanov’s 
Armiia i tolpa and N. A. Uchach-Ogorovich’s Psikhologiia tolpy i armii (Kiev, 1911) are indica-
tive of the new importance of crowd theory. Also see Daniel Beer, “ ‘Microbes of the Mind’: 
Moral Contagion in Late Imperial Russia,” Journal of Modern History 79, no. 3 (September 
2007): 531–71; Beer, Renovating Russia: The Human Sciences and the Fate of Liberal Modernity, 
1880 –1930 (Ithaca, 2008).
83. On rumors as viruses in the battle of Mukden, see Zaglukhinskii, “Psikhika boitsov 
vo vremia srazheniia,” 98.
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be less likely than their French or German colleagues to make a connec-
tion between lower-class background and pathological heredity, liberals 
such as Dmitrevskii still thought that smarter, better-educated soldiers 
were less prone to fear. “Indeed,” he claimed, “the higher the intellectual 
level, the fewer superstition-based fears, the fewer fears you will generally 
ﬁ nd. [ . . . ] The intellect only [ . . . ] tolerates fear in certain situations, 
and a fear that has been tailored to these situations, that is, rational fear: 
caution and circumspection.” 84
This exploration of fear in Russian military psychological thought 
leaves us on the verge of the cataclysm that is often regarded as the proper 
beginning of the twentieth century. As World War I drew closer, many 
Russians—and not just Russians—felt that they lived in “an era of nerves, 
nervousness, neurasthenia, that is, of mental imbalance.” 85 The centrality 
of soldierly fear in the psychological military sciences was both a symptom 
and a product of this era. A century earlier there was hardly any military 
psychology, but there was also hardly any mentioning of soldierly fear in 
ﬁ rst-person sources. The beginnings of modern warfare in the Crimean 
War and the introduction of a modern, mass-conscripted army in its af-
termath; the channeling through ﬁ ction in general and Tolstoi in particu-
lar, a variant of the well-known “art imitates life imitates art” pattern; the 
invention of the autonomous self; the interiorization thesis; modernity 
as mimicry; and the birth of soldierly fear from the spirit of the crime 
novel—these are, in descending order of signiﬁ cance, six explanations 
of why soldiers’ fear entered different kinds of Russian texts in the late 
nineteenth century.
By 1914 fear could look back on a remarkable, if willful career with 
distinct way stations: its emancipation in the writings, ﬁ rst of Tolstoi, then 
of military theorist Dragomirov, was followed by a migration (via the anal-
yses of German colleagues) into military psychiatry, which, confronted 
with traumatized soldiers from the Franco-Prussian War, had begun to 
ponder the pathogenic nature of fear. At ﬁ rst Russian military psychiatry 
mostly saw fear as a symptom of combat-induced mental illness, but the 
Russo-Japanese War and the 1905 Revolution moved fear to the top of the 
list of causes of mental illness.
Where does this exploration, then, leave a Russian history of emo-
tions? While future research in this young ﬁ eld might delve into the his-
tory of concepts of emotion (Begriffsgeschichte), the analysis of emotional 
norms, or the causal role of emotion in explaining human action, I have 
attempted to trace across time the locus of fear in military writings, espe-
cially military psychology. In other words, I have tried to unearth scientiﬁ c 
emotion talk and have hinted at the causes of this talk’s appearance—a 
84. A. Dmitrevskii, “Da, voin (rytsar) bez strakha i upreka—dostizhimyi ideal (Otvet 
g-nu Sh-vu),” Voennyi sbornik 56, no. 6 (1913): 99.
85. A. Dmitrevskii, “Logika bolgarskikh uspekhov i . . . poeziia russkoi chuvstvitelnosti,” 
Voennyi sbornik 56, no. 7 (1913): 115. This was a shared European sentiment. For Germany, 
see, e.g., Joachim Radkau, Das Zeitalter der Nervosität: Deutschland zwischen Bismarck und 
Hitler (Munich, 1998); Volker Ullrich, Die nervöse Grossmacht: Aufstieg und Untergang des 
deutschen Kaiserreichs, 1871–1918 (Frankfurt am Main, 1997).






departure from much of discourse analysis with its disregard for causal-
ity.86 The current attention paid to the history of emotions itself is due, 
in part, to a renewed interest in causality in history writing. Life science 
approaches to emotion hold the greatest potential for the establishment 
of clear causal connections.87 This is a potential I have chosen not to tap 
into for general methodological reasons that I expound in the introduc-
tion to this cluster and elsewhere.88 The expansion of the history of emo-
tions we are presently witnessing is further prompted by the turn from 
the linguistic turn that was underway within the historical discipline and 
by 9/11, which sped up this turn. The events of 9/11 occasioned, ﬁ rst, an 
acute interest in fanatical hatred and religious ecstasy, extreme emotions 
understood at the time as overwhelmingly corporeal, prelinguistic phe-
nomena, and, second, a (admittedly short-lived) discrediting of irony as 
the dominant style of historical exposition.
This exploration of soldiers and fear, ﬁ nally, leaves us with swaths 
to be mapped out in the future and prospective paths to be taken. One 
could move beyond 1914 –18 and discuss the reincarnation of Envald’s 
“romantic” fear paradigm in penal battalions and blocking detachments 
(zagraditelnye otriady) formed after Stalin’s “no step backward” order no. 227 
in July 1942: their task was to shoot panicked, deserting soldiers, that 
is, to place these soldiers in a kind of Catch-22.89 Or one could look at 
the rehabilitation of military psychiatry and the “realistic” school under 
Khrushchev.90 One could also move beyond Russia and point to the signs 
of a Cold War entanglement of 1970s Soviet psychopharmacological fear 
research and the development of modern western anxiety drugs. There 
may well be a Soviet genealogy of Prozac waiting to be researched and 
written.91 Or it would be possible to examine the return of legal prosecu-
tion for cowardice in the American military, which had been dormant 
since the Vietnam War because of the inroads psychoanalysis was making 
86. Foucault’s concept of discourse in the archaeological method up to the 1975 
publication of Surveiller et punir (Discipline and punish) was infamously murky about cau-
sality, prompting two sympathetic early interpreters to complain that “the causal power 
attributed to the rules governing discursive systems is unintelligible.” Hubert L. Dreyfus 
and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (Chicago, 1982), 
xxiv. His later understanding of discourse in the genealogical method also elided causality. 
As one commentator has written, “The genealogist/historian looks for beginnings, not 
origins. This for Foucault was an essential distinction. Origins imply causes; beginnings 
imply differences.” Patricia O’Brian, “Michel Foucault’s History of Culture,” in Lynn Hunt, 
ed., The New Cultural History (Berkeley, 1989), 37.
87. This potential is embodied, for example, in Steven Pinker, The Stuff of Thought: 
Language as a Window into Human Nature (New York, 2007).
88. See my Geschichte und Gefühl: Grundlagen der Emotionsgeschichte (Munich, 2010).
89. See Catherine Merridale, Ivan’s War: Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939–1945 
(New York, 2006), 70–71, 98, 108–10, 135–38.
90. On this, see Seniavskaia, Psikhologiia voiny v XX veke; Gabriel, Soviet Military 
Psychiatry.
91. Hints at the connection between espionage, fear-inducing biological weapons, 
and western anxiety drugs can be found in Alexander Kouzminov, Biological Espionage: 
Special Operations of the Soviet and Foreign Intelligence Services in the West (London, 2005). Also 
see the review by Jonathan B. Tucker, Moscow Times, no. 3127 (18 March 2005): 4.
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in military psychiatry: because of the curative promise anxiety drugs hold, 
the tolerance of behavior that might be deemed cowardly has diminished, 
so that in November 2003 during the Iraq War the U.S. Army initiated its 
ﬁ rst cowardice prosecution since 1968, charging Sergeant Georg Anderas 
Pogany, aged 33, with “cowardly conduct as a result of fear.” 92 The likeli-
hood of an uncoupling of soldiers from the emotion of fear—anywhere 
and anytime soon—is about as high as the appearance of a plesiosaurus 
on Nevskii Prospekt.
92. Mark Glassman, “The Changing Battleﬁ eld; When Grace Flees under Fire,” New 
York Times, 25 July 2004. Thanks to Susan Morrissey for this reference.




Poetics of Disgust: To Eat and Die 
in Andrei Belyi’s Petersburg
Olga Matich
Disgust is a sentiment that regulates transgressive experience with the 
purpose of enforcing social and cultural taboos. An aversive emotion, 
disgust is performative. The disgusting in literature tests the reader’s af-
fective tolerance, gauging if and when the reader as spectator averts her 
mental gaze from an idea or image that provokes feelings of revulsion. 
It distances the reader from a text that displays shocking visceral detail 
producing emotional recoil. Yet the deployment of the disgusting in the 
arts also has a liberating function in that it pushes the borders of the sensi-
bly and aesthetically permissible, inviting fascination, even delight on the 
part of the reader or viewer. Disgust is always about borders. In challeng-
ing our senses, the loathsome and shocking can produce delight precisely 
because they attack the norms of “civilized moral good” and traditional 
aesthetic beauty. The aesthetic sensibility that comes closest to inscribing 
such conﬂ icted affect is the baroque, in the generic sense, which tends to 
extremes and to grotesque representation. In the words of Geoffrey Galt 
Harpham, “the grotesque is preeminently the art of disgust.” 1
Unlike the French degoût and the English disgust, which literally mean 
repugnant to the taste, the Russian otvraschchenie comes from a verb sig-
nifying motion. It refers to the gesture of pushing something away with 
the purpose of calming visceral and/or moral revulsion. The emotion is 
associated with taste, smell, and touch, suggesting a close-up rather than 
a distanced experience. As such, it is associated with the physical proper-
ties of decay, bad smell, sliminess, and stickiness. According to Norbert 
Elias, disgust marks the “threshold of repugnance” that establishes nor-
mative social, moral, and emotional behaviors that serve the “civilizing 
process.” 2
Turning to literature and using the threshold metaphor as a spring-
board, I would suggest that disgust, especially in the Russian, spatializes 
the text by creating a discursive space in which to negotiate the reader’s 
aesthetic, sensual, and moral values.3 Considered from the perspective of 
aesthetics, disgust reveals the reader’s, or spectator’s, response to dissolu-
1. Geoffrey Galt Harpham, On the Grotesque: Strategies of Contradiction in Art and Litera-
ture (Aurora, Colo., 2006), 220.
2. Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations, trans. 
Edmund Jephcott (New York, 2000), 51.
3. For a theoretical discussion of the ethics and aesthetics of disgust, I refer you to 
the following excellent books: William Ian Miller, The Anatomy of Disgust (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1997); Winfried Menninghaus, Ekel: Theorie und Geschichte einer starken Empﬁ ndung 
(Frankfurt am Main, 1999), translated into English as Disgust: Theory and History of a Strong 
Sensation, trans. Howard Eiland and Joel Golb (Albany, 2003); Robert Rawdon Wilson, 
The Hydra’s Tale: Imagining Disgust (Edmonton, 2002); Martha C. Nussbaum, Hiding from 
Humanity: Disgust, Shame, and the Law (Princeton, 2004); Sianne Ngai, Ugly Feelings (Cam-
bridge, Mass., 2005).
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tion of form, one of whose primary subtexts is the body that has crossed 
the threshold of death—the ultimate threshold of repugnance. In the 
words of Winfried Menninghaus, “every book about disgust is not least a 
book about the rotting corpse.” 4 Death transforms the body into a corpse 
that will eventually dissolve into formless organic ooze—proscribed by 
classical aesthetics—which in the end turns into waste. “The corpse, 
the most sickening of wastes,” writes Julia Kristeva, “is a border that en-
croaches upon everything” and represents the infection of life by death.5 
One of the most controversial corpses in the visual arts is Hans Holbein’s 
Dead Christ in the Tomb, which represents Christ’s body as the site of death 
and decay—utter abjection, in other words—not of sacred and prophetic 
speech (see ﬁ gure 1). Certainly the response to the painting in The Idiot 
by Fedor Dostoevskii, in which it has an important symbolic as well as 
emotional function, reveals the profound anxiety its viewers experienced 
regarding faith in the resurrection.
The gaping mouth, featured prominently in the Holbein, has its ori-
gins not only in the naturalistic corpse, but also in the repulsive sight of 
food and the idea of eating it.6 The function of disgust, then, is to ward off 
mortality and decay, suggesting that our refusal to ingest spoiled food has 
to do precisely with afﬁ rming life and thereby warding off death, as well as 
the dissolution of meaning that is ultimately rooted in death.
Yet “death is the ‘other side’ of birth,” writes Mikhail Bakhtin.7 Death 
in nature produces the generative rot from which new life is born and 
thus perpetuates the organic life cycle. For the Russian philosopher 
Vladimir Solovev and his follower Andrei Belyi, the life cycle was the 
ultimate philosophical source of revulsion precisely because it perpetu-
ates death in life. In this regard, the loathsome in death is the genera-
tive excess that originates in putrefying organic matter. It represents the 
economy of life: people die and produce the fodder for new birth, and 
it is the relationship between life and death, the recognition that oppo-
sites coexist and dissolve into each other, that is at the heart of the dis-
gust reﬂ ex. This recognition informs baroque and modernist decadent 
aesthetics.
The abject and loathsome ﬁ gure prominently in the most important 
Russian modernist novel, Belyi’s neo-baroque Petersburg. Its poetics are 
characterized by striking grotesque and metamorphic imagery that re-
ﬂ ects a sensibility inimical to stable representation. The novel dissolves, 
or decomposes, form, thematized by the terrorist bomb—the source of 
4. Menninghaus, Disgust, 1.
5. Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, trans. Leon S. Roudiez (New 
York, 1982), 3 – 4.
6. See, e.g., Paul Rozin, Jonathan Haidt, and Clark R. McCauley, “Disgust,” in Michael 
Lewis and Jeannette M. Haviland-Jones, eds., Handbook of Emotions, 2d ed. (New York, 
2000), 638– 41; Georges Bataille, “Mouth,” Visions of Excess: Selected Writings 1927–1939 
(Minneapolis, 1985), 59– 60.
7. Mikhail M. Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, trans. Helene Iswolsky (Bloomington, 
1984), 407.
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Petersburg’s fragmentary structure and imagery.8 Belyi’s use of modernist 
fragmentation, however, does not tell the whole story, nor does the sym-
bolist aspect of the novel. What such approaches to Petersburg overlook are 
its profoundly psycho-visceral affective aspect, one that simultaneously 
engages the reader’s fascination and revulsion, stimulated especially by 
those images that represent dissolution of form, including into unshaped 
biomorphic images. It is my claim that disgust animates Belyi’s novel and 
that it represents its organizing affect.
Even though the disgust response has been premised on the expe-
rience of something viscerally and morally intolerable from which we 
typically recoil, I would propose that it also mediates its readability: the 
act of distancing helps make the disgusting readable in cognitive terms 
and facilitates a moral as well as a considered aesthetic response. Such 
is the impact of Francisco Goya’s profoundly disturbing Saturn devour-
ing one of his sons, a cannibalistic image that underlies Belyi’s Petersburg 
(see ﬁ gure 2).9 The nightmarishly grotesque painting produces recoil. 
But this gesture of recoil also helps the viewer read—contemplate from a 
distance—the horriﬁ c representation. A considered, cognitive response 
is after all contingent on the object’s readability. Relevant to what can be 
described as Petersburg’s baroque excess, or exuberance, is the painting’s 
horriﬁ c disﬁ gurement of a well-proportioned nude ﬁ gure; its young body 
stands in sharp contrast to the father’s grotesque body, especially to his 
gaping, devouring mouth, an important source of disgust in the visual and 
literary arts.
The statue of the cannibalistic god by the Italian sculptor Francesco 
Cabianca (1716) at the Neva entrance of the Summer Garden (an impor-
tant setting in Petersburg) offers a horriﬁ c baroque image that very likely 
inspired Belyi’s representation of the mythical Chronos/Saturn, thema-
tized as time and will to devour the next generation (see ﬁ gure 3). Al-
though the sculpture lacks the extreme baroque excess of the Goya and 
remains unnamed in the novel, on close examination it inscribes precisely 
the kind of recoil that Belyi self-consciously provokes.
8. Describing his creative process in Arabeski in 1908, Belyi compared it to the action 
of the bomb-throwing anarchist: “My writing is a bomb that I throw. The life inside me is a 
bomb that has been thrown at me. One bomb strikes another—sprays of shards, two inter-
secting rows of sequences. Shards of my writing represent the forms of art; shards of the vis-
ible are the images of necessity that blow up my life.” Andrei Belyi, “Iskusstvo,” Arabeski, in 
Kritika. Estetika. Teoriia simvolizma, ed. A. L. Kazin (Moscow, 1994), 2:200. In his memoirs, 
Belyi compares himself to Ivan Kaliaev, the bomb-throwing assassin of Grand Duke Sergei. 
See Andrei Belyi, Mezhdu dvukh revoliutsii, ed. A. V. Lavrov (Moscow, 1990), 79.
9. Chronos/Saturn deﬁ nes the relationship between father and son. Much has been 
written about the mythological and theosophic meaning of the god in Petersburg, whom I 
consider in relation to the oral sphere. Apollon Apollonovich, the Chronos/Saturn ﬁ gure 
in the novel, is also associated with the devouring tarantula by both Nikolai and Dudkin 
and with the Gorgon Medusa: “the unseen little white light that ﬂ ared up between the eyes 
and forehead scattered sheafs of snake-like lightning; the lightning-thoughts dispersed 
like snakes from his bald head, and if a clairvoyant stood before the distinguished gentle-
man at that moment, he would undoubtedly see the head of the Gorgon Medusa. And he 
would be seized with Medusa-like terror by Apollon Apollonovich.” Andrei Belyi, Peterburg 
(Moscow, 1981), 50.





Figure 2. Francisco Goya, Saturn Devouring His Son (1819–1823)
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Figure 3. Francesco Cabianca, Saturn (1716 –1717). Summer Garden, St. Peters-
burg, Russia. Author’s photo
The word in Russian that best characterizes the unformed organic de-
tritus produced by the bomb explosion and other acts of violence in Peters-
burg is bezobrazie. Invoked on numerous occasions in the novel, the word 
designates hideousness and deformity. Literally, it means without face (bez 
obraza), suggesting a lack of form as in this disturbing passage from Peters-
burg: “Totally red half of the wall: oozing redness; the walls are wet, and 






therefore, sticky, sticky [ . . . ] to see [ . . . ] under one’s feet the same dark 
red stickiness that splashed here after the loud sound; it splashed from a 
hole with a scrap of torn-off skin . . . (but from which part of the body?). 
Look up and ﬁ nd above me that it is sticking to the wall . . . Brrr! . . . Lose 
consciousness at that point.” 10
The passage, which inverts the murderous act in Goya’s and Cabianca’s 
Saturns depicts the patricidal fantasy of the son of Senator Apollon Apol-
lonovich Ableukhov. It represents the father’s imagined sundered body 
in the form of blood oozing down the bedroom wall, a shred of skin stuck 
in it. Exemplar of reactionary political authority and Petersburg’s rational 
geometry, the Senator has been dissolved into “bloody ooze” in the son’s 
and reader’s eye. The reference to “the sticky walls” evokes the name of 
the most menacing father ﬁ gure in the novel, Lippanchenko, from lip-
kii (sticky). Instead of the beloved geometric shapes that help Apollon 
(Apollo in Russian) maintain rational order in his life, his body is trans-
formed into organic ooze. The image suggests the body’s unﬁ nished and 
ﬂ uid aspect—its imaginary transformation into a corpse—characteristic 
of baroque aesthetics. The narrative engages us, together with the son, in 
a spatial performance of disgust. Like the son, who loses consciousness, we 
both avert our eyes from the representation of shapeless viscosity, which 
reminds us of our own mortality and its degrading consequences, and de-
light in the transgressiveness of the image. The distancing gesture, like the 
one we perform on seeing Goya’s Saturn, helps us read the scene and ex-
press either moral revulsion or aesthetic delight, or a combination of both.
We perform a zigzag so to speak: moving toward the representation, 
then away from it. The novel frequently refers to the ﬁ gure of the zigzag, a 
spatial image that inscribes recoil, to represent fear on the one hand, and 
the will to readability and knowledge on the other: for example, Nikolai 
Apollonovich traces a zigzag in a book to highlight an important passage. 
We encounter the zigzag for the ﬁ rst time when the young revolutionary 
Dudkin slips on the stairs as he tries not to drop the bomb in the mys-
terious bundle; as the Senator tries to make sense of the confrontation 
with Dudkin, from whom Apollon Apollonovich had recoiled in fear, he 
assigns his movement the threatening zigzag gesture. Fear, like disgust 
with which it is frequently aligned in the spectrum of aversive emotions, 
is typically associated with a recoiling movement. It is the Senator’s desire 
to interpret the meaning of the zigzag that initiates his investigation of 
the young terrorist. So the zigzag, which describes movement toward and 
away from something—just like the preﬁ x ot in otvrashchenie—is intimately 
related to interpretation in the novel. An involuntary gesture, the zigzag, 
like the emotion of disgust, is transformed into one that is cognitive, re-
vealing to us the attendant process of reading Belyi and appreciating the 
experience. It adds a spatial dimension to the act of interpretation, which 
can be likened to the act of viewing a painting, both close up and from a 
distance.
To return to Nikolai’s fantasy: Instead of a moral response, the pat-
10. Ibid., 329–30.
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ricidal desire gives rise to feelings of loathing about his own conception; 
he remembers that he used to be called his father’s spawn, concluding 
that “man is slime sewn up in skin [ . . . ] his [Nikolai’s] blood putriﬁ ed 
early [ . . . ] this is probably why he evoked disgust.” 11 The ooze of birth 
and the ooze of death become one in his mind: Nikolai contemplates 
the beginning of the life cycle—his own conception—and its end—his 
father’s death—as equally viscous and disgusting.12 The attendant feeling 
of shame, an emotional kin of disgust, has more to do with the recollec-
tion, however, not his patricidal fantasy. The look beneath the surface of 
the skin at the body’s slimy interior suggests the unformed, morally and 
aesthetically loathsome aspect of life that slips effortlessly into death, a 
look that can be aligned with aesthetically grotesque experience. Slime, 
located in between hard surfaces and freely moving liquids, dissolves 
boundaries. Yet it is very much present as a physical substance occupying 
space and slowly expanding over its surface, engulﬁ ng everything along its 
way. In the words of Robert Rawdon Wilson, slime is “too appalling to 
contemplate, too compelling to ignore.” 13 And even though Nikolai’s 
memory stimulates a cognitive response, his conclusion reveals that dis-
gust is deeply lodged in the senses, arguably more so than any other affect, 
because it always originates in the body, and in psychoanalytic terms, in 
sexual anxiety and repression.
In Being and Nothingness, Jean-Paul Sartre describes slime—le 
visqueux—as an in-between state, one that is amorphous and therefore 
aberrant, disgusting to contemplate because it represents the continu-
ous threat of annihilation and nothingness. Sartre afﬁ liates the slimy 
with feminine nature and its sticky engulﬁ ng essence, one that sucks 
everything into itself.14 In theoretical terms, slime—its sticky, viscous 
formlessness—can be associated with category slippage, a condition that 
produces not only visceral but also cognitive disgust because it dissolves 
meaning.15 In aesthetic terms, however, the dissolution of form and cat-
egory slippage represent Belyi’s modernist challenge to traditional repre-
sentation, as evidenced by Lippanchenko, certainly the slimiest character 
in the novel. He is slippery in more ways than one: politically, he is a 
double agent who works for the revolutionaries and the police; ontologi-
cally, he deprives Dudkin of meaning and faith in revolution.
Belyi’s most startling evocations of disgust in conjunction with death 
11. Ibid., 332. Cf. Franz Kafka’s expression of disgust at his own conception. In a let-
ter he writes that the sight of the bed where he was conceived “can turn his stomach inside 
out,” as if he was “indissolubly connected with these repulsive things; something still clings 
to the feet as they try to break free, held fast as they are in the primordial slime.” Quoted 
in Menninghaus, Disgust, 243 – 44.
12. “Where death is, there is also birth, change, renewal. The image of birth is no less 
ambivalent; it represents the body that is born and at the same time shows the image of 
the departing one.” Bakhtin, Rabelais, 409.
13. Wilson, Hydra’s Tale, 66.
14. Lippanchenko is also associated with the sucking gesture: he sucks in air like an 
infant as if it were milk from a bottle, and by extension he sucks in others in the novel.
15. Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, 
trans. Hazel Estella Barnes (New York, 1956), 772–78.






are those associated with the imaginary ingestion of food. Lippanchenko 
links death and food directly in the deceptively innocuous comment, “I 
am deathly hungry.” They are linked by the image of a repulsive mouth 
whose most transgressive activity is the consumption of human ﬂ esh, as in 
the Goya and the Summer Garden sculpture. Lippanchenko, moreover, is 
the owner of the novel’s most repulsively grotesque body, one which is in 
ﬂ ux— or unformed. He is variously a shadow, silhouette, persona (osoba), 
a giant clod (besformennaia glyba), fatty back, and viscous organic slime, 
almost all feminine nouns, suggesting that, like Sartre, Belyi afﬁ liates the 
disgusting with the feminine. Dudkin associates Lippanchenko with the 
letter ы, describing its sound as “something dull and slimy,” which he links 
to bezobrazie.
The owner of a repulsive mouth, Lippanchenko is also disgustingly ed-
ible: “Lippanchenko’s lips resembled little pieces of sliced salmon—not 
yellowish red, but oily and yellow (you have probably eaten such salmon 
with bliny in a family of modest means).” 16 The reference to “you have 
eaten” insinuates the reader into the act of eating Lippanchenko’s lips. His 
edibility is quickly subverted, however, as his fat whispering lips morph 
into rustling ant legs on a dug-up anthill, reinforcing the essentially unﬁ n-
ished quality of his body. These quick shifts that capture Lippanchenko’s 
unﬁ xed aspect, contributing to his sinister presence in the novel, reﬂ ect 
Belyi’s representational practice— one that inscribes recoil by means of 
the zigzag.
The reference to his ﬁ shy lips links Lippanchenko to the sinister sar-
dine tin containing the bomb he has prepared for the Senator; in a gro-
tesque association of eating and death, Nikolai imagines swallowing it de-
spite his aversion to the “yellow slime teeming with sardines.” 17 As we read 
these passages with growing fascination, we may experience the vomit re-
ﬂ ex ourselves, and as we squeamishly distance ourselves, we also begin 
to make sense of the images by developing a cognitive response, which 
is what Nikolai tries so hard to do throughout the novel. The question 
that arises in this context is whether the readability of the image, which 
requires a reasoned approach, undermines its emotional impact. I would 
suggest that it thickens our response by locating the cognitive moral layer 
of the initial visceral recoil.
The most startling representation of Lippanchenko’s edibility is 
Dudkin’s cannibalistic fantasy of Lippanchenko as a suckling pig, an im-
age ﬁ rst articulated in Nikolai’s patricidal fantasy.18 According to Elias, 
16. Belyi, Peterburg, 40.
17. Cf. Belyi’s representation of Maiakovskii’s expressive hyperbolic poetry: “The 
poem War and Peace is a hyperbole that gapes its snout at Gogols hyperbole, having swal-
lowed it to grow fat from its juices and then release them into the juicy plumbing of 
the arteries: ‘rusty viscous liquid was oozing in the plumbing’; ‘continents hang like car-
casses on bayonets.’ ” Andrei Belyi, Masterstvo Gogolia (Moscow, 1934), 312.
18. Earlier we are told that Lippanchenko wanted to export Russian pigs abroad for 
the purpose of getting rich. In an earlier patricidal fantasy, which is accompanied by feel-
ings of nausea, the narrator and Nikolai imagine plunging a knife into his father: “This is 
how a suckling pig in aspic and horseradish sauce is carved,” which is the ﬁ rst instance of 
this astonishing culinary ﬁ guration of death in the novel. Belyi, Peterburg, 221.
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“people, in the course of the civilizing process, seek to suppress in them-
selves every characteristic that they feel to be ‘animal.’ They likewise sup-
press such characteristics in their food,” removing all traces of its animal 
origin.19 In Petersburg, Belyi does the exact opposite.
Undressing Lippanchenko’s fatty shoulder and back in his mind’s eye, 
Dudkin imagines that he could be carved as easily as the delectable dish, 
but this transgressive culinary fantasy is interrupted by a cockroach, located 
outside it, which makes him spit in disgust. The spitting gesture—which 
signals the threshold between inside and outside—evacuates the desire 
quite literally. Saliva, like other bodily ﬂ uids when they leave the body, 
evokes disgust, marking Dudkin’s threshold of repugnance in the scene. 
Next, the culinary fantasy of carving Lippanchenko produces a sense of 
horror in Dudkin: he imagines his fatty neck as a noseless, eyeless face 
(a literal instance of bezobrazie) with a torn, toothless mouth. As in 
the instance of the salmon lips, the fantasy and its interruption by ver-
min followed by the frightening metamorphosis represent the perfor-
mative zigzag function of disgust through close-up and distancing: the 
fantasy performs Dudkin’s desire to kill and eat Lippanchenko, but the 
subsequent images distance him from it. The reader, whose fascina-
tion and revulsion have been engaged, participates in Dudkin’s gestural 
double play.
The narrative reiﬁ es the image of Lippanchenko as a pig actually be-
ing slaughtered by Dudkin (“this is how we slice the white hairless skin of 
cold suckling pig in horseradish sauce”).20 He seems to have overcome the 
feeling of disgust, which according to William Ian Miller is an enervating 
emotion, resulting in loss of energy and resolve to action. Positioning the 
reader directly on the threshold of repugnance, the narrative performs 
the slaughter as if with culinary intentions, but instead merely produces a 
corpse. Yet the afﬁ liation of Lippanchenko’s ﬂ esh with a delectable dish 
suggests coprophagy, which ups the ante of the disgusting, despite the 
laughable scissors with which the murder is performed. Even the sea near 
Lippanchenko’s dacha participates in the murder and consumption of 
the body: the narrative refers to the waves running up on the sand like 
thin blades and “licking” it, and running back as if mimicking the recoil-
ing movement of Lippanchenko’s body during the slaughter and ours in 
response to it. As he touches the viscous liquid that drips onto the sheet 
and falls abruptly on the bed, Lippanchenko realizes (on ponial) that his 
back and stomach had been slit open, meaning once again that recoil 
facilitates readability, not only for the reader, but for him as well.
19. Elias, Civilizing Process, 120.
20. Belyi, Peterburg, 386. Earlier in the novel, the narrator offers a cannibalistic image 
of his own: he compares Lippanchenko to a bloody skinned carcass with a gaping snout 
hanging in a butcher shop. Ibid., 282. As in Dudkin’s fantasy of carving Lippanchenko’s 
cooked body, the image of slaughter (resulting in a skinned carcass) is insinuated into the 
narrator’s fantasy; the narrator, like Dudkin, also subverts Lippanchenko’s edibility: the 
surreal carcass appropriates the power of the gaze and confronts us with its bloody meat 
that has assumed the shape of a gaping snout. (Note that elsewhere in the novel, there is 
a reference to the city’s slaughterhouse and its butchers.)






The corpse as emblem of the novel’s poetics engages its metamorph-
ing representational practice that inscribes organic decomposition. The 
next day we see Dudkin sitting astride Lippanchenko’s corpse in a pool 
of blood, one arm outstretched and a cockroach crawling on his lips and 
through his nose, as if he were a corpse as well. The grotesque tableau 
suggests Étienne Maurice Falconet’s Bronze Horseman, Petersburg’s genius 
loci, transformed into the site of a dying and decaying city. The tableau 
ﬁ gures the novel’s baroque sensibility, here represented as the invasion of 
the city’s emblematic statue by vermin and decay. The monument, a ﬁ gure 
of classical aesthetic proportion, is turned into one of baroque excess, 
with the horseman transformed into a ﬁ guration of madness and physical 
putrefaction, both of which have invaded the city.21
The last name of Lippanchenko’s wife is Fleisch (“meat” in German) 
which links the double agent and mastermind of the assassination plot to 
meat from yet another perspective. Smelling the delicious roast that she is 
cooking in the scene in which Dudkin sees Lippanchenko as a delectable 
dish, the latter announces to everyone that he is famished: “I am deathly 
hungry.” The comment and its context cement the attendant association 
of food and death, preﬁ guring Lippanchenko’s slaughter.
How do we explain the culinary metaphor and the grotesque afﬁ liation 
of food and death that inform both Nikolai’s and Dudkin’s murderous de-
sire and the role of Lippanchenko’s wife as cook, who, so to speak, offers 
up her thoroughly repulsive husband as that delectable dish? And how do 
we interpret his representation variously as dangerous animal, raw meat, 
delectable pork, and salmon dish, interspersed with images of insects and 
vermin? Suggesting the ingestion of moral and physical decay, the images 
remind us of our own mortality from which we shrink away in disgust. The 
insects and vermin connote moral and physiological putrefaction; they 
herald the transformation of Lippanchenko’s body into a corpse that will 
ultimately metamorphose into viscous organic matter.22 Certainly, life in 
Belyi’s novel enacts the inexorable end of Petersburg as represented in 
the apocalyptic myth of the Petersburg text, only Belyi’s images tap into 
a decadently grotesque representation of the dying city, contrasting its 
traditional image of classical Apollonian beauty and restraint.
Lippanchenko’s initial ﬁ guration in the novel is that of formless slime 
that gets under Dudkin’s collar and oozes down his spine. According to 
Belyi, man is but “a little glob of slime” pursued by primordial chaos 
throughout history, suggesting that the body’s smooth exterior surface is 
merely a cover for oozing matter, as if to invoke the baroque sensibility of 
21. The sculptor Falconet, whose work was inﬂ uenced by the Baroque sensibility, 
created an equestrian statue whose rider is represented in neoclassicist terms, but as Al-
exander Schenker writes, the representation of the horse rearing on its hind hoofs re-
ﬂ ects “baroque restlessness,” as does the “ﬂ uid wave-like shape of the pedestal.” Alexan-
der M. Schenker, The Bronze Horseman: Falconet’s Monument to Peter the Great (New Haven, 
2003), 265.
22. For a discussion of the natural cycle and the transcendence of its inexorable in-
scription of death in Vladimir Solovev’s erotic utopia, see Olga Matich, Erotic Utopia: The 
Decadent Imagination in Russia’s Fin de Siècle (Madison, 2005), 59– 61, 74 –77.
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grotesque opposites.23 The suggestion is that the body is merely a decep-
tive surface and that man emerges from slime and returns to it, that slime 
erases the distinction between life and death, the most sacred cognitive as 
well as existential distinction.
Next the image of Lippanchenko morphs into the adverb “suddenly,” 
the temporal cornerstone of baroque aesthetics premised on surprise. In 
one of the novel’s striking passages, the narrator offers a long disquisi-
tion on “suddenly,” emphasizing its animal nature and ravenous appetite: 
“Sometimes [ . . . ] an alien ‘suddenly’ looks at you from behind the shoul-
der of an interlocutor, wanting to sniff your ‘suddenly.’ [ . . . ] Your ‘sud-
denly’ feeds on your cerebral play; it devours your vileness with pleasure, 
then it swells up as you melt like a candle. If your thoughts are vile [ . . . ] 
having stuffed itself like a fattened, but invisible dog, ‘suddenly’ starts to 
precede you everywhere.” 24
Belyi endows the adverb with a repulsive canine body and suggests 
devouring once more, this time in a passage addressed to the reader 
(“your ‘suddenly’ ”), which makes ‘you’ complicit in suddenly’s loath-
some activity. The nominalized adverb, which has stuffed itself with 
“your” vile cerebral play, challenges the reader to identify with his own 
disgusting animal nature.25 It reinforces the action grammatically, with 
the nominalized adverb instantiating the metamorphosis on the level 
of language—what the futurists called sdvig (displacement), a modern-
ist trope that destabilizes traditional representation.26 The afﬁ liation of 
“suddenly” with Lippanchenko, and with the reader, refers to a moment 
in time—a sudden feeling of revulsion—yet one that acquires a loath-
some spatial dimension: this “suddenly” has grown fat, having gorged it-
self on vile thoughts. Moreover, the act of devouring that is associated with 
“suddenly” evokes the novel’s ubiquitous ﬁ gure of Saturn/Chronos. The 
link between the adverb and Apollon Apollonovich as Saturn had been 
established in the novel a few pages earlier; the question of who will de-
vour whom—the fathers the sons, or vice versa—is the key to Petersburg. 
“Suddenly’s” narrative power, afﬁ liated with Lippanchenko, and its meta-
morphic power of conﬂ ating time and space mark the novelistic space of 
the future murderous act, about which the ticking time bomb periodically 
reminds us.
The ﬁ guration of Lippanchenko as slime under Dudkin’s collar and 
the image of dogs snifﬁ ng each other, however, have other connotations 
as well. They imply a same-sex relationship between the two conspira-
tors, which Belyi suppresses as loathsome and into which he insinuates 
unmistakably homophobic feelings.27 We learn later that the young revo-
23. Belyi quoted in Magnus Ljunggren, The Dream of Rebirth: A Study of Andrej Belyj’s 
Novel “Peterburg” (Stockholm, 1982), 27.
24. Belyi, Peterburg, 39.
25. For further discussion of “suddenly” and “cerebral play,” see Olga Matich, “Backs, 
Suddenlys, and Surveillance in Andrej Belyj’s Petersburg,” Russian Literature (Special Issue: 
Andrej Belyj— On the Occasion of His 125th Birthday), 58, nos. 1–2 (2005): 149– 65.
26. Note also that the words vdrug and sdvig share three consonant sounds: v, d, and g.
27. To my knowledge, the ﬁ rst scholar to consider the homosexual subtext of the 






lutionary had participated in a loathsome “act” in Helsingfors involving 
Lippanchenko, which resulted in Dudkin’s entrapment in the assassina-
tion plot. Although Belyi elided the meaning of the act from the ﬁ nal 
version of the novel, a draft version explains that it involved “kissing the 
Goat’s arse and stamping on the cross.” 28 This mysterious act, recalled 
several times and marked by italics in a key scene, is the hidden source of 
Dudkin’s despair.
Belyi’s covert representation of same-sex desire as loathsome, or so 
I would suggest, engages another aspect of disgust, one that stigmatizes 
sexual difference. Martha Nussbaum, who has examined the exclusionary 
function of the emotion more extensively than anyone else, emphasizes 
the cultural and social politics of disgust that underlie racial prejudice, 
homophopbia, and misogyny, all of which ﬁ gure in Petersburg.29 Nussbaum 
argues that disgust, contrary to the belief that it is a moral sentiment, is 
in fact essentially immoral and should not only be contained but tran-
scended.30 Needless to say, Belyi, writing at the beginning of the twenti-
eth century, makes no such claims, nor does he distinguish between the 
affect’s philosophically existential and socially exclusionary functions. An 
undifferentiated disgust deﬁ nes both the novel’s aesthetic politics and 
practice and its generalized sexual anxiety.
What is striking about all sexual references in Petersburg is that they in-
scribe utter revulsion of the sort that a psychoanalytic reading of the novel 
would associate with deep-seated sexual anxiety: Nikolai, for instance, 
imagines his own conception in the moment when his father is perform-
ing his “conjugal duties” and experiences “familiar nausea with new power”; 
his father in turn remembers these duties in very similar terms.31 Nikolai’s 
nausea is of the same sort that Sartre would later associate with existential 
Dudkin-Lippanchenko relationship is Ljunggren in The Dream of Rebirth. In contrast to 
Belyi’s treatment, there are also positive coeval representations of same-sex love in Rus-
sian literature at the beginning of the twentieth century, e.g., in Mikhail Kuzmin’s Krylia 
(Wings, 1906). Belyi initially wrote a negative review of the novel (“ ‘Krylia’ Kuzmina,” 
Pereval, 1907, no. 6: 50–51), although he later changed his opinion of it.
28. See “Commentary” by S. S. Grechishkin, L. K. Dolgopolov, and A. V. Lavrov, in 
Belyi, Peterburg, 676n41.
29. For example, it is suggested that Lippanchenko is a Jew; the representation of 
Sofia Petrovna can certainly be described as misogynist.
30. Nussbaum, Hiding from Humanity. Instead of furthering the civilizing process, 
disgust, according to Nussbaum, frequently does the opposite: it undermines the values 
of what she calls liberal society. Although much less concerned with its illiberal func-
tion, Miller attributes a similar exclusionary function to disgust. Miller, Anatomy of Disgust, 
194 –205. Aurel Kolnai, the ﬁ rst modern thinker to consider the emotion in philosophical 
and theoretical terms, wrote as early as 1929 that, in certain instances, disgust “stands, one 
might say, in irregular service of the morally good.” Aurel Kolnai, Carolyn Korsmeyer, and 
Barry Smith, On Disgust (Chicago, 2004), 81.
31. Here is Apollon Apollonovich’s memory of the ﬁ rst night with his young wife: “an 
expression of disgust, disdain, masked by a submissive smile. That night Apollon Apollo-
novich, already a state councilor, committed the vile act sanctioned by set form: he raped 
the young woman. The rape went on for years, and one of those nights, Nikolai Apollono-
vich was conceived—between two different kinds of smiles, lechery and submission. Was it 
surprising then that Nikolai Apollonovich was as a result a composite of disgust, fear, and 
lechery?” Belyi, Peterburg, 362.
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angst and dissolution of meaning, which both Nikolai and Dudkin identify 
with sexual desire.
A particularly vivid instance of the afﬁ liation of death, food, viscosity, 
and sex is the description of Nevskii Prospekt in which the crowd turns 
into ooze, blurring all human boundaries. A variation on “What is this 
Russian empire of ours?” the parodic bureaucratic opening of the Pro-
logue, the later passage opens with “What is a ﬁ sh egg?” and continues 
with a ridiculous disquisition on the equally ridiculous question in which 
Dudkin has morphed into a grain of caviar—a ﬁ sh egg—that is hurled 
into the sticky, oozing crowd:
What is a grain of caviar? It is both the world and an object of consump-
tion. As an object of consumption, the grain does not represent a sat-
isfactory whole; caviar—is that whole: an aggregate of grains of caviar. 
The consumer does not know caviar grains, but he does know caviar, 
i.e., the sediment of grains spread on an open-faced sandwich that has 
been served. This is how the body of individuals rushing onto the pave-
ment turns into a collective organic body on Nevskii Prospekt [ . . . ]: the 
sidewalks of Nevskii become a sandwich ﬁ eld. The same happened to the 
body of Dudkin, who ﬂ ew here.32
Despite the comic parody of philosophical discourse, the disquisi-
tion in midstream introduces edibility into the image of Nevskii’s “human 
sediment.” Its subtext once again suggests cannibalism: in the narrator’s 
imagination, the sidewalks morph into a delectable caviar sandwich; not 
just a single person becomes edible, but all people walking on the avenue. 
And like Lippanchenko’s salmon lips, the metaphor once again inscribes 
ﬁ shy organic matter. Only this later image, as in the case of Goya’s Saturn, 
assumes gluttonous proportions, suggesting a comical, though revolting 
image of the end of Petersburg in an orgiastic meal, worthy of François 
Rabelais’s pen and of Bakhtin’s analysis.
Belyi’s Petersburg is a dying city whose architectural beauty has been 
invaded by putrefaction. In keeping with baroque aesthetics, the image 
juxtaposes life and death, only to show their inexorable linkage: the ﬁ sh 
eggs insinuate conception and death into the simultaneously comical and 
disgusting crowd on Nevskii. In the words of the author of The Anatomy 
of Disgust, “the having lived and the living unite to make up the organic 
world of generative rot—rank, smelling, and upsetting to the touch,” what 
Miller calls “life soup, fecundity itself. [ . . . ] It is slimy, slippery, wiggling, 
[ . . . ] generating spontaneously. [ . . . ] Images of decay imperceptibly 
slide into images of fertility and out again.” 33 Miller’s description would 
have resonated profoundly with the thinking of Solovev and his followers, 
but not with Bakhtin, who writes that, in the culture of laughter, death 
represents the necessary joyful condition for the renewal of life.
The image of Nevskii as a caviar sandwich, though comical, reminds us 
that we are what we eat, not only in the sense of what we ingest, and not 
even that we ingest the disgusting, but that we ingest ourselves. The mes-
32. Belyi, Peterburg, 256.
33. Miller, Anatomy of Disgust, 40– 41.






sage is that we appear in the world in the shape of a single sticky ﬁ sh roe 
only to devour ourselves collectively. The image evokes an earlier disqui-
sition on truth and eating that parodies Pilate’s question “what is truth”; 
the answer is rendered by means of a pun: “istina—estina” (the truth is 
what we eat), cannibalizing the truth. The punning response is framed by 
people eating pork in a tavern and calling each other pigs. The message is 
obvious: we eat pork, and we are pigs. The pun erases civilization’s desired 
distance between man and animal. Belyi subverts the truth by identifying it 
with eating, just as he deﬂ ates the human body, morphing it not only into 
animal ﬂ esh but also into human food and thereby transgressing society’s 
most sacred taboo. The result is a transgressive aesthetic challenge to the 
squeamish reader—Belyi’s contemporary who had not yet been assaulted 
by violent, sexually disturbing expressionist and surreal aesthetics.
Feelings of aversion have always been associated with the body’s ori-
ﬁ ces (mouth, nose, ears, genitals, and anus) and with gaping wounds as 
artiﬁ cial oriﬁ ces created violently. They have been considered danger-
ous openings through which the outside world—in the form of disease 
and moral decay—penetrates the physical and moral body and contami-
nates it.34 I have focused primarily on the repulsive mouth as the oriﬁ ce 
that ingests repulsive food. But the mouth in Petersburg is also the path to 
the anus, the most unclean body part. Apollon Apollonovich, who suffers 
from indigestion, spends a lot of time on the toilet, the private space that 
links the ingestion of food with its expulsion. The narrator refers to the 
toilet as that “incomparable place,” which the Senator considers a place of 
refuge, locking himself in it after the bomb explosion, but not only then. 
Pushing the threshold of repugnance, Belyi has him defecate in bed dur-
ing a bout of diarrhea, imaged as a bathtub ﬁ lled to the brim with stinking 
excrement that the narrator compares with watery dung and a disgusting 
hippopotamus splashing in it. The comical comparison of the tiny Senator 
to a large blubbery animal suggests the gargantuan size of the excrement.
The mouth and anus, however, are also linked to same-sex desire, 
which is the hidden subtext of desire in the novel. I have already referred 
to the homosexual underside of Dudkin’s relationship with Lippanchenko. 
His sidekick and double agent Morkovin, a man with a gaping mouth and 
cannibalist desire (he brings his mouth up to Nikolai like a cannibal want-
ing to swallow him), places a wet kiss on Nikolai’s lips in a smelly, sleazy 
restaurant, to which the latter responds with utter revulsion. What is strik-
ing about Belyi’s deployment of their mouths is that they are both animal-
like and that they commingle eating and sex in a disgusting way.35
34. Petersburg makes reference to the pollution of the Neva by germs.
35. “Nikolai Apollonovich stood in the billowing white clouds of stench from the 
kitchen, pale, white, and crazed, his red mouth agape, but not laughing, with a halo of 
very light, fog-like linen hair—a hunted animal, he bared his teeth and turned to Mor-
kovin.” Belyi, Peterburg, 212. The gaping mouth, which is here framed by stench— of food 
and, by association, of a decaying corpse—morphs into an image of bared teeth, reveal-
ing Nikolai’s animal nature. Before the kiss, Morkovin brings his “open oral cavity up to 
Nikolai Apollonovich like a cannibal who was going to swallow Ableukhov.” Ibid., 203 – 4. 
What we see are two disgusting oral cavities facing each other in a scene permeated by 
disgusting animal imagery.
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Perhaps the most repulsive depiction of Lippanchenko’s mouth is 
Dudkin’s surreal fantasy: “Suddenly a fatty neck fold bulged out between 
the back and the back of the neck in a giant smile [ . . . ] and the neck 
acquired the appearance of a face, as if a monster with a noseless, eyeless 
snout was sitting in the chair; and the neck fold acquired the appearance of 
a toothless torn mouth.” 36 The image of the torn mouth—simultaneously 
mouth and wound—has, as I mentioned earlier, been displaced onto Lip-
panchenko’s fatty backside. Dudkin’s response is one of recoil. His most 
powerful experience of revulsion toward the “vile act” in Helsingfors oc-
curs during the visit to his garret by the mysterious Shishnarfne, whose 
body is utterly changeable and ﬂ uid:
He would see himself holding his belly and shouting intensely into abso-
lute emptiness [ . . . ] his head was thrown back, and the huge oriﬁ ce of 
his screaming mouth would appear to him as a black abyss. [ . . . ] “But 
then, after the act,” his mouth tore open deafeningly and closed after 
being torn. Suddenly, the curtain was rent before Aleksandr Ivanovich’s 
eyes: he remembered everything clearly . . . That dream in Helsingfors 
[ . . . ] roars were being pushed out of him [ . . . ] and he understood: “Shish-
narfne” [ . . . ] It was a familiar word which he uttered as if he was perform-
ing the act; only, this dreamily familiar word had to be turned inside out 
[naiznanku]. And in a ﬁ t of uncontrollable fear, he tried to yell out: “En-
franshish.” [ . . . ] a voice that was roaring from his throat just before that 
roared threateningly: “Yes, yes, yes . . . It is me . . . I destroy irrevocably . . .”37
The biblical rent curtain, metaphorizing the way back into Dudkin’s 
troubled memory, reduplicates the image of the torn, wounded mouth 
that opens onto a dark abyss. He suddenly remembers that the word ema-
nating from him during the act was “Enfranshish,” the mysterious palin-
drome that he recognizes as “Shishnarfne” turned inside out: “naiznanku” 
comes from “iznanka,” which means the wrong, seamy side, here by ex-
tension also suggesting the backside. Later Dudkin will tellingly refer to 
Shishnarfne as his “iznanka.” One of the meanings of “shish,” the ﬁ rst 
and last syllable of Shishnarfne/Enfranshish, is the obscene gesture of 
the thumb between the index and middle ﬁ ngers. If we return to the idea 
that bodily oriﬁ ces have been considered openings through which physi-
cal and moral dangers penetrate the body, then Shishnarfne represents 
precisely that. He is the link to the “vile act” that Dudkin performed with 
Lippanchenko: the association of Dudkin’s lacerated, shouting mouth 
with the baroque palindrome—a case of verbal inversion—insinuates 
inverted desire.38 Putting the connection between them in anatomical 
36. Belyi, Peterburg, 277.
37. Ibid., 298–99.
38. We get our ﬁ rst inkling of Dudkin’s homosexual desire during his ﬁ rst meet-
ing with Nikolai, when he tells Nikolai that he has never been in love with women, and 
that since Helsingfors he has lusted after fetish objects: women’s body parts and parts of 
clothing like stockings. He also tells Nikolai that men have been in love with him, which 
Ableukhov interprets to mean Lippanchenko. In other words, Dudkin represents himself 
as a fetishist, which at the turn of the twentieth century was associated with same-sex de-
sire. In his conversation with Shishnarfne, he speaks about ritual fetishism, especially in 
satanist cults, suggesting once again the suppressed reference to “kissing the Goat’s arse 
and stamping on the cross.”






terms, the mouth is the beginning of a tube, the anus the end, or as Miller 
writes, “the gate that protects the inviolability, the autonomy of males.” 39 
The association also sheds light on the image of Lippanchenko as slime 
oozing down Dudkin’s back.
If we return to the representation of Dudkin’s gaping mouth during 
Shishnarfne’s visit once more, we see that it also expresses an emotion 
greater than disgust. The heartrending shout expresses shame, as well 
as profound existential angst, bringing to mind Edvard Munch’s famous 
proto-expressionist painting The Scream (1893).40 Belyi described his lec-
ture “The Tragedy of Dostoevsky’s Art” at the Religious Philosophical 
Society in 1910 as “a scream about my situation.” 41 The same claim can 
be applied to his groundbreaking novel.42 Like Dudkin’s shout, Munch’s 
painting also gives voice to anxiety that cannot be subdued. Here is how 
he depicted the source of The Scream: “I was walking along the road with 
two friends. The sun set. I felt a tinge of melancholy. Suddenly the sky be-
came a bloody red. I stopped, leaned against the railing, dead tired, and 
I looked at the ﬂ aming clouds that hung like blood and a sword over the 
blue-black ﬁ ord and the city. My friends walked on. I stood there, trem-
bling with fright. And I felt a loud, unending scream piercing nature.” 43 
If we place Belyi’s drawing of Nikolai Apollonovich side by side, espe-
cially with the black-and-white lithograph version of Munch’s painting 
(1895), we are struck by the similarity (see ﬁ gures 4 and 5).44 Even though 
Nikolai’s mouth is closed, his expressive serpentine form (his body often 
assumes such a shape) and the thick pen strokes that serve as background 
are strikingly similar to those in the lithograph. Belyi’s representation of 
the ﬁ gure’s angst and, especially, the general mood of the drawing seem 
to evoke Munch’s proto-expressionist style.
I have not been able to ascertain whether Belyi knew the painting or 
39. Miller, Anatomy of Disgust, 98–100.
40. Similar feelings are evoked by Dudkin’s grotesque morphing body in the subse-
quent scene in which the Bronze Horseman pours his molten metals into Dudkin’s veins. 
Like other characters in the novel, the Bronze Horseman is a metamorphic ﬁ gure, chang-
ing shapes and assuming different forms.
41. Ljunggren, Dream of Rebirth, 14. Here is how Munch described his painting: “You 
know my picture, The Scream? I was being stretched to the limit—nature was screaming in 
my blood—I was at a breaking point.” Quoted in Sue Prideaux, Edvard Munch: Behind the 
Scream (New Haven, 2005), 152.
42. It is a commonplace of Petersburg criticism that the image of Sofia Petrovna Lik-
hutina and Nikolai’s romantic involvement with her is Belyi’s parodic representation of 
his obsessive love for Liubov Dmitrievna Mendeleeva, Aleksandr Blok’s wife, and of their 
tumultuous relationship in the summer of 1905.
43. Vanessa Rumble, “Scandinavian Conscience: Kierkegaard, Ibsen, and Munch,” 
in Jeffrey W. Howe, ed., Edvard Munch: Psyche, Symbol and Expression (Chicago, 2001), 27. 
In The Philosophy of Art, Arthur Schopenhauer claimed that art was not able to reproduce 
a scream expressively; Belyi proved him wrong, as did Munch the symbolist, deploying 
what can be described as symbolist synesthesia, with light and color rendering sound and 
rhythm, and vice versa.
44. N. A. Kaidalova has perceptively noted that Nikolai’s head resembles Konstantin 
Somov’s well-known portrait of Blok (1907). N. A. Kaidalova, “Risunki Andreia Belogo,” 
in Stanislav Lesnevskii and Aleksandr Alekseevich Mikhailov, eds., Andrei Belyi: Problemy 
tvorchestva (Moscow, 1988), 599.
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Munch’s work, which was frequently exhibited at the beginning of the 
century; The Scream has been exhibited at Oslo’s National Gallery since 
1909. Belyi traveled to Norway twice, in 1913 to attend Rudolph Steiner’s 
lectures and in 1916 for a brief visit. In Munich in 1906, he became ac-
quainted with Stanislaw Pzsybyszewski, one of Munch’s close friends and 
admirers who collaborated on the ﬁ rst monograph of the painter’s works 
(1894).45 We know that Belyi had read Przybyszewski and wrote an essay 
about him, in which he describes his tormented heroes, as well as their 
gaping mouths, roaring into chaos.46 Przybyszewski inscribed Munch’s 
Scream into the ﬁ rst volume of his novel Homo Sapiens, Über Bord (which 
45. In 1906, Belyi frequented the café Simplicissimus in Munich—gathering place of 
the Secession artists with whom Munch was afﬁ liated.
46. Belyi, “Prorok bezlichiia,” Arabeski, 2:10–21 passim.
Figure 4 (left). Andrei Belyi, sketch of Nikolai Apollonovich for Petersburg 
(1910s). From Andrei Belyi. Aleksandr Blok. Moskva (Moscow, 2005). Used with 
permission. Figure 5 (right). Edvard Munch, black-and-white lithograph version 
of The Scream (1895).






Belyi knew), in which the painter Mikita depicts a sunset as “1000 open 
mouths in the sky screaming color (rivers of blood in the shape of dark 
red stripes) down onto the world.” 47 If not the painting, then this pas-
sage could have been one of the sources of the ubiquitous shout or gap-
ing mouth in Petersburg, for instance when Nikolai’s tormented murder-
ous mouth gapes at the sunrise as it turns into a bloody red column that 
dances in the air and then lands on the surrounding objects in the shape 
of bloody red spots.
In the novel, the only ﬁ guration of a shouting lacerated mouth that 
exclusively expresses despair is that of the noble caryatid whose shout is 
prophetic. Belyi transforms the muscular bearded caryatid, which sup-
ports the ediﬁ ce of state, into an oracular image as it rends its oral cavity 
by sounding the prophetic shout of coming destruction: “His muscular 
arms that ﬂ ew up over the stone head would straighten out in the elbows, 
and the chiseled sinciput would jerk wildly. The mouth would tear open 
in a thunderous roar, a long desperate roar—the mouth would tear, and 
you would say: ‘it is the roar of a tornado (thousands of black caps of the 
city’s hooligans roared like this at the pogroms).’” 48 The image of the lac-
erated mouth in this instance serves as an expression of terror-inspiring 
prophecy. The roar of the despairing caryatid, which has long observed 
Petersburg’s immutable, ignorant, and unseemly human centipede from 
its digniﬁ ed position high above the crowd, announces physical destruc-
tion, prophesying the whirlwind of the coming revolution and of the end 
of Petersburg, prophesied since the beginning.
The mouth of Belyi’s emphatically baroque caryatid resembles the 
Hellenistic Laocoön, beloved by the Baroque, even though Gotthold 
Lessing claimed, in his eponymous treatise on classical aesthetics, that it 
expresses pain and suffering nobly and does not transgress the classical 
“law of beauty” (see ﬁ gure 6). Laocoön’s jaw is constricted, not open, ac-
cording to Lessing and is therefore not disgusting.49 But the loathsome 
shout proscribed by Lessing and classical aesthetics clearly emanates from 
Belyi’s caryatid. The shout, which dissolves rational measured speech, is 
a typical motif of baroque and modernist excessive emotion. What made 
disgust the subject of representation in baroque, Romantic, and mod-
ernist aesthetics was also its morbidly alluring aspect. The excessive, not 
just the loathsome, is an important locus of aesthetic representation in 
Petersburg, where the motif of the lacerated and gaping mouth disﬁ gured 
by pain or incoherent prophesy is aligned with the sphere of baroque 
terror tempered by disgust, which represents the decadent underbelly of 
the beautiful imperial city. Just like the novel’s Bronze Horseman, who is 
linked to death and decay, the caryatid announces death and destruction 
ﬁ gured in baroque terms—through its torn gaping mouth.
Belyi deployed this image in his writing elsewhere as well. “A large as 
47. Quoted in Ranga Thiis Stang, Edvard Munch: The Man and His Art, trans. Geoffrey 
Culverwell (New York, 1979), 90. Homo sapiens was enormously popular in Russia.
48. Belyi, Peterburg, 265.
49. Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Laocoön: An Essay on the Limits of Painting and Poetry, 
ed. Edward Allen McCormick (Baltimore, 1984), 7– 8.





Figure 6. Detail of Laocoön from Laocoön and His Sons (160 –20 BC)






if lacerated mouth with a protruding lip” is how he describes Solovev’s 
mouth in Arabesques (1911). Besides evoking revulsion, Solovev’s mouth, 
as described by Belyi, is oracular (like that of the caryatid): it gives birth 
to “the words of a prophet.” 50 He depicts the Russian philosopher Nikolai 
Berdiaev in similar terms, framing his philosophical discourse with the 
disgusting representation of a violent seizure of the oral cavity, a facial tic 
that Berdiaev suffered.51 The description evokes the ﬁ gure of a gargoyle, 
yet another grotesque sculptural ﬁ gure that evinces a baroque sensibility. 
As in the case of Solovev, Belyi endows Berdiaev’s disgusting mouth with 
prophetic philosophical power. In line with baroque, Romantic, and mod-
ernist aesthetics, he situates the disgusting in the context of the higher 
truth and the sublime, of which the disgusting functions as the under-
side. The mouth serves this dual purpose—as the conduit of the power of 
philosophical or prophetic language and, because of its direct link to the 
digestive tract, the source of revulsion. What seems to connect the sub-
lime and disgust emotionally and aesthetically is that they inspire terror: 
both perform the reader’s, or the spectator’s, attraction to and recoil from 
terror and the sphere of grotesque representation.
In his study of the grotesque body, Bakhtin offers a somewhat dif-
ferent view of the gaping mouth, which he identiﬁ es with the grotesque 
face: “The grotesque face is actually reduced to the gaping mouth; the 
other features are only a frame encasing this wide-open bodily abyss.” The 
grotesque body, which is inseparable from the rest of the world, is a body 
in the act of becoming, continues Bakhtin: “it is never ﬁ nished, never 
completed; it is continually built [and] created”—shapeless and formless, 
in other words.52 This can certainly be ascribed to Belyi’s ﬁ guration of 
Lippanchenko and his ghostly emanation Shishnarfne. Like subsequent 
theorists of disgust, Bakhtin claims that the grotesque body is character-
ized by its “apertures and convexities” and that it expands in “copulation, 
pregnancy, childbirth, the throes of death, eating, drinking, and defeca-
tion,” revealing the body’s constantly changing state.53 The gaping mouth 
and grotesque body, however, are positive, joyful concepts for Bakhtin, 
which he afﬁ liates with the culture of laughter. Yet as in Belyi’s novel, the 
gaping abyss in Bakhtin is associated with chaos, which in classical Greek 
meant the formless, wide-open abyss from which the world emerged.
One of the conclusions that may be drawn from my discussion of Pe-
tersburg is that representation in it is utterly misanthropic. But is that really 
50. Belyi, “O Vladimire Soloveve,” Arabeski, 350. In the same essay, Belyi also empha-
sizes Solovev’s raucous demonic laughter emanating from the torn mouth.
51. “His red mouth tore open [ . . . ] his teeth, that were biting, shone in the oral 
cavity that appeared for a moment to be a snout; his head began to write commas; ﬁ nally, 
freeing himself from the armchair, he squeezed his ﬁ ngers hysterically below his torn 
mouth and pressed his curly head to his trembling ﬁ ngers in order to hide his tongue.” 
Belyi, Mezhdu dvukh revoliutsii, 416. I remember my grandfather, who had known Berdiaev, 
performing the philosopher’s nervous tic at the dinner table. The rest of us would invari-
ably watch with fascination, especially my brother and I, and then proceed to express our 
disgust with my grandfather’s bad table manners. At table? Really! How disgusting!
52. Bakhtin, Rabelais, 317.
53. Ibid., 321.
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the novel’s message? Most theorists of disgust have emphasized the affect’s 
normative moral function, as well as its exclusionary connotations. It is 
undeniably protective and conservative: it polices the normative hierar-
chical boundaries between life and death, sublime and base, man and 
animal, self and other, male and female, heterosexual and homosexual 
desire; in each pair, the disgust response validates the ﬁ rst item against 
the second.54 It protects not only from baseness, contamination, and our 
own mortality but also from the racial other, female danger, and same-sex 
eros as the self reassures itself “about its own solidity and power,” writes 
Martha Nussbaum.55 She questions, however, the emotion’s moral viability 
in instances when it is an expression of social, political, or cultural intoler-
ance. Most of these boundaries are under attack in Petersburg. The experi-
ence of disgust in the case of Dudkin and Nikolai Apollonovich suggests a 
response to their internalized moral boundaries: Dudkin feels shame and 
horror in regard to the act, the repressed enfranshish, which he performed 
with Lippanchenko; Nikolai imagines killing his father many times, yet is 
horriﬁ ed by his Oedipal desire and by sexual desire in general. Despite 
marking moral boundaries around patricide, murder, and other forms of 
violence, disgust does not result in the reestablishment of moral order in 
the novel. Nor is it contained or surmounted in line with Nussbaum’s call 
to overcome the kind of socially deﬁ ned disgust that violates another’s 
self-deﬁ nition.
In regard to Bakhtin’s theory of the grotesque and its afﬁ liation with 
laughter, my discussion of Petersburg has self-consciously eschewed this di-
mension of the novel, including its scathing dark satire. Instead I have cho-
sen to emphasize the profoundly disturbing aspect of the novel’s affect by 
foregrounding the horror it evokes, which Belyi links primarily to the trou-
bling dissolution of the boundaries between life and death, especially in Pe-
tersburg’s slimy aspect. It is oozingly spatial, a dimension that laughter lacks.
The question that remains is whether Petersburg can be associated with 
the decadent in the arts at the turn of the twentieth century, an ambivalent 
sensibility in regard to ethical norms. Decadence famously aestheticized 
the transgression or inversion of social and artistic norms, yet revealed 
a troubled view of sexuality. If we return to slime and its embodiment 
of the transience of life, which characterized the baroque, it symbolizes 
“life’s soup” from which new life is born. The self-conscious evocation of 
disgust in this regard reveals Belyi’s own profound anxieties about sex and 
the life cycle. If we consider the deployment of disgust in Petersburg from 
this perspective, we can compare it with some emendations to Sigmund 
Freud’s theory of the life and death instincts—eros and thanatos—which 
was most certainly tinged with decadence. According to Freud’s later writ-
ing, the theory consists of the struggle of eros—a unifying life-afﬁ rming 
principle—contra thanatos, which represents the instinctual desire to re-
turn to an original inorganic state. Belyi’s novel is about the victory of the 
death instinct, a decadent view, but instead of an inorganic state, it is af-
54. Martha C. Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions (Cambridge, 
Eng., 2001), 625.
55. Ibid., 204.






ﬁ liated with the dissolution of the body into oozing organic slime, which is 
utterly decadent. The dissolution of Lippanchenko’s body in the end takes 
his novelistic life full circle by returning it to the slime that oozes down Dud-
kin’s back at the beginning of the novel. It brings to mind Solovev’s idea of 
eros and thanatos, partners in the self-perpetuating life cycle—the cause 
of death in life—which was instrumental in shaping Belyi’s views. Solovev’s 
paradoxical “erotic utopia” in Smysl liubvi (The meaning of love) called for 
abstinence as the only possible weapon against the death-dealing cycle of 
birth and death, which his utopian project was meant to bring to an end.
Petersburg, however, is not a utopian text. Quite the contrary! Its narra-
tive succumbs fully to thanatos, in the decadent sense, as a site not of the 
beautiful corpse but of its grotesque decay. Structurally, the novel is pre-
mised on repetition on all of its levels—what in psychoanalysis is known as 
the compulsion to repeat, which according to Freud governs the death in-
stinct, although I would suggest that it governs the procreative life instinct 
as well. Petersburg represents the end of the Ableukhov line, whose parodic 
genealogy, which repeats the generative impulse to procreate endlessly, is 
traced back to Adam at the beginning of the novel. Quite obviously, the 
termination of the Ableukhov line has not abolished death, which still 
reigns in the Epilogue, but strikingly its termination no longer evokes 
revulsion. There are no disgusting close-ups; instead we contemplate the 
aging and death of Nikolai’s parents from a distance, the son’s reading 
of the Book of the Dead in North Africa, and his return to Russia to lead a 
solitary life in the countryside. We could conclude that the disgusting in 
death has been overcome since there is no generative rot in the Epilogue 
to reinvigorate procreative life and its representation in a family novel, of 
which Petersburg is a modernist parody.
Evoking the baroque and late Romanticism as well as modernism, the 
novel intertwines horror and disgust as they degrade the beautiful impe-
rial city—its classical order—and by extension those that live, eat, and die 
in it. Contrary to Petersburg’s architectural history in which classical order 
triumphed over the baroque, Belyi’s novel marks the return, or revenge, 
of decadent baroque excess. The novel dissolves traditional imagery by 
offering a disgusting yet stunning vision of the end of the imperial city. 
Baroque writing also triumphs in the novel’s epilogue, in which Nikolai 
is reading the eighteenth-century Ukrainian mystic Skovoroda, the most 
important representative of the Ukrainian baroque.
This brings us back to the aesthetic function of disgust in the novel 
and its will to undifferentiated, contingent slime. In the traditional idiom 
of Russian symbolist criticism, disgust deﬁ es Apollonian restraint and the 
ﬁ xity of classical aesthetic boundaries, revealing Petersburg’s Dionysian ex-
uberance, symbolized by the ticking bomb in the sardine tin and the slime 
it contains and produces. But the deployment of the disgusting by Belyi in 
his crowning novelistic achievement confronts the reader with more than 
disgust. It encourages readers to delight in the loathsome aesthetically, 
and not avert their readerly gaze or resort to laughter. This does not mean 
that readers must elide an emotional response, quite the contrary.
The ultimate challenge of Petersburg is to appreciate the ways it de-
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ploys bezobrazie by pushing the boundaries of the permissible aestheti-
cally, boundaries that lie beyond the novel’s rich musical and synesthetic 
structure and its symbolist poetics. The challenge is to recognize that it 
is precisely the loathsome that best informs Belyi’s unique experiment 
in modernist image-making: that the decomposition of form, which the 
loathsome in the novel produces, is the animating source of Petersburg’s 
modernist will to abstract representation. Perhaps the existential chal-
lenge of Petersburg is to stand in aesthetic awe of disgust and contemplate 
the decomposing corpse as the original source of abstraction that offers 
access to that which we call death.




“With a Shade of Disgust”: Affective Politics of 
Sexuality and Class in Memoirs of the Stalinist Gulag
Adi Kuntsman
Disgust, in both its subjective experience and social expression, is dense with 
cultural signiﬁ cance. It is a dynamic component of the most exalted philoso-
phies and the most murderous political ideologies. It can work to protect 
cultural boundaries, but sometimes in ways that indicate their vulnerability to 
disruption, and the psychological and social cost paid for securing them.
—Jonathan Dollimore, “Sexual Disgust”
This article deals with the work of disgust in memoirs of the Stalinist gu-
lag, and in particular, with what Jonathan Dollimore describes as the “cul-
tural signiﬁ cance” of disgust in the formation of sexual and class bound-
aries. My engagement with this topic started several years ago, when I 
was researching attitudes toward sexuality in Israel’s post-Soviet émigré 
diaspora. During debates that took place in the immigrant media in the 
early 2000s about the Jerusalem Pride Parade, I came a cross a disturbing 
text—a poem that deployed Soviet criminal jargon, used for men and 
women engaged in same-sex contacts (words, such as pidory, kobly, and 
kovyrialki), to describe the marchers in the parade.1 In the subsequent 
debate that unfolded between the poet and a group of Russian-speaking 
gays and lesbians who protested against the poem, the poet wrote: “I am 
disgusted by the ﬁ lth of sodomy.” He, and a number of journalists who 
This article is part of a larger, ongoing project on the formations of sexuality and class 
in memoirs of Soviet prisons and camps and their circulation in various Soviet and post-
Soviet domains. I would like to thank the participants in the Modern Russian History and 
Culture discussion group (Manchester and Shefﬁ eld Universities, United Kingdom) as 
well as participants at two conferences, “Queering Central and Eastern Europe: National 
Features of Sexual Identities” (London, 2008) and “Emotions in Russian Literature and 
History” (Moscow, 2008), for insightful discussions of this project. I am grateful to Dan 
Healey, Jan Plamper, Mark D. Steinberg, Vera Tolz, and the two anonymous reviewers for 
Slavic Review for their productive comments on an earlier draft of this article. The epi-
graph is taken from Jonathan Dollimore, “Sexual Disgust,” in Tim Dean and Christopher 
Lane, eds., Homosexuality and Psychoanalysis (Chicago, 2001), 368.
1. Pidory is usually used for passive homosexuals; kobly is often used for the women 
who play the “masculine” role in same-sex relations; kovyrialki is often used for the women 
who play the “feminine” role in same-sex relations. The link between homosexuality and 
criminality is almost a commonplace in Soviet and post-Soviet collective imagery, largely 
due to the criminalization of male homosexuality by Iosif Stalin in 1933, when Article 121 
was instituted, sentencing men to up to ﬁ ve years of imprisonment. Female sexuality in the 
Soviet years was medically pathologized rather than criminalized, but same-sex relations 
between women were often mentioned in references to prisons and camps, in particular 
in Soviet penal literature and in the late Soviet years also in the media. For more details, 
see Laurie Essig, Queer in Russia: A Story of Sex, Self and Other (Durham, 1999); Dan Healey, 
Homosexual Desire in Revolutionary Russia: The Regulation of Sexual and Gender Dissent (Chi-
cago, 2001); and Igor Semenovich Kon, Lunnyi svet na zare: Liki i maski odnopoloi liubvi 
(Moscow, 1998).
Slavic Review 68, no. 2 (Summer 2009)
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partook in the debate, constructed same-sex relations as both disgusting 
and distasteful—they were represented as simultaneously low-brow, an 
offense to a good taste, and animalistic. During the debate, which I docu-
ment and analyze elsewhere, several things stood out.2 The ﬁ rst was the 
poet’s extensive use of criminal imagery to denounce and humiliate his 
opponents; the second was the conﬂ ation of heteronormativity with class 
respectability and culturedness. And lastly, it was the sheer intensity of 
disgust, communicated through the poem and subsequent publications.
The debate about the Pride Parade revealed that disgust is indeed 
dense with cultural signiﬁ cance. Expressions of disgust link aesthetics and 
politics, social norms and internal struggles in the immigrant community, 
memories of the past and visions of the future. But most important, in the 
debate that took place in the post-Soviet émigré diaspora of the 2000s, 
the performance of disgust in the present was haunted by shadows of 
the Soviet past. It was a past that was constituted through silences, docu-
mented only partially, remembered with unease, or forgotten altogether. 
I am referring to the history of same-sex relations in the Soviet gulag, 
where millions of citizens—political dissidents, religious practitioners, 
former prisoners of war, and simply “family members of the enemies of 
the people”—were forced to spend years of their lives.
The atrocities of the Soviet gulag are widely documented in what is 
known as “dissident literature”—the corpus of gulag memoirs, written by 
the former political prisoners of Stalinist and post-Stalinist terror.3 Despite 
the substantial body of historical and literary scholarship dedicated to the 
memoirs of political prisoners and survivors of those times, we ﬁ nd little 
discussion of same-sex relations in the camps, with the exception of an 
occasional mention of homosexual rape or marginal references to lesbian 
relations. Both, importantly, are mentioned predominantly in relation to 
common criminals.4 This absence in scholarship can partly be explained 
by the lack of empirical material: most memoirs of the former political 
prisoners, “repressed” during the Stalinist and post-Stalinist periods, do 
not mention same-sex contacts and intimacies in their lives. But sexuality 
is not rare in the memoirs. In fact, we can ﬁ nd a lot of references to sexual 
encounters in the writings of both men and women. What we have to be 
attuned to, however, is how these encounters are described and by whom. 
In many memoirs the political prisoners are repeatedly and consistently 
heterosexualized, while descriptions of the criminal inmates contain 
many references to same-sex relations. Gulag memoir literature, in other 
2. Adi Kuntsman, “Between Gulags and Pride Parades: Sexuality, Nation and Haunted 
Speech Acts,” GLQ: A Journal of Gay and Lesbian Studies 14, no. 2–3 (2008): 263 – 87.
3. For a detailed discussion of the literary corpus of gulag memoirs, its history, de-
velopment and internal tensions, see Leona Toker, Return from the Archipelago: Narratives 
of Gulag Survivors (Bloomington, 2000), 28–72. See also Beth Holmgren, “Introduc-
tion,” in Beth Holmgren, ed., The Russian Memoir: History and Literature (Evanston, 2003), 
ix–xxxix.
4. See, for example, a brief note on homosexuality in Toker, Return from the Archi-
pelago, 61. On sexual relations between women, see Veronica Shapovalov, ed. and trans., 
Remembering the Darkness: Women in Soviet Prisons (Lanham, Md., 2001), 39.






words, creates the division into the heterosexual “politicals” from the in-
telligentsia and the homosexual “common criminals,” a division that, with 
few notable exceptions, is rarely challenged by researchers.5 The silence 
of the memoirists becomes the silence of the discipline: gulag studies as a 
ﬁ eld seems to have little interest in the topic of same-sex relations.
If we turn to the ﬁ eld of sexuality studies and, in particular, to the Rus-
sian scholars who ﬁ rst attempted to break the silence surrounding homo-
sexuality in the Soviet Union, we ﬁ nd a rather different approach. In their 
discussions of same-sex relations in the Soviet period, the memoirs of 
former political prisoners ﬁ gure as the main historical documents shed-
ding light on the topic. Vladimir Kozlovskii, a Russian-American journal-
ist, notes in his widely cited Argo russkoi gomoseksualnoi subkultury:
We have practically no evidence on what happened with [homosexual re-
lations] in Soviet prisons and camps; but the following period is reﬂ ected 
in the large body of the memoir literature, written by the former Stalinist 
prisoners and later also the contemporary political convicts, and rarely 
also by former criminals who became writers. . . . Apparently homosexu-
ality occupies an important part of life in prisons and camps, because it 
is reﬂ ected in the writings of dozens of former Soviet prisoners.6
Olga Zhuk, a Russian scholar and activist, describes a similar problem in 
her book on lesbian subculture in twentieth-century Russia. The second 
half of her book, dedicated to lesbian relations in the gulag, is based on 
literary sources as well as on interviews with women who had been im-
prisoned in the 1970s and 1980s.7 “Information on women’s camps of the 
Stalinist period—the—1930s to the 1950s—is fairly limited,” notes Zhuk. 
“The majority of the older generation of women who have been through 
the Stalinist torture chambers avoid talking about the lesbian topic. In 
some respects this is compensated for by the so-called dissident memoir 
literature.” 8
Both Zhuk and Kozlovskii emphasize the bias of these sources. Kozlov-
skii, for example, points out that “political prisoners describe this [homo-
sexual relations] with a shade of disgust, creating the impression that they 
keep themselves isolated from prison sodomy.” 9 Zhuk echoes him when 
5. For a discussion of intimacy among women in the camps, see Nadya L. Peterson, 
“Dirty Women: Cultural Connotations of Cleanliness in Soviet Russia,” in Helena Goscilo 
and Beth Holmgren, eds., Russia-Women-Culture (Bloomington, 1996) 171–208. For a brief 
but insightful analysis of the way some women memoirists described same-sex relations, 
see Beth Holmgren, “For the Good of the Cause: Russian Women’s Autobiography in the 
Twentieth Century,” in Toby W. Clyman and Diana Greene, eds., Women Writers in Russian 
Literature (Westport, Conn., 1994), 133 –35. Both Peterson and Holmgren emphasize the 
importance of class position in the memoirs of political prisoners; both address the rela-
tions of distance and repulsion expressed by women from the intelligentsia towards the 
“common criminals.”
6. Vladimir Kozlovskii, Argo russkoi gomoseksualnoi subkultury: Materialy k izucheniiu 
(Benson, Vt., 1986). Reprinted in Andrei Bulkin, Zapiski golubogo (Moscow 1997), 326.
7. Olga Zhuk, Russkie amazonki: Istoriia lesbiiskoi subkultury v Rossii, XX vek (Moscow, 
1998).
8. Ibid., 97. Translation from Russian is mine.
9. Kozlovskii, Argo russkoi gomoseksualnoi subkultury, 338.
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she states that the dissident literature “shows little compassion for the 
humiliating situation of homosexual men, and talks about women with 
disgust and unmasked contempt.” 10 Both authors note the emotionality 
of the memoirs’ descriptions of same-sex relations. Yet neither of them 
explains the disgust they observe in the texts, its origins, or its effect on 
the formation of cultural knowledge about same-sex relations that the 
memoirs produce. It is this affective dimension of the memoirs that I will 
address here. The cultural politics of disgust and related emotions, such 
as contempt, fear, or hatred, is crucial to understanding the highly nega-
tive ﬁ gurations of same-sex relations in the gulag literature, as well as the 
effect these ﬁ gurations can have on contemporary formations of sexuality. 
A close reading of disgust, I believe, also sheds light on the classed map-
ping of the gulag world into “heterosexual” political prisoners from the 
intelligentsia, and “homosexual” prisoners from the criminal underworld. 
It is only by unpacking such a mapping that we can understand the per-
sistent link between same-sex relations, social class, and criminality that 
prevails to this day.
In my analysis I will approach disgust as existing between the indi-
vidual and the social, the subjective and the historical, the internal and 
the external. Following cultural theorists of emotions such as Sara Ahmed, 
Jonathan Dollimore, Mary Douglas, Julia Kristeva, William Ian Miller, and 
Elspeth Probyn, I will show how memoirs constitute the disgusting, the 
disgusted, and the boundary between them, and how the formations of 
all these are “dense with cultural signiﬁ cance.” 11
The aim of this article, then, is to explore the role of disgust in the 
literary world of the gulag memoirs. What disgusts the authors, and how 
is their disgust constituted through the text? According to Dollimore, dis-
gust “can work to protect cultural boundaries, but sometimes in ways that 
indicate their vulnerability to disruption.” 12 Which boundaries does the 
gulag disgust aim to protect? What is the role of disgust in broader per-
ceptions of morality and humanness? And lastly, what role does disgust 
(and do related emotions) play in the process of transforming memory 
into literature? This article concentrates on the period of Stalinist politi-
cal terror and, more speciﬁ cally, on descriptions of the Kolyma camps of 
the 1930s–1950s. I will be making references to several memoirists, but 
I will predominantly focus on the two best-known and most inﬂ uential 
gulag survivor-authors: Evgeniia Ginzburg and Varlam Shalamov.
The Disgusting
Or take the repulsive goggle-eyed toad, Zoika the lesbian. This one was 
accompanied by three so-called kobly [studs]. Hermaphrodite-like crea-
tures with short hair, husky voices, and men’s names—Edik, Sashok, and a 
third one.13
10. Zhuk, Russkie amazonki, 97.
11. Dollimore, “Sexual Disgust,” 368.
12. Ibid.
13. Evgenia Ginzburg, Within the Whirlwind, trans. Ian Boland (New York, 1981), 101. 






This is how Ginzburg, the author of Krutoi marshrut (translated into 
English as Journey into the Whirlwind, volume 1, and Within the Whirlwind, 
volume 2), presents the world of women engaged in sexual relations with 
each other in the camps. These relations were based on the gendered 
division of roles: there were the “lesbians” (more often described as 
kovyrialki), the women who play a “feminine” role, and the “studs” (kobly, 
sometimes also translated as “dogs”), who played a “masculine” role.14 
The latter were also sometimes called “its” (ono). In many memoirs the 
masculine women were described as particularly ugly, fearsome, and vio-
lent, and their feminine counterparts appear as subservient, docile, and 
pathetic.15 Let us take a closer look at the affective textual means by which 
these women are depicted by Ginzburg.
Both the lesbian and the studs, whom Ginzburg later calls “infernal 
creatures” and “humanoids,” are described with disdain and disgust. Both 
are located outside the human world. The feminine Zoika, the lesbian, is 
endowed with animal features (“goggle-eyed”) and is called a toad. The 
masculine studs are described as “creatures.” In Ginzburg’s text, disgust 
appears as one of Zoika’s physical attributes; however, it is also transferred 
onto the studs by means of what cultural theorist Sara Ahmed calls “meto-
nymic sticking.” 16 Deploying Roman Jakobson’s idea of metonymy as substi-
tution of objects located in textual proximity, Ahmed notes that emotions 
can stick signs together through affect.17 Here, the reader’s emotional reac-
tion toward Zoika sticks to the studs—hermaphrodite-like creatures—and 
to their gender transgression: their voices, names, and visual appearance, 
so it is the studs that appear disgusting. What makes the studs disgusting 
seems to be both their textual and their sexual proximity to the feminine 
lesbian as well as the transgressive relations in which they are engaged.
Anthropologist Mary Douglas suggests that disgust guards social 
boundaries by deﬁ ning what is “polluted” and expelling it beyond the 
boundaries of the social.18 In many cultures, the polluted and the ﬁ lthy—
dirt, blood, excrement, and so on, whether actual or metaphorical—is 
kept at bay through a complex process of physical and ritual puriﬁ cation. 
At the same time, objects— or people or actions—that transgress social 
norms and taboos are deﬁ ned as polluting and are often perceived to 
be disgusting.19 In Ginzburg’s text same-sex relations and the deliberate 
The English translation of this particular passage omits the nuances in Ginzburg’s de-
scription of the feminine and the masculine women; I therefore modiﬁ ed the translation 
slightly for the sake of accuracy. Evgeniia Ginzburg, Krutoi marshrut: Tiurma, lager, ssylka 
(Milan, 1979), 2:113.
14. See, for example, Healey, Homosexual Desire in Revolutionary Russia, 237.
15. For more examples of such descriptions in the memoirs, see Kozlovskii, Argo rus-
skoi gomoseksualnoi subkultury and Zhuk, Russkie amazonki.
16. Sara Ahmed, The Cultural Politics of Emotion (New York, 2004).
17. Roman Jakobson, “Zametki o proze poeta Pasternaka,” Raboty po Poetike (1935; 
Moscow, 1987), 21– 44.
18. Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo (New 
York, 1966).
19. For a detailed discussion of cleanliness and its relation to gender, class, and mo-
rality in Soviet Russia, see Peterson, “Dirty Women,” 177–208.
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insubordination to gender norms is what transgresses the social order.20 
They are simultaneously positioned beyond the border of the feminine 
and the human. Gulag lesbians and studs exist outside the acceptable and 
are therefore located within the animal world of creatures, which is also 
the world of the infernal, as I shall elaborate later.
Similar expressions of disgust toward gender transgression can be 
found in other memoirs. For example, the Socialist Revolutionary Ekat-
erina Olitskaia describes the masculine women she encountered during 
her imprisonment in the 1930s, in a style similar to Ginzburg’s:
The blessing of our barrack was that we did not have the criminals [ugo-
lovnye]. We met them in the dining room, in the camp. We were imme-
diately shocked by those extremely noticeable women—the “its” [ono]. 
Repulsive, disgustingly impudent creatures. In Magadan there were not 
as many of them as they were usually sent further away. Impudent faces, 
their hair cut in masculine fashion, their coats on their shoulders. They 
had their lovers, their mistresses among the prisoners. They went about 
the camp in pairs, arm in arm, boldly showing off their love. The admin-
istration and the great majority of inmates hated the “its.” Women in 
camps fretfully made way for them.21
In Olitskaia’s text disgust and repulsion are merged with the hatred 
and fear experienced by most of the inmates as well as by the camp admin-
istration.22 These feelings are directed ﬁ rst and foremost toward the mas-
culine women, the “its.” Similarly to Ginzburg, Olitskaia positions these 
women outside the human collective; they are “creatures,” not human 
beings. (In Russian the pronoun “it” is used for objects and for living be-
ings that are symbolically located outside civilization, such as animals or 
monsters.) But Olitskaia brings in another aspect that is linked to disgust: 
the deﬁ ant visibility of these women. The “its” and their female compan-
ions cause disgust ﬁ rst because their individual “polluted” bodies are too 
evident, too out of place: they stand out and threaten the gender order. 
But they also appear disgusting because of their presence in the space of 
the camp and the visibility of their sexual relations. Such visibility goes 
against the intelligentsia’s concepts of shame and modesty in relation to 
female sexuality in general, and to what is considered deviant, sinful, or 
immoral sexuality—“vice”—in particular. Tellingly, the rare examples of 
same-sex relations among the political prisoners from the intelligentsia 
emphasize their discrete nature.23 For example, Maiia Ulanovskaia in her 
20. I want to distinguish these women’s masculine appearance by choice from a gen-
eral degendering of women’s appearance in the camps. Many imprisoned women resented 
and mourned the destruction of their femininity by extreme conditions, camp clothes, 
and hard physical labor.
21. Ekaterina Olitskaia, Moi vospominaniia (Frankfurt am Main, 1971), 243 – 44. 
Translation from Russian is mine.
22. The motive of fear is echoed by Vasilii Grossman, who describes lesbian relations 
in the camp as a “tragic and ugly world” that “caused chilling horror in the souls of thieves 
and killers.” Vasilii Semenovich Grossman, Vse techet: Pozdniaia proza (Moscow, 1994), 319. 
Translation from Russian is mine.
23. This was also true more generally for the descriptions of intimate relations be-
tween political prisoners. For an excellent analysis of the relations between class, sexual 






description of same-sex relations between women in the camps, notes 
that while lesbian relations existed among all groups of female prisoners, 
the common criminals behaved openly, whereas “among the intelligentsia 
everything was hidden, masked, ambiguous. Only rarely would one admit 
the vice, but that happened, too.” 24 The lack of shame and hypervisibility 
is what makes the “its” and their “mistresses” disgusting.
The conjuncture of gender transgression and cross-gender practices, 
such as wearing the clothes of the opposite gender or adopting a genderly 
“wrong” name, with the lack of shame and embarrassment, is not unique 
to Olitskaia. We can ﬁ nd it, for example, in Varlam Shalamov’s “Women 
in the Criminal World”: “No discussion of women in the criminal world is 
complete without a mention of the vast army of ‘Zoikas,’ ‘Mankas,’ ‘Dash-
kas,’ and other creatures of the male sex who were christened with women’s 
names. Strangely enough the bearers of these feminine names responded 
to them as if they saw nothing unusual, shameful or offensive in them.” 25
Writing about women in the world of common criminals he encoun-
tered in Kolyma, Shalamov’s descriptions effeminate those men who were 
engaged in sexual relations with other men and bore female names but 
did not experience embarrassment or shame regarding their situation:26 
Sigmund Freud described shame, embarrassment, and disgust as mecha-
nisms that protect civilization from the rule of instinct.27 But of course, 
the very concept of civilization and the civilized is a sociocultural con-
struct that has its historical speciﬁ cities (see, for example, the work by 
Norbert Elias on the “civilising process”).28 According to Douglas, shame 
and disgrace, as well as the sense of ﬁ lth and disgust, appear at moments 
when the social order and associated boundaries of the normal are under 
threat. Shame and disgust, in other words, work to both deﬁ ne and guard 
the “normal” and the “civilized.” The lack of shame where it is expected to be 
experienced, locates those who do not experience shame beyond the bor-
ders of the civilized. It is not surprising that Shalamov, like Ginzburg, calls 
the effeminate men “creatures” and deploys a wide range of textual means 
to signal their monstrous status. Another, practically identical description 
of effeminate men appears in another story, “Swindler’s Blood,” where 
the “male creatures” are constructed, not only as lacking shame, but also 
as explicitly animal:
and moral purity, and the construction of memoir narratives, see Peterson, “Dirty Women,” 
177–208.
24. Nadezhda Ulanovskaia and Maiia Ulanovskaia, Istoriia odnoi semi: Memuary (St. 
Petersburg, 2003), 249–50. Translation from Russian is mine.
25. Varlam Shalamov, “Women in the Criminal World,” in Kolyma Tales, trans. John 
Glad (New York, 1980), 205.
26. A passive role was linked to low status in the criminal hierarchy; many men were 
raped and abused and then forced into the status of passive homosexuals. See Healey, 
Homosexual Desire in Revolutionary Russia.
27. Sigmund Freud, Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, in James Strachey, ed. and 
trans., Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud (London, 1905), 
7:123 –245.
28. Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations, 
2d ed., trans. Edmund Jephcott (Oxford, 2000).
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The criminals [blatari] are all pederasts. Each of them in the camp 
is surrounded by young people with swollen and muddy eyes—“Zoikas,” 
“Mankas,” “Verkas,” whom the criminal is feeding and with whom he 
sleeps.
In one of the camps where there was no hunger, blatari had tamed 
and corrupted a female dog. They fed and petted her, and then slept 
with her, like a woman, openly, in front of everyone in the barrack.
One does not want to believe these cases, because of their mon-
strousness. But this is everyday life [byt].29
In Shalamov’s gulag cosmology the pederasts—men, who play the ac-
tive role in homosexual contacts—are akin to animals. In their beastly 
sexuality they do not distinguish between women, “creatures of the male 
sex” with female names, and dogs. The passive homosexuals—a nameless 
crowd of repulsive deviants—are similarly depicted through the use of 
animal imagery. In the text the dogs and the “young people with swol-
len and muddy eyes” mirror each other and appear metonymically in-
terchangeable; both are attached to the blatar and engage in monstrous 
sexual relations with him. The parallels between the effeminate men and 
the dog are strengthened by the use of similar words: the blatar feeds and 
sleeps with both; and in both cases it is done openly and shamelessly.
While Ginzburg uses animal imagery metaphorically, Shalamov’s tac-
tic of metonymic substitution clearly sticks together homosexuality and 
zoophilia. Same-sex relations in the camp simultaneously endanger two 
highly tabooed boundaries: between the male and the female, and between 
the animal and the human.30 Those who transgress these boundaries by 
breaking the rules of gender behavior or by engaging in “deviant” sexual 
practices are deﬁ ned as disgusting. Their status preserves the boundaries 
of cultural mores in general, and of heterosexuality and gender normativ-
ity in particular. In that respect, the memoirs cited here are not unique: 
same-sex relations are tabooed in many, although not in all, cultures. But 
same-sex relations are not simply disgusting; rather, their affective con-
stitution plays an important role in the very deﬁ nition of the “human.” 
Ahmed in her discussion of emotions describes the work of disgust in 
the following way: “They [the disgusting bodies] are constructed as non-
human, as beneath and below the bodies of the disgusted. Indeed, through 
the disgust reaction, ‘belowness’ and ‘beneathness’ become the proper-
ties of their bodies. They embody that which is lower than human.” 31
The very idea of the nonhuman as disgusting is not unique either, 
at least at ﬁ rst glance. According to Douglas, for example, the polluted/
tabooed in cultural cosmologies is symbolically located outside the col-
29. Varlam Tikhonovich Shalamov, “Zhulnicheskaia krov,” Preodolenie zla: Izbrannoe 
(Moscow, 2003), 564. Translation from Russian is mine.
30. For an interesting discussion of animal metaphors in relations to sex between 
men in Soviet camps and the ways these metaphors are played out in post-Soviet popular 
ﬁ ction, see Eliot Borenstein, “Band of Brothers: Homoeroticism and the Russian Action 
Hero,” Kultura 4, no. 2 (May 2008): 17–22, at www.kultura-rus.de (last accessed 26 Febru-
ary 2009).
31. Ahmed, Cultural Politics of Emotion, 97.






lective, that is, outside the human “us.” Indeed, in both Shalamov’s and 
Ginzburg’s texts, gangster-pederasts, effeminate male “creatures,” lesbi-
ans, and kobly are all positioned lower than human, thus tying humanness 
and affect. But Douglas’s reading of disgust is, I believe, insufﬁ cient to un-
derstand the gulag memoirs and their cultural and historical speciﬁ city. 
Neither it is sufﬁ cient for approaching the work done by disgust. Ahmed 
reminds us that disgust is not simply about the bodies of others who are 
constructed as “hateful and sickening”; it is also about those who are dis-
gusted and the boundary between them. Ahmed’s reading of disgust as 
boundary—an important aspect which I address below—takes us away 
from the focus on the disgusting object (or subject). Rather than focusing 
on disgust as a feature of the gulag “monsters” and exploring, following 
the Douglasian approach, what makes them disgusting, I want to shift the 
emphasis to those who experience and narrate the disgust. Who are the 
disgusted subjects in the memoirs? What are the boundaries of the hu-
man that they aim to preserve, and what threatens such preservation? As 
the following discussion will reveal, disgust in the gulag memoirs works 
not only to protect particular sexualities and genders but also to sustain 
the class distinction between criminal inmates and the political prisoners 
from the intelligentsia.
The Disgusted
Unlike Douglas who focuses ﬁ rst and foremost on analyzing the disgusting 
object, Miller, the author of The Anatomy of Disgust, turns to the subject 
who experiences disgust. He notes that “to feel disgust is human and hu-
manising. Those who have very high thresholds of disgust and are hence 
rather insensitive to the disgusting we think of as belonging to somewhat 
different categories: protohuman like children, subhuman like the mad, 
or suprahuman like saints.” 32
Rather than focusing on the nonhuman nature of those who cause 
disgust, Miller approaches the feeling itself as humanizing: experiencing 
disgust is what makes one human. Of course, the ability to feel disgust 
is not universal and is mediated by many factors. In his extensive review 
of how and when disgust is felt, Miller notes both the role of psychologi-
cal development (for example, children are not capable of experienc-
ing disgust until a certain age), and the impact of changing social norms 
and shifting cultural concepts of the disgusting. In particular, Miller is 
interested in the relations between emotions and moral, social, and po-
litical hierarchies. He sees emotions such as disgust, revulsion, or con-
tempt as central to the formation and existence of the social and political 
order.
Miller’s approach to disgust as a navigator of social hierarchies is 
echoed in the works of contemporary British cultural theorists. For ex-
ample, Ahmed discusses the work of disgust in the formation of colonial 
relations and knowledges, as well as in the context of contemporary rac-
32. William Ian Miller, The Anatomy of Disgust (Cambridge, Mass., 1997), 11.
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ism.33 Imogen Tyler and Beverly Skeggs address the role of disgust in the 
formations of class and gender.34 Tyler and Skeggs approach class not as 
a pregiven social structure but as a world of subjectivity that is constantly 
in the making. Tyler, for example, notes that class is “emotionally medi-
ated through repeated expressions of disgust at the habits and behavior 
of those deemed to belong to a lower social class.” 35
Disgust, in other words, maintains power relations and animates social 
hierarchies, such as those of class or race. It makes some bodies (or things) 
appear disgusting, while marking others as being disgusted by them. It is 
at the moment of experiencing disgust that social distinctions are both an-
nounced and reproduced. The question then becomes which social hier-
archies are constituted by the disgust and contempt that the former gulag 
prisoners experience toward same-sex relations? As I already noted in 
the introduction, most memoirs attribute same-sex relations solely to the 
criminal inmates; the distinction between humans and monsters, coupled 
with the distinction between “normal” heterosexual relations and “devi-
ant” homosexual ones, turns out to be a class distinction. By class I mean 
both the prisoner’s status (“political” prisoners, sentenced according to 
Article 58, as opposed to “criminal prisoners,” sentenced according to 
other articles of the Soviet Criminal Code) and whether or not they be-
long to the intelligentsia.36 The latter is less about one’s material status 
before arrest and imprisonment, and more about education and what 
Pierre Bourdieu referred to as cultural capital and habitus—embodied 
predispositions, knowledge, taste, and subjectivity.37 It is also, importantly, 
about morality and respectability, and these, as George Mosse reminds us, 
are closely tied to sexuality.38
When Ulanovskaia writes that “among the intelligentsia everything 
was hidden, masked, ambiguous,” she is referring to same-sex relations 
between female prisoners in the gulag.39 But among the intelligentsia, the 
idea of discreteness and invisibility characterizes the overall approach to 
sexuality and the body.40 Even when writing about heterosexual relations, 
the authors—and this is particularly true for women writers—frequently 
deploy euphemisms and focus on the spiritual, rather than the physical, 
33. Ahmed, Cultural Politics of Emotion.
34. Imogen Tyler, “Chav Scum: The Filthy Politics of Social Class in Contemporary 
Britain,” M/C Journal 9, no. 5 (November 2006), at journal.media-culture.org.au/0610/
09-tyler.php (last accessed 26 February 2009); Beverley Skeggs, Class, Self, Culture (Lon-
don, 2004).
35. Tyler, “Chav Scum.”
36. Article 58 of the Soviet Criminal Code was used for a variety of “anti-
revolutionary” or “anti-Soviet” activities. In addition, the camps had their own “class sys-
tem,” as several survivors have noted: this system distinguished between different lengths 
of imprisonment, the denial of rights of settlement, and other civil rights.
37. Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge, 
Eng., 1977).
38. George L. Mosse, Nationalism and Sexuality: Respectability and Abnormal Sexuality in 
Modern Europe (New York, 1985). See also Peterson, “Dirty Women.”
39. Ulanovskaia and Ulanovskaia, Istoriia odnoi semi, 250.
40. See Peterson, “Dirty Women.”






aspects of heterosexuality. Direct descriptions of sex are rare, and when 
they occur, they usually refer, not to the narrator, but to someone else. 
Veronica Shapovalov, the editor of Remembering the Darkness: Women in So-
viet Prisons, notes in the introduction to her collection that female survi-
vors tend to avoid the topic of sexuality when describing their lives: “Few 
women made sexuality a special theme in their memoirs—not only be-
cause it was not a traditional theme in Russian literary memoirs, but also 
because of the reluctance of women to talk and write about it or relive the 
experience.” 41
Shapovalov’s main emphasis here is on the traumatic nature of the 
gulag experiences; however, her reference to the literary canon brings up 
another important factor. In the Russian tradition, sex and the body are 
often juxtaposed to the idea of art and literature. Svetlana Boym in her 
discussion of literary erotics, for example, notes that writing about sex was 
often considered not only immoral but also distasteful.42 Silences about 
sexual relations among the intelligentsia should therefore be understood 
as a matter of aesthetics (which, in turn, is embedded in classed norms of 
respectability, kulturnost [culturedness], and “good taste”), and not only 
as a question of history and testimony.43
But descriptions of sexuality are only absent in the narratives about 
political prisoners. The presence of the criminal inmates in the texts is 
radically different: they are constructed as explicitly and disgustingly sex-
ual. This is as true for the instances of same-sex relations as it is for the 
relations between the sexes. For example, in the chapter dedicated to 
questions of love and sex, Ginzburg presents a moral dilemma faced by 
fellow women prisoners in Kolyma. Many of them became intimate with 
the criminal inmates.44 For some, it was a way to survive the hunger and 
the horriﬁ c conditions (sexual relations would be exchanged for food and 
41. Shapovalov, ed. and trans., Remembering the Darkness, 279.
42. Svetlana Boym, “Loving in Bad Taste: Eroticism and Literary Excess in Marina 
Tsvetaeva’s ‘The Tale of Sonechka,’ ” in Jane T. Costlow, Stephanie Sandler, and Judith 
Vowles, eds., Sexuality and the Body in Russian Culture (Stanford, 1993), 158.
43. The memoirists’ own silence is reinforced by editorial practices, not only samiz-
dat and tamizdat during the Soviet regime, but also post-Soviet ones. For example, in 
Shapovalov’s edited collection of women’s memoirs of Soviet camps, sexual relations be-
tween women are conﬁ ned to a single footnote. This is particularly surprising since one 
section of the book is devoted to sexuality. Shapovalov explains this absence by the lack 
of research on the topic. She then cites the memoir of V. R. Nikitina who describes the 
prostitutes she encountered in the camp in 1931—apparently the only example of les-
bian relations known to the author. The prostitutes mentioned by Nikitina had girlfriends 
whom they were protecting with knives. The second part of the editor’s long footnote 
takes an unexpected turn: she quotes extensively from Maiia Ulanovskaia, who mentions 
lesbian relations among both political and criminal women. The reader is left to wonder 
why Ulanovskaia has not been included in the collection. Her testimony should have been 
especially valuable for Shapovalov’s collection because of its rarity and openness, its un-
derstanding and compassion towards love among women, and its approach, almost unique 
among women memoirists of the gulag.
44. We ﬁ nd similar stories in Shapovalov’s collection. Most women describe sexual 
relations and partnerships with the criminals with reservation and shame; a notable ex-
ception is the story of Valentina Ievleva-Pavlenko, “Unedited Life,” in Shapovalov, ed. and 
trans., Remembering the Darkness, 317–53. Her narrative is structured as a series of love af-
fairs, passion, and friendship with various male prisoners, “political” as well as “criminal.”
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clothes); for others it was also about sexual desire.45 Yet others rejected 
any form of intimate relations in Kolyma, “since it is too easy to slip into 
prostitution pure and simple.” 46 Reﬂ ecting on the dilemmas these women 
faced, and on the horror of the conditions under which these choices 
were made, Ginzburg makes the following comment: “I should add that 
I am writing only of cases concerning women from the intelligentsia, im-
prisoned on political charges. The professional criminals are beyond the 
bounds of humanity. I have no desire to describe their orgies, although I 
had much to put up with as an involuntary witness.” 47
For Ginzburg, the distinction between the intelligentsia and the crimi-
nals is based on the juxtaposition of sexuality and morality. The criminals 
are associated with unruly, bestial sex and orgies; they do not experience 
moral dilemmas, on the contrary, they produce them (it is they who cre-
ate the conditions of prostitution). It is only within the context of im-
moral criminality that we encounter stories of same-sex relations in the 
camp. In Ginzburg’s memoirs, as well as in those written by Shalamov and 
Olitskaia, criminality and homosexuality are constantly positioned next to 
each other. The relations between the two are best described by Jakobson’s 
idea of metonymic substitution. In the memoirs, this substitution occurs 
on two levels. First, it occurs on the level of what Ahmed deﬁ nes as “met-
onymic sticking” through textual closeness (“Blatari are all pederasts,” “we 
met [the criminals] in the dining area . . . we were shocked by those . . . 
‘its’ ”). Second, the criminals and the prisoners engaged in same-sex rela-
tions (men with female names, “pederasts,” “kobly,” “its,” and “lesbians”) 
are connected at the level of the plot. It is this second level that I want to 
discuss in further detail.
Zoika, the lesbian, and the kobly appear in the book when Ginzburg 
describes a short time spent in one of most distant and most terrifying 
camps in Kolyma. She was sent there as a punishment for hiding and 
then destroying a letter that would have endangered many people if 
found. The camp, where Ginzburg was the only political prisoner, is de-
scribed as a shocking world where the people were “satyrs, Grand Guignol 
grotesques.” 48 “Izvestkovaya. The punishment center to end all punish-
ment centers. The isle of the damned,” is how Ginzburg begins her de-
scription of this camp, where she was miraculously saved from rape and 
death by a fellow prisoner, who managed to arrange a transfer for her to 
work with him.49 Ginzburg ﬁ rst describes Simka-the-killer, a violent and 
dangerous woman who looks like “an illustration from a psychiatry text-
book come to life,” then she presents the other women whom she treated 
when working at a camp hospital, among them “Zoika the lesbian” and the 
“hermaphrodite-like creatures,” already mentioned earlier.50
45. Ginzburg, Within the Whirlwind, 12–13.
46. Ginzburg, Within the Whirlwind, 12. Some women married former criminals after 
they were released and had settled in Kolyma. Having been denied the right to return to 
big cities and to their former lives, they settled and created new families there.










These humanoids lived a life of fantasy in which there was no distinc-
tion between night and day. Most of them never went out to work at all; 
they simply lay around all the time in their bunks. Those who did put in 
an appearance out of doors did so merely in order to light a campﬁ re, 
crouch around it, and bawl out ribald songs. . . . 
An enormous iron barrel glowed red hot. These ﬁ ends were con-
stantly boiling something or other on top of it, cavorting around the 
stove virtually naked.51
As Ginzburg depicts them, lesbian relations are part of the repulsive 
and horrifying world of retardation, violence, syphilis, alcohol, drugs, and 
orgies. This world is precisely what Ginzburg has “no desire to describe” 
when reﬂ ecting on the moral life of the women of the intelligentsia. But 
this world, importantly, is not simply sick or distorted. As Ginzburg pres-
ents it, it bears clear connotations of hell, and in particular, of the medi-
eval inferno, with its grotesque ugliness, potions, and demons dancing.52 
A captive witness of the monstrous, the author—like other women from 
the intelligentsia—sustains her humanness in a world that is beyond the 
borders of the human.
A similar connection between same-sex relations, criminality, sickness, 
and evil can be found in Shalamov’s Kolyma Tales. For example, in one of 
the stories, these relations are linked to venereal diseases. Both Ginzburg 
and Shalamov encounter the infected criminals while working in the gu-
lag hospitals; for both the disease also stands for moral decay.53
Male venereal zones were always the source from which the hospital ad-
mitted the criminals’ young “wives” [zhertvy] who had been infected with 
syphilis through the anus. Almost all the professional criminals were ho-
mosexuals [pederasts]. When no women were at hand, they seduced and 
infected other men—most frequently by threatening them with a knife, 
less frequently in exchange for “rags” (clothing) or bread.54
Homosexuality in Shalamov’s Tales is also described in conjunction 
with general cruelty. For example, Shalamov’s depiction of the blatari’s 
male victims in “Swindler’s Blood” is followed by a reference to the bla-
tari’s ruthless treatment of women. “It is difﬁ cult to imagine that a human 
can come up with something like that,” concludes Shalamov, “but the 
blatar has nothing human.” 55 It is important to emphasize that the actual 
sex between men is only mentioned in the context of being infected with 
syphilis. Yet the closeness of same-sex relations to the cruelty and to the 
various horrors of the criminal world is constant. And just as in Ginzburg’s 
text, these horrors are constituted as nonhuman and as infernal, while the 
51. Ibid., 102.
52. Metaphors of hell are not unique to Ginzburg and are common in many memoirs 
of the former political prisoners.
53. As Peterson notes, for Ginzburg and other women of her generation, the crimi-
nals are dirty inside and out; they are repulsive both physically and morally. Peterson, 
“Dirty Women,” 192.
54. Shalamov, “Women in the Criminal World,” 204 –5.
55. Shalamov, “Zhulnicheskaia krov,” 565.
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narrator’s survival depends on his or her moral and spiritual strength and 
the ability to confront the diabolic.
The motifs of the infernal, and more generally, the presence of reli-
gious associations in the Kolyma Tales, have been addressed at length by 
Leona Toker.56 For example, she notes the many references to the New 
Testament, as well as the images of sainthood and redemptions, as well as 
those of demons and hell. In Shalamov’s prose in particular the survival 
of the political prisoner in the criminal world is depicted as martyrdom, 
as an encounter between the divine and the diabolic. But the suffering 
and the survival here is not only, and not necessarily, about narrowly un-
derstood religiosity. Rather, it is about the spiritual experience, which for 
many prisoners was linked to literature, and to poetry in particular. In “A 
Day Off” Shalamov writes:
I know that everyone has something that is most precious to him, the 
last thing that he has left, and it is that something which helps him to live, 
to hang on to the life of which we were being so insistently and so stub-
bornly deprived. If for Zamiatin this was the liturgy of John the Baptist, 
than my last thing was verse—everything else has long since been forgot-
ten, cast aside, driven from memory. Only poetry had not been crushed 
by exhaustion, frost, hunger, and endless humiliations.57
Ginzburg echoes Shalamov when she writes that what saved her spirit 
on the long journey to the camp was the poetry that she kept reciting.58 
Both authors link the literary and the spiritual, the classed and the moral. 
What helps them or their protagonists survive is poetry, literature, or what 
Bourdieu would term cultural capital.59 Their personal endurance is trans-
formed into the survival of the whole intelligentsia. And their (classed) 
humanness is mediated by their experience—and their narration— of 
disgust.
The Impossible Boundary
For both Ginzburg and Shalamov, then, disgust functions as both the 
form and the sign of survival—classed, moral, and spiritual. It becomes 
an invisible barrier that guards the human in a world that has nothing 
human, and a conﬁ rmation that the human is still possible in the inhu-
mane condition. In this respect, we need to approach disgust not only 
as a feature of the subject—whether of the one who generates or of the 
one who experiences it—but as a boundary between the disgusting and 
56. Toker, Return from the Archipelago. See also Leona Toker, “A Tale Untold: Varlam 
Shalamov’s ‘A Day Off,’ ” Studies in Short Fiction 28, no. 1 (Winter 1991): 1– 8; and Leona 
Toker, “Varlam Shalamov’s Kolyma,” in Galya Diment and Yuri Slezkine, eds., Between 
Heaven and Hell: The Myth of Siberia in Russian Culture (New York, 1993), 151–70.
57. Shalamov, “A Day Off,” in Kolyma Tales, 110. Emphasis in the original.
58. “Beyond the turning the going became easier and our steps more rhythmical. 
At this pace I could recite poetry to myself, which is what I proceeded to do.” Ginzburg, 
Within the Whirlwind, 100.
59. Bourdieu, Outline of aTheory of Practice.






the disgusted. Ahmed, for example, deﬁ nes disgust as a fear of proximity, 
as an unwillingness to come close to the disgusting.60 Another feminist 
scholar, Elspeth Probyn, similarly notes that public statements designat-
ing something as disgusting are a way “to distance ourselves from the un-
comfortable proximity . . . to assuage doubts that we have not been con-
taminated, that we are not disgusting.” 61 But according to Ahmed, disgust 
is ambivalent: on the one hand, it can serve as a boundary between objects 
or subjects; on the other hand, it signals that the disgusting has already 
come too close and that these boundaries are already under threat.
Ahmed traces the ambivalence of disgust through her employment of 
Julia Kristeva’s notion of the abject.62 Kristeva notes that the abject is the 
horrifying and the unthinkable that threatens the boundaries of what is 
possible and tolerable. At ﬁ rst glance, one may see a striking resemblance 
between the notion of the abject and Douglas’s idea of pollution, where 
the “ﬁ lth” marks the limits of the acceptable. But Kristeva’s account of the 
abject is radically different. For her, the abject signals that the boundaries 
are already threatened, and the unthinkable has already become part of 
the subject:
It is no longer I who expel, “I” is expelled. The birder has become an ab-
ject. How can I be without border? That elsewhere that I imagine beyond 
the present, or that I hallucinate so that I might, in the present time, 
speak to you, conceive of you—it is now here, jetted, abjected, into “my” 
world. Deprived of world, therefore, I fall in a faint. In that compelling, 
raw, insolent thing in the morgue’s full sunlight, in that thing that no 
longer matches and therefore no longer signiﬁ es anything, I behold the 
breaking down of a world that has erased its borders: fainting away.63
According to Kristeva, any attempt to push away the disgusting—the 
abject—signals the closeness and the interconnectedness of the “I” and 
the disgusting. Taking Kristeva’s account of the subject into the social 
analysis of disgust, Ahmed suggests that “what threatens from outside only 
threatens insofar as it is already within. . . . It is not that the abject has got 
inside us; the abject turns us inside out, as well as outside in.” 64
The textual closeness and metonymic substitution of same-sex rela-
tions and criminality, outlined throughout this article, is crucial here. Male 
creatures with female names, pederasts, lesbians, and “its” are disgusting 
not only because of their appearance or behavior. Rather, they condense 
broader cultural anxieties regarding morality and class, anxieties that are 
reworked in the memoirs into angst about humanness. In this respect, the 
threat of same-sex relations that are “already within” is less about sexuality 
per se and more about the simultaneous importance of boundaries and 
the impossibility of sustaining them for the gulag survivors.
60. Ahmed, Cultural Politics of Emotion.
61. Elspeth Probyn, Carnal Appetites: FoodSexIdentities (London, 2000), 131.
62. Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, trans. Leon S. Roudiez (New 
York, 1982).
63. Ibid., 3 – 4.
64. Ahmed,Cultural Politics of Emotion, 86.
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Almost all memoirs of the former political prisoners, and especially 
those that refer to the Stalinist camps, address the close connection be-
tween moral and physical survival—“a topos in the literature of atroci-
ties in general and in concentration camps in particular,” according to 
Toker.65 Stories of survival in the memoirs are always linked to the break-
down or transgression of boundaries. This, however, does not mean that 
the boundaries disappear altogether. They are reworked, often incor-
porating the unthinkable into the everyday— or in Ahmed’s words, they 
show that the threatening is already within. For example, Ginzburg in her 
reﬂ ections on the intimate relations in the camps, already cited earlier, 
notes: “It is hard to describe the way in which someone ground down by 
inhumane forms of life loses bit by bit all hold on normal notions of good 
and evil, of what is permissible and what is not. Otherwise how else could 
there have been in the children’s home infants whose mother might have 
a diploma in philosophy, and whose father might be a well-known burglar 
from Rostov?” 66 The relations between an intellectual woman and a thief 
cross the lines of respectability and class; by doing so they seem to shake 
the very foundations of good and evil. What appears unthinkable here 
is the intimate contact between the criminal and the intelligentsia: not 
only a spatial proximity of the infernal world, but its actual penetration 
of—and growth within—the body.
While Ginzburg focuses on sexual contact, Shalamov presents an-
other form of physical contact between the criminal and the political 
prisoners—eating of tabooed food. In his “A Day Off” Shalamov describes 
two criminals who cold-heartedly butcher a puppy and prepare soup.67 
After their meal, they offer some of the soup left in the pot to the narrator. 
Having witnessed the slaughter of the puppy, the narrator refuses. The 
soup is then offered to Zamiatin who used to befriend the puppy. (Zamia-
tin is already familiar to the reader: the ﬁ rst part of the story describes an 
encounter between the narrator and Zamiatin who was praying and say-
ing the Sunday liturgy in the woods.)68 Unaware of its content, Zamiatin 
accepts the food. The criminals offer him the pot with the words, “Hey, 
Father! Have some mutton. Just wash out the pot when you are done.” 
When he learns the true nature of the soup, his body rejects the unaccept-
able food, literally, by vomiting:
Zamiatin came out of the darkness into the yellow light of the smok-
ing kerosene lantern, took the pot, and disappeared. Five minutes later 
he returned with a washed pot.
“So quick?” Semyon [one of the criminals] asked with interest. “You 
gobbled things down quick as a seagull. That wasn’t mutton, preacher, 
but dog meat. Remember the dog ‘North’ that used to visit you all 
the time?”
Zamiatin stared wordlessly at Semyon, turned around, and walked 
65. Toker, Return from the Archipelago, 153.
66. Ginzburg, Within the Whirlwind, 13.
67. The description of the puppy, licking the hand of its killer, has simultaneous as-
sociations with public execution, martyrdom, and religious sacriﬁ ce.
68. Shalamov, “A Day Off,” 110.






out. I followed him. Zamiatin was standing in the snow, just beyond the 
doors. He was vomiting. In the light of the moon his face seemed leaden. 
Sticky spittle was hanging from his blue lips. Zamiatin wiped his mouth 
with his sleeve and glared at me angrily.
“They are rotten,” I said.
“Of course,” Zamiatin replied. “But the meat was delicious—no 
worse than mutton.” 69
Toker extensively analyzed “A Day Off” in the context of the rela-
tions between moral and physical survival.70 She discusses at length the 
two seemingly distinct components of the story: the liturgy in the forest, 
and the scene with the soup. What particularly interests her is Shalamov’s 
poetics of collocating ﬁ ctionalized and factographic material: events, that 
in reality took place in different locations and with different people, are 
put together by “simulating the way things worked in the camp.” 71 Textual 
proximity allows Shalamov to explore the topic of survival through paral-
lels and comparisons, challenging the simplistic separation of the moral 
and the physical.
But what is no less interesting is the bodily proximity, forced on the po-
litical prisoner. The unacceptable penetrates the body—the food “tricks” 
its way inside the stomach, just as the bodies of the thieves get inside the 
bodies of the women—and turn them inside out, physically and meta-
phorically. Both Ginzburg’s and Shalamov’s narratives signal the ambiva-
lence of the unacceptable and the disgusting. It is attractive: Shalamov, 
for example, notes how the inmates could not sleep “because of the smell 
of the meat soup” and Zamiatin emphasizes how delicious the dog tasted, 
“no worse than mutton.” 72 Ginzburg mentions both the hunger and the 
women’s sexual desire. But at the same time it is also repulsive, disgusting, 
at times literally rejected by the body—as is the case for Zamiatin. Here 
is how Kristeva describes this ambivalence: “Loathing an item of food, a 
piece of ﬁ lth, waste or dung. The spasms and vomiting that protect me. 
The repugnance, the retching that thrusts me to the side and turns me 
away from deﬁ lement, sewage, and muck The shame of compromise, of 
being in the middle of treachery. The fascinated start that leads me toward 
and separates me from them.” 73
Babies in the children’s home born as a result of an unimaginable 
sexual liaison and dog soup, sickening and delicious at the same time, 
both demonstrate the complex interconnectedness of physical and moral 
survival. They illuminate the impossibility of maintaining the boundary 
between the criminals and the intelligentsia, between the human and the 
monstrous, and yet, for the survivors, they simultaneously signal the des-
perate need for such a boundary. It is this desperate need that leads to 
the passionate disgust deployed in the descriptions of same-sex relations 
in the camps by Ginzburg, Shalamov, and many other authors. For the 
69. Ibid., 111.
70. Toker, Return from the Archipelago, 152–55.
71. Ibid., 153.
72. Shalamov, “A Day Off,” 111.
73. Kristeva, Powers of Horror, 2.
S5106.indb   324 4/23/09   11:37:34 AM





intelligentsia, the inferno of the criminal world, and its horrifying forced 
closeness, are disgusting. It is not just the same-sex relations that are dis-
gusting. These relations, and the people involved in them, are only part 
of the inferno. But in the process of transforming memory into literature, 
they become the synecdoche of the camp experience. The “disgusting 
creatures” embody the horrors of the repressions and the camps and the 
sickening, but unavoidable, proximity of that which is “below the border 
of the human.”
Concluding Remarks: Rethinking Gulag Historiography
Disgust can be a quality of the object or subject that causes negative feel-
ings as well as a feature of the subject that feels it. In the memoirs, same-
sex relations among the criminals—explicit, visible, not silenced by shame 
nor restrained by codes of respectability—are constructed as disgusting 
because they go against gender norms and against class perceptions of 
sexual morality. These perceptions, embedded within the habitus of the 
intelligentsia, are transformed into the universal category of humanness. 
In Miller’s words, the memoirs served to humanize the disgusted political 
prisoners, locating the common criminals beyond the bounds of human-
ity.74 For the political prisoner, sent into the infernal world of the gulag, 
feeling disgust is more than simply humanizing. It was not just a form of 
protection, a light in the darkness, together with poetry. In the upside-
down world of the camps, where criminals were the rulers and the ex-
ecutioners and the country’s former elite was “the enemy of the people,” 
disgust provided a safe haven, or at least, the illusion thereof.75 The re-
petitive presence of disgust in the memoirs signals a desperate need to 
sustain boundaries of respectability and morality, which are not merely 
“vulnerable to disruption,” in Dollimore’s words, but are, more often than 
not, impossible.76
My analysis is of course limited in terms of the material presented 
here. Although my reading is informed by broader textual observations of 
the memoirs, I chose to zoom in on two authors, Shalamov and Ginzburg, 
both of whom describe a very particular time of imprisonment—the 1930s 
to the 1950s of the Stalinist terror—and also a very particular location, 
the Kolyma camps, considered one of the worst in terms of their condi-
tions. If we turn to other authors of gulag memoirs, we will ﬁ nd some 
striking resemblances, but also many individual differences of literary 
style and tone, of conditions of imprisonment, and of course of person-
alities and life trajectories. There are also notable differences between the 
memoirs of the 1930s–1950s, and those of the 1970s–1980s, both because 
the sentences became shorter and the conditions improved signiﬁ cantly, 
74. Miller, Anatomy of Disgust.
75. Tellingly, Lev Samoilov (Klein), a Soviet ethnologist and a former camp prisoner, 
who in the 1980s was sentenced to a criminal colony outside Leningrad on grounds of ho-
mosexuality, called his book on the criminal subculture A Journey to the Upside-Down World. 
Lev Samoilov, “Puteshestvie v perevernutyi mir,” Neva 4 (1989): 150– 64.
76. Dollimore, “Sexual Disgust,” 368.






and because the authors were often already informed by the writings of 
their famous predecessors (such as Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn). All these un-
doubtedly have their effect on the way same-sex relations are or may be 
narrated. Indeed, one of the aims of my larger project is to map discursive 
and affective formations of sexuality across the different memoirs, noting, 
for example, the shift from disgust and hatred to pity and compassion.77 
Such a shift, notable mainly in the later memoirs, is interesting because it 
offers a different ﬁ guration of sexuality, morality, and humanness, while 
often sustaining the distinction of class, in terms of both intelligentsia 
versus “common people” and political versus criminal inmates.
But the limited number of texts discussed in this article does not af-
fect my arguments regarding disgust and its role in cultural formations of 
sexuality and class. Ginzburg and Shalamov’s writings are (together with 
Solzhenitsyn’s The Gulag Archipelago) among the best known and the most 
inﬂ uential texts that constitute the post-Soviet cultural memory of the 
Stalinist terror. Drafts of these texts have been read since the 1960s and 
were initially distributed secretly through samizdat (later, the very act of 
possessing or distributing these texts could in itself become a reason for 
imprisonment). Some were ﬁ rst published in the west and became widely 
available only in the late 1980s. At that time, Soviet readers were ﬂ ooded 
with materials and memoirs of political terror; later, in the 1990s, these 
and many other gulag memoirs came out as books. For many readers 
the memoirs were received as the truth about the Soviet regime, shocking 
and particularly memorable because of the painful revelations of terror 
that they offered. Needless to say, these texts had a high moral author-
ity, both because of the suffering experienced by the political prisoners, 
and because the authors, following the traditions of Russian literature, 
presented their memoirs, not as private autobiographies and individual 
narratives, but as documents of transcendental historical signiﬁ cance. 
And ﬁ nally, the memoirs were seen as the true history, juxtaposed to the 
lies, silences, and distortions that had constituted ofﬁ cial Soviet historiog-
raphy. The status of these memoirs as true testimony and as the “real 
history” metonymically granted them unquestioned authority about the 
other issues described by the survivors. Among them were same-sex re-
lations, which for the memoirs’ authors—and later for their readers—
became forever linked to criminality, violence, and monstrosity. There-
fore the gulag memoirs—and the writings of Ginzburg and Shalamov ﬁ rst 
and foremost—have been a formative inﬂ uence on the intelligentsia’s 
perceptions of morality and humanness since the 1960s. And although 
the memoirs were not the only source of the criminalization of same-sex 
relations in the public imagination, they are one of the main grounds 
for the persistent connection between same-sex relations, low classness, 
criminality, and monstrosity.78
77. Two notable examples of such a shift are Igor Guberman, Progulki vokrug baraka: 
Roman (Moscow, 1993) and Inna Ratushinskaia, Grey Is the Color of Hope, trans. Alyona Ko-
jevnikov (New York, 1988). Both refer to the camps of the early 1980s.
78. Some papers and magazines of the 1980s and early 1990s, for example, offered 
accounts of same-sex abuse in male as well as female prisons.
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At the same time, occasional references to same-sex relations among 
the political prisoners—for example, in Ulanovskaia’s memoir, in the in-
terviews with former prisoners collected by Zhuk, or in some later mem-
oirs such as Aleksandr Gidoni’s—demonstrate that sexuality, intimacy, and 
love existed among men and women of all groups and were not necessarily 
linked to violence, sickness, or crime.79 The interviews collected by Zhuk 
and the detailed historical research conducted by Dan Healey suggest that 
same-sex relations in the camps were not always forced and that ties of 
love and attachment sometimes continued for years after imprisonment.80 
And yet, these relations never made their way into the collective memory. 
Similarly, neither the criminalization of homosexuality since Iosif Stalin 
outlawed it in 1933 nor the repression of Soviet homosexuals since then 
received any attention from Soviet dissidents. In the 1990s, Russian poet 
and journalist Gennadii Trifonov noted bitterly, “No one ever counted 
the number of victims of the criminal persecution of homosexuals in the 
Soviet Union. Even the Soviet human rights activists of the stagnation pe-
riod never did and never tried to address this problem.” 81 Earlier, Michel 
Foucault made a similar remark about the dissidents’ silence regarding 
the repression of homosexuals and about sexuality more generally, as Jan 
Plamper describes in his “Foucault’s Gulag.” 82
But it is not just the evidence of same-sex relations or the commemo-
ration of homosexual victimhood that I am looking for here. I am not 
suggesting that gulag historiography has to “uncover a hidden history” 
of gulag sexualities in order to allow their remembrance. I am well aware 
of the epistemological limitations of such a task: most accounts of same-
sex relations can be found either in Soviet penology or in the memoirs 
of the former political prisoners;83 stories of same-sex love among the 
imprisoned intelligentsia are mostly silenced; and the former criminal 
inmates of the 1930s–1980s have access to neither the literary cultural 
capital and the habitus of writing memoirs, nor the historical and moral 
authority of the political survivors. To some extent, prisoners engaged in 
same-sex relations—whether they were classiﬁ ed as politicals or common 
criminals—can be described as what Avery Gordon calls “lost subjects of 
history.” 84 Their existence cannot be documented—it is covered by lay-
ers of silence or by narratives of dehumanization—but their absent pres-
79. Aleksandr Gidoni, Solntse idet s zapada: Kniga vospominanii (Toronto, 1980).
80. Healey’s pioneering work on the history of homosexuality and lesbianism in the 
early Soviet period and his particular emphasis on the role of the gulag and the clinic as 
two sites where same-sex relations were contained begs for a much needed continuation 
into the late Soviet decades. See Healey, Homosexual Desire in Revolutionary Russia. Zhuk’s 
Russkie amazonki is yet to be translated into English.
81. Gennadii Trifonov, “Sovetskie gomoseksualisty: Vchera, segodnia, zavtra,” at 
az.gay.ru/articles/articles/slav1c.html (last accessed 26 February 2009).
82. Jan Plamper, “Foucault’s Gulag,” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian His-
tory 3, no. 2 (Spring 2002): 267.
83. Notably, the two sometimes intersect: former political prisoners became authors 
of academic articles on the “criminal subculture.”
84. Avery F. Gordon, Ghostly Matters: Haunting and the Sociological Imagination (Min-
neapolis, 1997), 195.






ences in the past haunts the present, reappearing, like a shadow, at the 
most unexpected moments (such as a debate about Pride Parades among 
post-Soviet émigrés of 2000s).
So the path I would like to suggest for rethinking gulag historio-
graphy is a well-trodden one, albeit not in the emotions key: we must be 
more attentive to the ways the past is constituted through literature; to 
what is forgotten or overlooked as either unimportant or undeserving 
of attention. We must remember that the memoirs, as Toker and Beth 
Holmgren emphasize, are not neutral historical documents but rather a 
literary corpus, with their particular narrative traditions and their own aes-
thetics of silencing and exposure.85 And gulag scholarship as a ﬁ eld must 
face its own lacunae, provide a more careful and informed reading of the 
memoirs’ silences, and question the very formations of humanness in the 
memoirs. Unpacking the relations between sexuality, class, and human-
ness is central here, for it is the category of the human that constitutes 
historical subjecthood, a life worth understanding and remembering. My 
analysis of the work of disgust is one modest contribution to this impor-
tant endeavor.
85. Holmgren, “Introduction.”






Each of these rich essays is framed as the discussion of a speciﬁ c emotion 
or emotional attitude—the “perception of emotional coldness” (Andrei 
Zorin), “fear” ( Jan Plamper), “disgust” (Olga Matich and Adi Kuntsman). 
But these authors offer us both much less and much more. Less, because 
individual emotions cannot really have their own history, independent of 
the kinds of self or emotional styles that emerge in given periods. More, 
because each essay opens up to these broader, interdependent conﬁ gura-
tions of self and emotion, creating a window on a complex landscape of 
emotional change. Zorin’s study of Andrei Turgenev provides a glimpse of 
the transition from an eighteenth- to an early nineteenth-century emo-
tional regime. Plamper’s examination of the emergence of military psy-
chology traces the development of a late nineteenth-century social sci-
ence of the “psyche.” Olga Matich explores the somatic anxieties of an 
early twentieth-century novelist, reminiscent of a whole strain of troubled 
and troubling early twentieth-century reﬂ ection. Adi Kuntsman probes 
the powerlessness of victims of Stalinist-era labor camps, whose sufferings 
resemble those of millions of others caught in modernist state projects 
aimed at administering mass emotions.
As these essays themselves remind us, emotion words are notoriously 
vague, with multiple near-synonyms and overlapping meanings. Although 
the emotional vocabularies of western languages display many similarities, 
and words with shared etymologies, nonetheless translation among them 
is never easy and often hazardous. Distinctions between English terms 
that seem important to some (such as between feeling and emotion) have 
no equivalents in other languages; French sentiment does not mean quite 
the same thing as German Empﬁ ndsamkeit. Ennui does not mean boredom. 
Attempts by experimental psychologists to identify simple emotions have 
failed. Research has instead stumbled on new phenomena, such as stress 
and trauma, that correspond to no term in the traditional vocabulary, 
or the ﬁ ght-ﬂ ight response that corresponds both to rage and to panic. 
Everyday emotions such as love, grief, admiration, or envy defy identiﬁ ca-
tion even in the most sophisticated brain scans.1
1. See, for example, Seth Duncan and Lisa Feldman Barret, “Affect Is a Form of Cog-
nition: A Neurobiological Analysis,” Cognition and Emotion 21, no. 6 (2007): 1184 –1211; 
Tanya L. Chartrand, William W. Maddux, and Jessica L. Lakin, “Beyond the Perception-
Behavior Link: The Ubiquitous Utility and Motivational Moderators of Nonconscious 
Mimicry,” in Ran R. Hassin, James S. Uleman, and John A. Bargh, eds., The New Uncon-
scious (Oxford, 2005), 334 – 61; Richard J. Davidson, Daren C. Jackson, and Ned H. Kalin, 
“Emotion, Plasticity, Context, and Regulation: Perspectives from Affective Neuroscience,” 
Psychological Bulletin 126, no. 6 (2000): 890–909; James A. Russell, “Core Affect and the 
Psychological Construction of Emotion,” Psychological Review 110, no. 3 (2003): 145–72; 
S. J. Lupien, F. Maheu, M. Tu, A. Fiocco, and T. E. Schramek, “The Effects of Stress and 
Stress Hormones on Human Cognition: Implications for the Field of Brain and Cogni-
tion,” Brain and Cognition 65, no. 3 (2007): 209–37; Benjamin D. Sachs, “A Contextual 
Slavic Review 68, no. 2 (Summer 2009)






Ethnographic research reveals that the vague, overlapping character 
of emotion terms is common to all the languages so far studied. The do-
main of emotions is variously deﬁ ned and its boundaries variously drawn. 
Yet something roughly equivalent to emotion is always found. Emotion 
terms are useful because situations are complicated and dynamic. If I say, 
“I am afraid of ﬂ ying,” I indicate a general motivational orientation. In a 
given circumstance I may in fact take a plane; I may take planes frequently. 
But such a statement allows others to anticipate tendencies, preferences 
that may under some circumstances determine choices. We are only par-
tially known to ourselves, as well. If I say, “I love you,” I may be trying it 
out to see if it works. If I say, “Have a nice day,” I may be actively managing 
my mood, hoping to keep it cheerful. In widely varying cultural contexts, 
local practices include schemas for performing approved emotions, emo-
tional rituals, emotional ideals—such as Stoic apatheia (absence of feel-
ing), Balinese mue cedang (the bright face), or siniligur (even tempered-
ness) in the language of the Faeroe Island—and penalties for emotions 
that are not approved. Emotional experience is thus always in a state of 
becoming, in twilight at the edges, tinged with uncertainty, partially con-
forming to community standards, partially at odds. And it is always of great 
political signiﬁ cance.2
We are beginning to glimpse the long-term chronology of European 
emotional history.3 Each of these essays contributes to this project. The 
late eighteenth-century sentimentalist craze—signaled by the success of 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Confessions, Wolfgang von Goethe’s Werther, Ber-
nardin de Saint-Pierre’s Paul et Virginie, among other bestsellers—burned 
itself out in the early 1790s, as revolution and terror reawakened doubts 
about the human capacity for virtue. As the dawn of a new era loomed, 
the last sentimentalist generation poured out their souls in letters and 
journals; they shed sincere tears before canvases by Jacques-Louis David 
and operas by Christoph Willibald von Gluck. They were enthralled with 
Friedrich Gottlieb Klopstock’s poems for his dead wife.4 Germaine de Staël 
greeted each new love in her life with professions of absolute and undy-
ing devotion. Between 1796 and 1806 Berlin lawyer Ferdinande Beneke 
mentioned in his journal twelve different women who stirred feelings of 
Deﬁ nition of Male Sexual Arousal,” Hormones and Behavior 51, no. 5 (2007): 569–78; Cyn-
thia A. Graham, Stephanie A. Sanders, Robin R. Milhausen, and Kimberly R. McBride, 
“Turning On and Turning Off: A Focus Group Study of the Factors That Affect Women’s 
Sexual Arousal,” Archives of Sexual Behavior 33, no. 6 (December 2004): 527–38; Serge Sto-
leru, Marie-Claude Gregoire, Nicolas Costes, Luc Cinotti, Frank Lavenne, Didier Le Bars, 
Maguelone G. Forest, and Jean-François Pujol, “Brain Processing of Visual Sexual Stimuli 
in Human Males.” Human Brain Mapping 11, no. 3 (2000): 162–77.
2. For reviews, see William M. Reddy, “Emotional Styles and Modern Forms of Life,” 
in Nicole Karafyllis and Gotlind Ulshöfer, eds., Sexualized Brains: Scientiﬁ c Modeling of Emo-
tional Intelligence from a Cultural Perspective (Cambridge, Mass., 2008), 81–100.
3. This is discussed in further detail in William M. Reddy, “Historical Research on the 
Self and Emotions,” Emotion Review (2009).
4. Elke-Maria Clauss, Liebeskunst: Untersuchungen zum Liebesbrief im 18. Jahrhundert 
(Stuttgart, 1993).






love in him. Too poor to marry without a dowry, he moved on, not without 
scars, especially when one of them, Charlotte Kramer-Chaupié, accepted 
the hand of Beneke’s best friend in 1804.5 Beneke’s experiences were not 
uncommon. The difﬁ cult, painful pursuit of love marriages preoccupied 
many and inspired voluminous letters and journal entries in those years, 
as studies by Amanda Vickery, Anne-Charlott Trepp, and Rebekka Haber-
mas show.6 Doubt about one’s own feelings was common. There were also 
conﬁ rmed doubters like Melchior Grimm or Suzanne Necker, who found 
the younger generation to be intolerably self-absorbed and feared they 
were also shallow.7 But Andrei Turgenev’s doubts went deeper than most. 
He seemed on the verge of grasping Friedrich Schiller’s notion that in-
tense emotions did not have to be virtuous; this idea foreshadowed the 
reconﬁ guration of emotional experience in Romanticism, as a realm of 
sublime engagement that existed for its own sake, detached from the ev-
eryday.8 So also did Turgenev’s fear of marriage. Only a Romantic, a Byron 
or a Marie d’Agoult, would have viewed the love and comfort of married 
life as opposed to artistic inspiration. But Turgenev proved himself to be 
a sentimentalist in his self-searching torment over Ekaterina Sokovnina; 
only a sentimentalist could have become so distraught over “this burden-
some coldness of the soul.” It is as if Turgenev were both Clarissa and 
Lovelace rolled into one.
Nineteenth-century normative attitudes towards emotions broke 
sharply with those of the eighteenth. Reason and cool self-possession 
again came into vogue. Human nature was, as in the Reformation, con-
demned as prone to illusion and inconstancy— only now on scientiﬁ c 
rather than religious grounds. Thomas Malthus, François Guizot, G. W. F. 
Hegel, and others offered new reasons to trust in authority and the rule of 
law. As philology, history, and political economy strove for scientiﬁ c rigor, 
psychiatrists began advancing the medicalization of human sexuality and 
emotional experience. By Charles Darwin’s time, it was difﬁ cult for edu-
cated Europeans to see themselves in other than a diagnostic mode. Emo-
tions were problems; they were symptoms or causes of conditions with 
etiologies and possible cures. Plamper tracks the impact of this develop-
ing psychiatric framework on military thinking in Russia. This is a highly 
original project that promises a new, deeper understanding of the impact 
of World War I. Russia confronted the new kind of warfare more intensely 
and earlier than other nations. Mechanized weaponry killed heroes and 
cowards with equal efﬁ ciency; most deaths were inﬂ icted by anonymous 
5. Beneke’s case is discussed in Anne-Charlott Trepp, Sanfte Männlichkeit und selb-
ständige Weiblichkeit: Frauen und Männer im Hamburger Bürgertum zwischen 1770 und 1840 
(Göttingen, 1996).
6. Trepp, Sanfte Männlichkeit; Amanda Vickery, The Gentleman’s Daughter: Women’s Lives 
in Georgian England (New Haven, 1998); Rebekka Habermas, Frauen und Männer des Bürger-
tums: Eine Familiengeschichte (1750 –1850) (Göttingen, 2000).
7. William M. Reddy, The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions 
(Cambridge, Eng., 2001), 151, 163.
8. Ibid., 354 – 430.






shell fragments. Military psychology was ready with a new vocabulary of 
fear that gave voice to the soldier’s sense of helplessness, as well as with 
diagnoses and treatments.
In literature and the arts, the diagnostic mode won some over and 
inspired others to seek to transcend it. In works by George Bernard Shaw, 
Thomas Mann, or Marcel Proust, characters appear to be dominated by 
their inescapable limitations and perceptual errors. But another set of 
artists and thinkers, including Henrik Ibsen, Friedrich Nietzsche, Lou 
Andreas-Salomé, Rainer Maria Rilke, August Rodin, Colette, Igor Stravin-
sky, rebelled against the strict standards and the diagnoses, insisting that 
joy could be found in transgression and that the psyche could generate its 
own satisfying new mythologies.9 In this context, Andrei Belyi’s Petersburg 
looks forward to surrealism, as Matich suggests. Neither diagnostician nor 
rebel, Belyi plunges the reader into a world of pathological fantasy that 
seems to have no borders or purpose. Not only are the characters’ plans 
and actions undercut by their gruesome results, but there seems to be no 
safe ground from which an onlooker could diagnose or correct. Was Belyi 
already sufﬁ ciently aware of World War I’s likely effects to anticipate them? 
That seems hardly possible. Instead, both Matich’s and Plamper’s papers 
reveal a Russia that is hardly a follower or taker in relation to western Eu-
ropean cultural change and appears several steps ahead.
In relation to avant-garde projects of moral liberation of the prewar 
period, such as those of the Pankhurst sisters or Magnus Hirschfeld, the 
Soviet regime, like the fascist regimes, preserved some ideas, but rejected 
many others.10 There was no return to repressive Victorian self-discipline, 
although, as Plamper suggests, certain interwar regimes relied on an older 
“romantic” view of fear. Through the massive deployment of coercive vio-
lence, and the universal fear it generated, governments sought to shore 
up unlimited dedication and heroism. As Modris Ecksteins suggests, this 
revaluation of fear may have stemmed from the trench warfare experi-
ences of veterans as much as antiwar sentiment did.11 Without suggest-
ing that “totalitarian” regimes were all of a piece, one can recognize that 
9. Rudolph Binion, “Fiction as Social Fantasy: Europe’s Domestic Crisis of 1879–1914,” 
Journal of Social History 27, no. 4 (Summer 1994): 679–99; Rudolph Binion, Frau Lou: Ni-
etzsche’s Wayward Disciple (Princeton, 1968); Linde Salber, Lou Andreas-Salomé (Reinbek bei 
Hamburg, 1990); Biddy Martin, Woman and Modernity: The (Life)Styles of Lou Andreas-Salomé 
(Ithaca, 1991); Ralph Freedman, Life of a Poet: Rainer Maria Rilke (Evanston, 1996); J. Adolf 
Schmoll gen. Eisenwerth, Auguste Rodin and Camille Claudel, trans. John Ormrod (Munich, 
1994); Julia Kristeva, Colette, trans. Jane Marie Todd (New York, 2004); Linda Kraus Worley, 
“Girls from Good Families: Tony Buddenbrook and Agathe Heidling,” German Quarterly 
76, no. 2 (Spring 2003): 195–211; Kerry Powell, “New Women, New Plays, and Shaw in 
the 1890s,” in Christopher D. Innes, ed., The Cambridge Companion to George Bernard Shaw 
(Cambridge, Eng., 1998), 76 –100.
10. On Nazi appropriation of Weimar themes of sexual liberation, see Dagmar Her-
zog, “Hubris and Hypocrisy, Incitement and Disavowal: Sexuality and German Fascism,” 
Journal of the History of Sexuality 11, nos. 1–2 ( January–April 2002): 3 –21.
11. Modris Ecksteins, Rites of Spring: The Great War and the Birth of the Modern Age 
(Boston, 1989).






Bolsheviks and fascists shared a moment in emotional history. Along with 
fear, they used obligatory pageantry and ceremony, disseminated through 
the mass media, to shape normative enthusiasm, unending optimism, un-
qualiﬁ ed commitment. These governments needed little from the popu-
lations they rounded up and conﬁ ned in camps, only that rumors of their 
fates be sufﬁ ciently frightening.
The conditions described in Kuntsman’s essay—systematic depriva-
tion, conﬁ nement, and neglect—differ sharply from those instituted by, 
for example, the French during the Battle of Algiers or the Argentine mil-
itary during its dirty war.12 In those latter cases, forms of torture, includ-
ing systematic humiliation and the careful staging of pain (so that others 
could see or hear), were aimed at breaking down resistance and forcing 
revelations. The Soviet gulags, in contrast, arranged a kind of social death, 
in which the social distinctions crucial to the identities of many detain-
ees were systematically eroded. Disgust could become, in this context, an 
instrument for preserving a sense of self, a way to reassert a social iden-
tity in the face of threatening social death, a desperate gambit aimed at 
revivifying one’s sense of who one was. At the same time, the word disgust 
hardly begins to capture the range of emotions, of despair, defeat, viola-
tion, anxiety, that Kuntsman ﬁ nds in the texts under consideration, sug-
gesting that disgust was hardly enough to protect victims from the acidic 
effects of their internment. One wonders if a certain kind of trauma could 
be identiﬁ ed among the survivors, not one of combat with arms, but one 
stemming from combat for self. This possibility in turn suggests the need 
to better understand the systematic humiliation that individuals at the low 
end of the social order both routinely suffer and inﬂ ict on each other, in 
“normal” liberal societies.
In short, these essays shed precious new light on an emerging terrain, 
and, by their careful interpretive work, point to important connections 
and chronological twists. They share a method: a close reading of texts 
inspired by a conviction that texts can partially reveal personal experi-
ence. Unlike earlier efforts at psychohistory or psychological biography, 
however, these papers need not rely on a speciﬁ c psychoanalytic or psy-
chotherapeutic theory to ﬁ nd meaning in personal experience. Having 
gone through and beyond poststructuralism, historians are now capable 
of historicizing such theories and the selves that human beings “fashion” 
or, rather, with effort, “manage.”
As Plamper notes, historians of emotion can now begin to search for 
possible causal explanations of emotional change. As I have suggested 
elsewhere, one possible cause can be found in an interaction between 
prevailing conceptions of the self and the emotional styles these concep-
tions dictate, on the one hand, and the fate of these styles when put into 
12. See, e.g., Raphaëlle Branche, La torture et l’armée pendant la Guerre d’Algérie: 1954 –
1962 (Paris, 2001); Talal Asad, “On Torture, or Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treat-
ment,” in Arthur Kleinman, Veena Das, and Margaret Lock, eds., Social Suffering (Berkeley, 
1997), 285–308.






practice. Human emotions cannot be pushed too far; they are inherently 
vague and unresolved, because they are about orientations, not decisions. 
One cannot be perfectly sensible, perfectly rational, perfectly enthusiastic, 
perfectly sincere, perfectly healthy.13 When a government, a family, an in-
stitution, in a moment of crisis, tries to walk on water, it sinks. And when 
an individual tries to preserve an intact sense of self in radically altered 
circumstances, she or he will certainly fail, at least partially.
13. Reddy, Navigation of Feeling.
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